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Summary 
 
Science is generally not thought of as being deeply historiographical.  Although it is clear 
that scientists frequently write about history in their work—that, for example, they 
identify the significance of an advance by situating it historically, or refer to a historic 
source of authority in order to add legitimacy to a position—it is often supposed that the 
historical claims of scientists are incidental to the scientific.  This thesis contests basic 
assumptions of this view.  In a study of the textbooks of twentieth century Anglo-
American genetics—of a place where the canon of a science is consolidated, as the 
heterogeneous approaches and controversies of its practice are rendered unified for its 
reproduction—I develop a novel taxonomy of the forms in which history can be written, 
and of the scientific functions that they can serve.  Progressing from an analysis of 
narrative historical accounts, to latent and embedded formulations of the past, I 
demonstrate the ways in which geneticists used history-writing in the disciplining of the 
foundations, future practitioners, conceptual order, and boundaries of their science.  
 
After an introductory chapter identifying some of the ways in which the textbooks and 
historical accounts of a science may be contributory, rather than intellectually external 
and temporally subsequent, to its formation and development, I advance the central 
argument of this thesis in four chapters.  Each examines a different form of history-
writing.  In the first, I explore the disciplining of the foundations of genetics, with a study 
of the explicit, narrative histories of hereditary science that were written in three 
important first-generation genetics textbooks.  Identifying radical differences in their 
accounts of the same nineteenth-century figures, experiments and theories, I argue that 
these different ways of consolidating history were connected to fundamentally different 
ideas of the conceptual foundations of the science, and that they were used to advance 
divergent visions of the science’s future.  I then look at the historical case-based and 
problem-solving method of teaching that was developed in the 1920s-1940s to convey the 
science of genetics.  I argue that this method created “virtual historical environments” that 
allowed students to learn and practice not only the principles that were studied by 
geneticists and were explicitly taught as rules in the text, but also the tacit skills needed to 
follow, find, and understand these rules.  Here, history was used in the disciplining of the 
mind of the student.  In the third chapter, I look at the “standard historical approach” to 
teaching in the 1930s-1950s, exploring the establishment of this approach, the functions 
and consequences of literary devices on which it relied, and the ways in which the 
meaning of facts and theories were shaped within it.   My central contention is that a 
notion of history was constitutive of the organizational logic, narrative structure, and 
inner rationality of textbook genetics, thereby performing a powerful function in the 
disciplining of the conceptual order of the science.  The fourth chapter explores the sense 
of history embodied in the use of the concept of “classical genetics” in textbooks of the 
1960s-1970s.  Tracing the semantic development of “classical” from its first uses in the 
1920s, I argue that this term was a politically powerful concept in the language of 
geneticists: at first used to define and establish sources of scientific authority, it was 
subsequently developed in arguments about the philosophical and ideological character of 
genetics, and eventually served to establish the disciplinary identity and boundaries of the 
science.  By differentiating these various uses of “classical,” I show that the disciplinary 
power of this term—which is derived from the authority of history—relied on the 
effacement of its historicity and the situations in which it was created and deployed.  
 
With this thesis, I push the boundaries on common conceptions of what is involved in, 
and what should be counted as, the “history” and “writing” of history-writing.  Advancing 
a novel taxonomy of the forms in which the historical can appear, I provide a starting 
point for further historiographical research on the subtle yet powerful ways in which the 
historicity of our past can make claims upon us.  
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 1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Textbooks and Histories in Science 
 
 
 
Science is not often thought of as being deeply historiographical.  Although scientists 
would acknowledge that they write about history in their work—that, for example, they 
identify the significance of an advance by situating it historically, or refer to a historic 
source of authority in order to add legitimacy to a position—most would also contend 
that their history-writing is incidental to their scientific claims.  And non-scientists would 
often agree.  It would appear to many that the historical claims in scientific writing are 
constitutive not of the science itself, but of the narratives used to explain the science; on 
this view, history is a frame in which scientific claims are presented, and from which 
they can be removed.  Some may also suggest that the historical claims of scientists 
extend only insofar as current scientific problems require and that they are not, therefore, 
actually statements about the past and should not be counted as history-writing.  In this 
thesis, I challenge this strong differentiation of the historical from the scientific and the 
assumptions about history-writing on which it is based.  In a study of the textbooks of 
twentieth century Anglo-American genetics—of a place where the canon of the science 
was consolidated, as the heterogeneous approaches and controversies of its practice were 
rendered unified for its reproduction—I develop a novel taxonomy of the forms in which 
history can be written, and of the scientific functions that they can serve.  Progressing 
from an analysis of narrative historical accounts, to latent and embedded formulations of 
the past, I demonstrate the ways in which geneticists used history-writing in the 
disciplining of the foundations, future practitioners, conceptual order, and boundaries of 
their science.  
 
 
 
 2 
The Functions and Characteristics of University Science Textbooks 
 
Placing textbooks at the center of my analysis, I work against a common hierarchical 
ordering of historical sources, suggesting that written work should not be valued less than 
experimental practices, nor published writing less than laboratory notes, nor textbooks 
less than journal articles.1  Although textbooks may appear to be removed from, and 
unrepresentative of, the practice of the science that is presented within their pages, this 
appearance is the result of an inadequate picture of the work done by their authors.  
Textbooks are not passive representations of a science that exists elsewhere, but rather 
interpretations that shape the science as they present it; it is in their pages that disparate 
scientific practices and theories are brought together and presented as being a coherent 
science for the first time.  Thus textbooks are not simple artifacts of a science, but rather 
heterogeneous tools, and they should be analyzed as processes, not objects.  A textbook 
must be understood in terms of the numerous places in which it is used, for in each of 
them its salient features and functions are created or reformed.  What a textbook is and 
does depends on whether it is in the hands of students, reviewers, practitioners, non-
scientists, or somewhere in-between.2   
In the hands of students textbooks are, according to Thomas Kuhn, “pedagogical 
vehicles for the perpetuation of normal science.”3  They discipline the student’s 
conceptual orientation, method of investigation, and sense of history.  Suggesting that 
textbooks cannot separate facts from methods of investigation, Kuhn writes: “I suspect 
that students will learn both together as samples of accepted achievement, which is only 
                                                
1 As discussed in G. Myers, Writing Biology: Texts in the Social Construction of Scientific Knowledge 
(London: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1990), 5, it has been suggested that textual analysis fails to 
get at the heart of scientific practice:  see, e.g., B. Latour, Science in Action: How to Follow Scientists and 
Engineers through Society (Milton Keynes: Open University Press, 1987), 61; M. Lynch, Art and Artifact 
in Laboratory Science: A Study in Shop Work and Shop Talk in a Research Laboratory (London: 
Routledge, 1985), 143-154; and H. Collins, Changing Order: Replication and Induction in Scientific 
Practice (London: Sage, 1985), 73.  For a discussion of the value of textual analysis in the study of 
scientific practice, see the first chapter of Writing Biology, “Controversies about Scientific Texts.”  A 
general case for the study of textbooks is made in J. Issitt, "Reflections on the Study of Textbooks," 
History of Education 33 (2004).  
2 NB: Unless otherwise stated, my claims about “textbooks” throughout this dissertation should be read as 
referring to university science textbooks that would have been identified by their authors in these terms—a 
definition that excludes many of the written works that have been used in teaching science, especially prior 
to the twentieth century.  For a general discussion of the category “textbooks,” see Issitt, "Reflections on 
the Study of Textbooks," 684-687.  
3 T. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 2nd ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970), 
137.  
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to say that I suspect they will learn paradigms.”4  In Kuhn’s discussion of the dogma-
enforcing functions of textbooks, he notes an interesting asymmetry between the 
pedagogical literature of the sciences and that of the humanities: whereas introductory 
university science is generally taught with textbooks that are written for students, 
introductory courses in many of the humanities are taught using articles and monographs 
that are produced by and for practitioners of the discipline.  A student in an introductory 
course on European history, for example, will generally not read a textbook, but rather 
the seminal works that have been written by historians of Europe.5  Because of this 
asymmetry and the homogeneity of science textbooks, the books that compete for use in 
a science course differ primarily in level and detail, whereas those that compete for use in 
a humanities course differ in terms of approach, substance, and conceptual structure.6  It 
is for this reason that textbook science can perform powerful dogma-enforcing functions, 
according to Kuhn.  It has been suggested, however, that Kuhn’s account of the functions 
of textbooks places too much emphasis on the relationship between the textbook and the 
psychology of the student.  Greg Myers, for example, has argued that because most 
scientists will eventually reappraise the textbook knowledge they have learned, textbooks 
cannot perform these dogma-enforcing and psychology-forming functions and thus, “If 
textbooks are still important, it cannot be on the kinds of psychological grounds offered 
by Kuhn.”7  In drawing this conclusion, it seems to me that Myers goes too far; for 
although a scientist can certainly reevaluate the information contained within the 
textbook that introduced him to his subject, it does not follow that he can completely 
overcome the early conditioning of his scientific mind.  However, Myers’ criticism does 
rightly point to a significant limitation in any interpretation of textbooks that focuses 
solely on their role in the beginning of the life of a scientist.  
In addition to performing key pedagogical functions, textbooks play an important 
role in the literature of a science, shaping the development of its conceptual order.  They 
                                                
4 T. Kuhn, "Discussion," in Scientific Change, ed. A. C. Crombie (London: Heinemann, 1963), 391. 
5 T. Kuhn, "The Function of Dogma in Scientific Research," in Scientific Change, ed. A. C. Crombie 
(London: Heinemann, 1963), 350: “Perhaps the most striking feature of scientific education is that, to an 
extent quite unknown in other creative fields, it is conducted through textbooks, works written especially 
for students.” 
6 Ibid., 350-351. 
7 G. Myers, "Textbooks and the Sociology of Scientific Knowledge," English for Specific Purposes 11 
(1992): 6.  
 4 
are not just repositories into which established and distilled journal science is 
downloaded, but rather sites of production.  This often unrecognized aspect of the 
textbook’s place and function has been identified in the model of science proposed by 
Ludwik Fleck, who suggests that scientific ideas and facts are conceived and developed 
in four types of literature, each of which is used by a different part of the “thought 
collective.”  For those students being initiated into the esoteric circle of the science there 
is “textbook science”; inside the esoteric circle of experts there is “journal science” and 
“vademecum (or handbook) science”; and outside the esoteric circle there is “popular 
science.”  The ideas and facts of expert science do not arise from within the esoteric 
circle of laboratories and journal publications alone.  Rather, they are created and 
developed during their circulation through the four types of science.8  Although Fleck 
only briefly mentions the “socio-intellectual form” of textbook science and does not 
elaborate on its specific functions, the nature and function of textbooks are indirectly 
illuminated by his comments on handbook science.9  For example, in a discussion of the 
requirement of internal consistency, Fleck suggests: “The vademecum is therefore not 
simply the result of either a compilation or a collection of various journal contributions.  
The former is impossible because such papers often contradict each other.  The latter 
does not yield a closed system, which is the goal of vademecum science.”10  For this 
reason, the writing of a handbook must be understood as the production—rather than the 
mere presentation—of science: “This [the handbook] is the means by which exoteric 
knowledge, knowledge originating in other collectives, and strictly specialist knowledge 
are all selected, blended, adapted, and molded into a system.”  Through the “selection 
and orderly arrangement” of the science into this system, the author shapes the future of 
the science: “The plan according to which selection and arrangement are made will then 
provide guidelines for future research.  It governs the decision on what counts as a basic 
concept, what methods should be accepted, which research directions appear most 
                                                
8 For a systemic textual analysis of how facts are actually constituted in various forms of scientific writing, 
see Myers, Writing Biology.  
9 L. Fleck, Genesis and Development of a Scientific Fact, trans. F. Bradley and T. J. Trenn (London: 
University of Chicago Press, 1981), 112. 
10 Ibid., 119. 
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promising.”11  Much the same can be said of a textbook, for the textbook is the only other 
place where the entire science is brought together and presented as a cohesive system.  
Like a handbook, a textbook is not just a collection of a science that exists elsewhere, but 
rather a presentation that is the result of significant interpretation and conceptual 
ordering.  When seen in this context, as a part of the production of disciplinary order and 
coherence, textbooks are opened to new types of analysis.  If textbooks do in fact provide 
a space in which significant aspects of scientific consensus are first produced and 
established—and are therefore responsible for resolving or eliminating conflicts in the 
scientific community—it is important to question traditional understandings of the actors 
involved in the process by which science “progresses.”  It will be important to explore 
the narrative devices used in creating internal coherence, or the illusion thereof, within 
the text of the textbook.  And it will be essential to use textbooks as a source when 
tracking and understanding the ways in which new ideas become established.  
Although Fleck is certainly correct in suggesting that science develops as ideas 
travel back and forth across the various types of scientific literature, it is important to 
note that the textbook is often used as if it were a mere reference point—a collection of 
established and static scientific facts.  When used in this way, textbooks must be 
understood in terms of their place in the hierarchy of scientific authority.  They must be 
seen as the conclusion of a process of accreditation, in which claims of fact travel from 
journal articles, to articles citing journal articles, to review articles, to textbooks; at each 
stage in this development, fewer claims are made, and those that remain are more 
established as facts.12  Thus, a salient feature of textbooks is that their authors give only a 
few references in support of the theories and facts that they select and present; and when 
they do cite an article, it is often a review, and not the paper in which the claim was first 
made.13  Discussing the self-justifying structure of textbooks, Myers notes that they often 
just refer to other parts of the textbook, thereby setting up a self-contained reference 
system that is very different from that found in articles: “the scientific article depends on 
                                                
11 Ibid., 119-120. 
12 This aspect of textbooks has been briefly discussed in J. Ziman, An Introduction to Science Studies: The 
Philosophical and Social Aspects of Science and Technology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1984), 66.   
13 Myers, "Textbooks and the Sociology of Scientific Knowledge," 11-12. 
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a vast network of references to other texts that themselves refer to further texts… In the 
process of accreditation, an author furthers a claim by using earlier texts and, more 
important, by getting later texts to use it.”14  When looking at how accreditation 
culminates in textbooks, it is also important to explore if and how textbooks are 
subsequently brought back into the literature of the science as authoritative sources.  In 
my brief study of one of the most widely used genetics textbooks of the 1930s-1960s, 
Principles of Genetics (Sinnott et al.), I found that the textbook functioned as a “closed” 
source of authority for authors of articles in genetics and general science journals.15  For 
example: in the journals Science and Genetics, this textbook was cited in claims about 
the results of particular genetic crosses,16 the lethality of almost all homozygous 
deficiencies in Drosophila,17 the definition of “population,”18 the preparation of cornmeal 
for Drosophila experiments,19 and the interdependence of gene functions.20  
Occasionally, Principles was used to support explicit claims about matters of 
consensus—to prove that it was, for example, “generally agreed” that a claim was true.21  
Although these uses of Principles are in some respects similar to the uses of journal 
articles, they differ in one central respect:  whereas a journal article that is decades-old 
will rarely be cited, except as support for a claim about “history” rather than “science,” 
the 1950 edition of Principles was cited as an authoritative source in Science as recently 
                                                
14 Ibid.: 11. 
15 In addition, to gain a sense of whether the citation of textbooks was unique to a limited period in the 
development of genetics or to this particular textbook, I looked at all of the citations in the first issue of 
Genetics in 1950, and in 1975.  In both, approximately thirty percent of all articles cited textbooks: e.g., E. 
J. Gardner and C. M. Woolf, "The Influence of High and Low Temperatures on the Expression of 
Tumorous Head in Drosophila Melanogaster," Genetics 35 (1950); I. Opatowski, "On the Interpretation of 
the Dose-Frequency Curve in Radiogenetics," Genetics 35 (1950); D. Marinkovic and F. J. Ayala, "Fitness 
of Allozyme Variants in Drosophila Pseudoobscura. I. Selection at the Pgm-1 and Me-2 Loci," Genetics 79 
(1975); M. Wasserman and H. R. Koepfer, "Fitness of Karyotypes in Drosophila Pseudoobscura," Genetics 
79 (1975); and C. Wills, J. Phelps, and R. Ferguson, "Further Evidence for Selective Differences between 
Isoalleles in Drosophila," Genetics 79 (1975). 
16 J. C. DeFries, J. P. Hegmann, and M. W. Weir, "Open-Field Behavior in Mice: Evidence for a Major 
Gene Effect Mediated by the Visual System," Science 154 (1966): 1578. 
17 R. D. Milkman, "The Genetic Basis of Natural Variation. II. Analysis of a Polygenic System in 
Drosophila Melanogaster," Genetics 45 (1960): 386.  
18 J. B. Hughes, G. C. Daily, and P. R. Ehrlich, "Population Diversity: Its Extent and Extinction," Science 
278 (1997): 689. 
19 E. S. McDonough, "Inhibition of Mold Contamination in Drosophila Food Using Sodium 
Orthophenylphenate," Science 118 (1953): 388. 
20 R. Blanc, "Dominigenes of the Vestigial Series in Drosophila Melanogaster," Genetics 31 (1946): 395. 
21 Ibid. 
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as 1997.22  When confronted with this picture of the non-pedagogical uses of textbooks, 
the importance of textbooks in a science’s system of authority becomes apparent, as do 
some important features of the textbook.  Insofar as the authority of the textbook does not 
rely on citations, the way in which it establishes and presents its authority is unique.  
Given that all claims in textbooks cannot have reached the same degree of accreditation, 
the text will include narrative devices that differentiate claims of differing degrees of 
certainty.  
The writing of textbooks also plays an important role in the development of the 
pedagogical aims of the science.  The content of the claims made in textbooks is in part 
shaped by the framework in which they are written—by the pedagogical theories and 
ideas that guide the author’s formulation of the text.  While textbooks are generally 
written as pedagogical tools, they can be intended to produce a wide variety of results.  
They can, for example, be designed to convey a body of theories, facts, ideas, or 
knowledge; or alternatively, to foster the development of a method of investigation.  
When the goals of the author are informed by general pedagogical theory, the textbook is 
not just shaped by the scientific practice, but also by the broader culture.  The use of 
pedagogical theory must not only be seen as playing a crucial role in a relationship 
between authors and students, but also as participating in and arising out of the 
development of the philosophy of science education.  The goal of science education was 
a subject of great concern during the 1920-1960s, and the teaching of genetics was itself 
seen as an emerging science.  In 1925, for example, Edmund W. Sinnott and L. C. Dunn 
discussed the need to invent a new model of teaching and explained their attempts to do 
so in the preface to Principles of Genetics: “Genetics is still so young a science and is 
changing so rapidly from year to year that no uniform practice has been established for 
the text-book treatment of its subject matter.”23  William E. Castle agreed when 
reviewing the textbook, stating that he welcomed and applauded “any new contribution 
                                                
22 Hughes, Daily, and Ehrlich, "Population Diversity: Its Extent and Extinction," 689. 
23 E. W. Sinnott and L. C. Dunn, Principles of Genetics: An Elementary Text, with Problems, 1st ed. (New 
York: McGraw-Hill, 1925), ix. 
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to the only-partly-solved problem of how successfully to teach genetics.”24  With time, 
methods became established and popular textbooks were copied.  For example:  James 
Watson’s Molecular Biology of the Gene used modified illustrations from Principles,25 
and the method of teaching “three-factor mapping” developed by Sinnott and Dunn in 
1925 became standard.26  Given the influence of pedagogical conventions, a textbook—
even when it is a first edition—must be viewed as text with a significant history.   
It is not just in the context of pedagogical development, however, that the 
historicity of textbooks is connected to their functions.  Although this feature of 
textbooks may not be an important one in the minds of the authors producing them, 
textbooks are nevertheless received and used as markers of time.  For example: in the 
1910s-1940s, the rapid rate of progress in the science of genetics was generally 
mentioned in the first paragraph of reviews of genetics textbooks.27  And new textbooks 
were taken to be indicative of this progress.  This gave them value, independent of their 
pedagogical utility.  According to A. F. Blakeslee, for example: “The two publications 
cited above are of interest from the light they throw upon the rapid evolution of genetics 
within recent years, entirely apart from the information which they may lay before the 
student.”28  Ernst Caspari likewise suggested: “A comparison of the present text with the 
previous ones serves best to demonstrate the enormous changes genetics has undergone 
in the last decade.”29 This use of textbooks was invited by their unique significance in the 
literature of science.  Unlike journal articles, which only claim to deal with an aspect of 
the science, textbooks appear to be total and coherent representations of the basic 
                                                
24 W. E. Castle, "Some New Books on Genetics," Review of Genetics in Plant and Animal Improvement, 
by D. F. Jones,  Principles of Genetics, by E. W. Sinnott and L. C. Dunn, and Animal Genetics by F. A. E. 
Crew, Science 62 (1925): 567.  
25 W. G. Whaley, "Edmund Ware Sinnott," Biographical Memoirs of the National Academy of Sciences 54 
(1983): 355. 
26 M. Chalfie, "Is the Traditional Way of Teaching Three-Factor Mapping Sufficient?" Trends in Genetics 
13 (1997): 94. 
27 E.g., Castle, "Some New Books on Genetics," 567: “our knowledge of genetics has been increasing so 
rapidly that no text remains up-to-date unless it is frequently revised or rewritten.” See also N. M. Grier, 
Review of Genetics, by H. E. Walter, The American Midland Naturalist 12 (1930): 166; E. M. East, 
"Genetics," Review of Elemente der Exakten Erblichkeitslehre, by W. Johannsen, Botanical Gazette 57 
(1914): 239; J. A. Detlefsen, Review of Genetics: An Introduction to the Study of Heredity, by H. E. 
Walter, Science 56 (1922): 145; and T. Just, Review of The Principles of Heredity, by L. H. Snyder, The 
American Midland Naturalist 26 (1941): 440. 
28 A. F. Blakeslee, Review of Principles of Genetics, by E. W. Sinnott and L. C. Dunn and Recent 
Advances in Plant Genetics, by F. W. Sansome and J. Philip, Science 77 (1933): 284.  
29 E. Caspari, Review of Principles of Genetics, by E. W. Sinnott, L. C. Dunn, and Th. Dobzhansky, 
Science 112 (1950): 725. 
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features of the science; and thus, comparisons between textbooks of different times allow 
for claims about progress.  In this capacity, textbooks serve as markers of time.  And as 
markers, they function in two ways.  At the moment of production, a textbook identifies 
what it means to be a practitioner in the present, declaring as much as possible what the 
discipline is about.  When time passes and the textbook loses currency, it becomes a 
token of old science, and a point of reference against which new textbooks can define 
progress.  Thus, if use determines function, the nature of a textbook is not only that of a 
resource in the present; it is, in addition, that which becomes a sign of the past.  
Thus far, I have discussed the nature of textbooks by identifying features that 
arise from their use in six aspects of a scientific practice—the reproduction of the 
science, the formation of the science’s conceptual order and consistency, the 
accreditation of its facts, the establishment of its pedagogical tools and aims, and the 
evaluation of scientific progress.  In fulfilling each of these functions, a textbook takes on 
different salient characteristics, which I have begun to identify.  My list and discussion 
are necessarily incomplete, however, given the scope of this introduction.  To fully 
understand the functions of textbooks, one would need a far more complete picture of 
their use.  As articulated by L. C. Cronbach at a major conference on “the textbook” 
more than fifty years ago: “One cannot really judge the functional contribution of the text 
alone, for the text-in-use is a complex social process wherein a book, an institution, and a 
number of human beings are interlaced beyond the possibility of separation.”30  To 
understand the text-in-use would require an analysis of reading practices that are, in the 
words of Adrian Johns, “no less skillful, and no less local, than the conducting of an 
experiment.”31  Even this type of analysis, however, would only begin to uncover the 
functions and uses of textbooks.  In addition, it would be essential to trace the history of 
the textbook through the entire “communication circuit” in which it is involved.32  This 
                                                
30 L. J. Cronbach, "The Text in Use," in Text Materials in Modern Education: A Comprehensive Theory 
and Platform for Research, ed. L. J. Cronbach (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1955), 188. 
31 A. Johns, The Nature of the Book: Print and Knowledge in the Making (London: University of Chicago 
Press, 1998), 48. 
32 For a discussion of the value of studying a text in terms of its circulation through a “communication 
circuit,” see R. Darnton, The Kiss of Lamourette: Reflections in Cultural History (London: Faber and 
Faber, 1990), esp. 111-113, 136-137.  In the fields of education and policy—in which studies of textbooks 
are not uncommon—some research has addressed aspects of the communication circuit of textbooks.  See, 
e.g., the collections of articles in L. J. Cronbach, ed., Text Materials in Modern Education: A 
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would involve looking at how resources passed from the field, to the author, to the 
manuscript, to the publisher, to the printed materials, to the distributor, to the teacher, to 
the teacher’s lessons, to the student, to the lessons noted and stored; and conversely, at 
the paths by which information about the reception of the textbook by students, teachers, 
and reviewers was communicated to market research companies, publishers, and authors, 
as well as at how this communication shaped the writing of future texts.  This type of 
analysis would certainly help create a more robust picture of the uses of textbooks, yet it 
too would be but another beginning, for as Adrian Johns has also argued: “Any printed 
book is, as a matter of fact, both the product of one complex set of social and 
technological processes and also the starting point for another.”33  And just as a textbook 
is the product of various modern technological production systems, it is itself a form of 
technology—a craft that shapes the perspective of the producer and user.  Thus, an 
analysis of the place of the textbook in the full communication circuit would require a 
project on the scale of Jim Secord’s Victorian Sensation.34  But given the questions about 
textbooks that motivate this thesis, it has been infeasible to write such a history.  While I 
will look at book reviews, I have set aside many important questions about use and 
reception.  This is in part because a substantive analysis along these lines would have 
required primary sources that are unavailable for the textbook that most interested me.35  
                                                                                                                                            
Comprehensive Theory and Platform for Research (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1955); J. Y. Cole, 
ed., The Textbook in American Society (Washington, DC: Library of Congress, 1981); P. G. Altbach et al., 
eds., Textbooks in American Society: Politics, Policy, and Pedagogy (Albany: State University of New 
York Press, 1991); and J. G. Herlihy, ed., The Textbook Controversy: Issues, Aspects, and Perspectives 
(Norwood, NJ: Ablex, 1992). 
33 Johns, The Nature of the Book: Print and Knowledge in the Making, 3. 
34 J. A. Secord, Victorian Sensation: The Extraordinary Publication, Reception, and Secret Authorship of 
Vestiges of the Natural History of Creation (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003). 
35 I considered following the example of Secord, and the suggestions of Cronbach, Johns, and Darnton, 
and I did extensively research the history of the most widely used textbook of the period in the history of 
genetics that interested me—Sinnott, Dunn, and Dobzhansky’s Principles of Genetics.  But I was unable to 
find a wealth of archival material.  The L. C. Dunn Papers and Theodosius Dobzhansky Papers in the 
American Philosophical Society contain very little that sheds light on the production of the textbook; for 
example, the only manuscript material is for a chapter of an edition that was never published due to Dunn’s 
death, and the little correspondence they had about the textbook most often pertained to this unfinished 
edition.  In the transcripts of the extensive McGraw-Hill Oral History Project at Columbia University, there 
does not seem to be any discussion of the publication of Principles of Genetics or any other college science 
textbooks (although changes in the writing and publishing of college textbooks for courses in vocational 
education are discussed).  From the Tracy Sonneborn manuscripts collection at the University of Indiana, I 
obtained a few references to Principles of Genetics in teaching notes, but I did not find any other similar 
documents elsewhere.  The archives of Harvard University—which contain a substantial collection of 
course syllabi and reading lists dating to the nineteenth century—have few such documents for genetics 
courses, as these materials were often not saved by science departments.  It is important to note, however, 
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But more centrally, it is because writing such a history of a textbook would have been 
incompatible with a central aim of this thesis, which is to develop a systematic and 
substantive analysis of the scientific uses and functions of history-writing.   
 
 
Uses of History and the Nature of History-Writing 
 
In The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, T. S. Kuhn famously described scientists’ 
accounts of the history of science:  “Partly by selection and partly by distortion, the 
scientists of earlier ages are implicitly represented as having worked upon the same set of 
fixed problems and in accordance with the same set of fixed canons that the most recent 
revolution in scientific theory and method has made seem scientific.”36  While Kuhn did 
not provide detailed support for this claim—or for any of his other novel and provocative 
suggestions about scientists’ uses of history—historians and sociologists of science have 
since shown interest in these questions.  The disciplinary functions of history-writing, for 
example, have been explored in several excellent studies.37  A special issue of Osiris has 
been devoted to commemorative practices in science.38  And, with respect to genetics in 
particular, the uses of Mendel have been the subject of much work.39  In this section, I 
will attempt to categorize and briefly summarize key functions and forms of history-
writing that have been identified and discussed in this developing body of literature.40  
                                                                                                                                            
that there might be suitable material related to the production and use of other textbooks.   If one were 
interested in this type of project, it would be worth exploring the William G. Whaley Papers at the 
University of Texas at Austin, which contain third edition corrections and fourth edition plans for 
Principles of Biology, as well as correspondence with Harper and Row; the A. H. Sturtevant Papers at 
California Institute of Technology, which contain a manuscript of An Introduction to Genetics and 
correspondence with co-author George Beadle; and the Adrian M. Srb Papers at Cornell, which contain 
some correspondence concerning one of the most widely-used genetics textbooks of the 1960s, General 
Genetics. 
36 Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 138.  
37 See, e.g., N. Jardine, "The Mantle of Müller and the Ghost of Goethe," in History and the Disciplines: 
The Reclassification of Knowledge in Early Modern Europe, ed. D. R. Kelley (Rochester: The University 
of Rochester Press, 1997); J. Martin, "Explaining John Freind's History of Physick," Studies in the History 
and Philosophy of Science 19 (1988); and the collection of articles in L. Graham, W. Lepenies, and P. 
Weingart, eds., Functions and Uses of Disciplinary Histories (Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1983). 
38 P. G. Abir-Am and C. A. Elliott, eds., Commemorative Practices in Science: Historical Perspectives on 
the Politics of Collective Memory, vol. 14 (1999). 
39 See, e.g., A. Brannigan, "The Reification of Mendel," Social Studies of Science 9 (1979); R. Olby, 
"Mendel No Mendelian?" History of Science 17 (1979); L. A. Callender, "Gregor Mendel: An Opponent of 
Descent with Modification," History of Science 26 (1988); and J. Sapp, "The Nine Lives of Gregor 
Mendel," in Experimental Inquiries, ed. H. E. L. Grand (Kluwer, 1990). 
40 Note that this discussion will focus on the functional consequences of history-writing in university 
science, and therefore will not address all of the ways in which scientists and educators have intended to 
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A function of history that has been the subject of a few studies is one that 
emerges in times of conflict and uncertainty, when history-writing is used to direct 
science, by either justifying and catalyzing a revolution, or counteracting and preventing 
change.  The factual and neutral appearance of a historical account is used to make the 
research, discoveries, and advances of one faction appear to be inevitable.  Through this 
“normalization” or “fatalization” of the direction in which the science will progress, 
history-writing has a powerful effect on practitioners, the public, and those funding 
science.41  One such use of history-writing has been identified in a study by Wolf 
Lepenies, who notes that accounts of the discovery of the double helix were written 
while the development of molecular biology was ongoing; thus what started on the 
margins of biology revolutionized the discipline, but was presented as the seemingly 
natural direction of its development.42  Rachel Laudan has identified a similar use of 
“stipulative history” in Charles Lyell’s Principles of Geology: the historical introduction 
was meant to precipitate a revolution by showing that progress in geology was being 
hindered by the dominant methodology, and by identifying the merits of Lyell’s 
alternative method.43  These types of historical accounts, which are written to catalyze 
change, glorify the work of certain individuals and set them up to become founding 
                                                                                                                                            
use history of science.  For example: I will not discuss whether or not lessons in the history of science have 
actually had a humanizing effect on scientists or whether they have fostered a stronger democracy, 
although these are “functions” that they have been intended to serve.  For discussions of these goals, see A. 
K. Mayer, "Moralizing Science: The Uses of Science's Past in National Education in the 1920s," British 
Journal for the History of Science 30 (1997); A. K. Mayer, "Fatal Mutilations," History of Science 40 
(2002); and M. Shortland and A. Warwick, eds., Teaching the History of Science (Oxford: Blackwell, 
1989).  There are also several doctoral dissertations on this topic, including A. K. Mayer, "Roots of the 
History of Science in Britain 1916-1950" (Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, The University of Cambridge, 2003); 
E. A. Melia, "Science, Values and Education: The Search for Cultural Unity at Harvard under Charles W. 
Eliot, A. Lawrence Lowell and James B. Conant" (Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, The Johns Hopkins 
University, 1995); and W. J. Sherratt, "History of Science in Education" (Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, 
University of Leicester, 1980). 
41 The idea of “normalization” comes from Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Chapter 11.  On 
D. von Engelhardt on the “fatalization” of the history of science in the nineteenth century, see N. Jardine, 
The Scenes of Inquiry: On the Reality of Questions in the Sciences (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991), 236. 
42 W. Lepenies, "Introduction," in Functions and Uses of Disciplinary Histories, ed. L. Graham, W. 
Lepenies, and P. Weingart (Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1983), xvii.   
43 R. Laudan, "Redefinitions of a Discipline: History of Geology and Geological History," in Functions 
and Uses of Disciplinary Histories, ed. L. Graham, W. Lepenies, and P. Weingart (Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 
1983), 81-84, 87-91, 94-95.  See also R. Porter, “Charles Lyell and the Principles of the History of 
Geology,” British Journal for the History of Science 9 (1976): 91-31.   
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founders.44  It is not just during periods of unrest, however, that history-writing plays an 
important role in the creation of “revolutions.” 
After a science has undergone a significant change, practitioners generally 
provide historical explanations of why it happened in order to stabilize the new science.45  
And when, as is often the case, an account of the actual cause of the change does not 
appear logical to the new scientific community, these post hoc explanations rely on 
historical revisionism.  This happens, for example, when the change was the product of 
scientific reasoning that no longer appears valid, or when it was the product of social, 
political, or economic causes.  In these cases, a historical account can be used to project 
the post-revolution standards back onto the transitional period, and help turn the 
revolution into a new foundation.  It is in these contexts that founding-father myths are 
also often created; the supposed innovations of founding fathers are often just 
articulations, generalizations, or refinements of the current scientific practice.  In these 
cases, history-writing provides rational explanations for the acceptance of methods, 
experiments, and theories that were in fact adopted on other grounds.46  
Retrospective reinterpretations of history also serve important pedagogical 
functions.  When, for example, teachers want students to learn a theory or law by 
“discovering” it, either experimentally or on paper, they often provide an account of how 
it was first discovered.  This popular form of teaching can give the student a sense of the 
logic of the science, and of how ideas, theories, and discoveries relate to and build on 
each other.  But in using this technique, teachers must often significantly reinterpret the 
past.  If there has been a change in the significance of a principle or equation—or in the 
context and community in which it was developed—it will not make sense to have the 
student mimic the actual steps taken in its discovery or derivation.  Thus, it is necessary 
to develop a new way for the student to arrive at the same conclusion.  Retrospectively 
                                                
44 For an excellent discussion of the production and functioning of founding founders, see B. Bensaude-
Vincent, "A Founder Myth in the History of Sciences? The Lavoisier Case," in Functions and Uses of 
Disciplinary Histories, ed. L. Graham, W. Lepenies, and P. Weingart (Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1983). 
45 E.g., Laudan shows that in the early histories of plate tectonics, what was seen as a Kuhnian revolution 
by many geologists was stabilized by histories that characterized it as being similar to revolutions in other 
sciences: Laudan, "Redefinitions of a Discipline: History of Geology and Geological History," 84-87, 91-
93, 95-98.   
46 This type of history-writing is famously described in Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 138.  
See also Jardine, The Scenes of Inquiry, 149-150.   
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reconstructing it, the author is able to present it in such a way that the student sees it in 
terms of its place in the modern science.  Like histories that retrospectively rationalize 
change, this pedagogical revisionism presents the past in terms of the present.47 
Another crucial function of histories comes from their role in the formation of 
disciplines.  Whether or not disciplinary categories are the product of intentional or 
unintentional anachronism, they are generally retrospective historiographical artifacts: 
the names of disciplines do not simply label existing practices, but rather assist in uniting 
disparate fields of practice into an apparently natural and cohesive entity.  They are, in 
Ian Hacking’s vocabulary, “interactive kinds,” altering and informing the behavior of the 
group of individuals to which they are applied.48  The name of a discipline, for example, 
plays a key role in institutionalization, providing the basis for the creation of university 
departments and research centers, the development of professional societies, and the 
general allocation of resources.  In addition to performing these crucial economic and 
political functions, the disciplinary category shapes the vocational identity of scientists 
by directing the lines of questioning they pursue, defining the tools and methods they 
employ, and structuring their relationships with institutions.  Moreover, in the 
competition between fields of research, powerful but vaguely defined senses of 
disciplinary identity can help a research program assert primary ownership or control 
over experimental practices that it shares with other fields.  Disciplinary categories do 
not just function within the domain of scientific practice, but also perform an important 
role in the organization, packaging, and transmission of concepts and techniques from the 
scientific field to outside groups, including the general public, grant-giving foundations, 
and governmental regulatory bodies.  In these ways, amongst others, the conception of a 
science that is in part established through history-writing performs crucial disciplinary 
functions.49   
                                                
47 For a brief discussion of physicists’ pedagogical reinventions of Maxwell's equations, see P. Galison, 
"Re-Reading the Past from the End of Physics," in Functions and Uses of Disciplinary Histories, ed. L. 
Graham, W. Lepenies, and P. Weingart (Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1983), 48. 
48 On “interactive kinds,” see the fourth and fifth chapters of I. Hacking, The Social Construction of What? 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999), esp. 103-109, 115-119, 123, 130. 
49 For more on the nature and functions of disciplines, see the discussions of “scientific fields” and “credit” 
in P. Bourdieu, "The Specificity of the Scientific Field and the Social Conditions of the Progress of 
Reason," Social Science Information 14 (1975); “research programs” and “disciplinary programs” in T. 
Lenoir, Instituting Science: The Cultural Production of Scientific Disciplines (Stanford: Stanford 
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When historical claims are used to present an image of an experiment, they 
perform a very different type of function: the creation of virtual-witnesses.50  In part, this 
type of history-writing takes place in detailed descriptions of the experiment that was 
performed and explanations of what should be done to replicate the experiment.  But not 
all history is presented with words.  Equally powerful are the accompanying figures, 
including data tables, schematic representations of the study, and images of and from the 
experiment. All of these aspects of the text have a shared purpose—to enable the reader 
to imagine an experimental scene that they did not in fact witness.  And thus they must 
be understood as a type of history-writing that not only reports on what was seen, but 
also and more importantly provides the basis for a new type of seeing.  Through these 
literary devices, the reader becomes a virtual witness, who can testify to the validity of 
the author’s claims of fact.  In this capacity, history-writing increases the number of 
witnesses involved in testimony so dramatically that it transforms the means by which 
facts are constituted.  
Another important function performed by history-writing is the legitimization of 
claims, questions, and research methods—a function that is often achieved by redefining 
or referring to the canon, tradition, community, or rituals of a science.  A variety of 
literary technologies are employed towards these ends.51  The legitimacy of a research 
method, for example, can be established with a historical account of how it performed 
when tested against precedent and standards, thereby presenting the reader with its 
calibration, or by giving a causal account of the operation of the method, thereby 
                                                                                                                                            
University Press, 1997), 46-62; “discursive formation” in M. Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge 
(London: Tavistock Publications, 1972), 21-76; and “trading zones” and “intercalcation” in P. Galison, 
Image and Logic: A Material Culture of Microphysics (London: University of Chicago Press, 1997), 781-
844.  A detailed case study of discipline formation can be found in R. E. Kohler, From Medical Chemistry 
to Biochemistry: The Making of a Biomedical Discipline (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982).  
For an excellent historical account of the idea of disciplines, see D. R. Kelley, "The Problem of Knowledge 
and the Concept of Discipline," in History and the Disciplines: The Reclassification of Knowledge in Early 
Modern Europe, ed. D. R. Kelley (Rochester: The University of Rochester Press, 1997). 
50 This idea of “virtual-witnessing” and its functions comes from S. Shapin, "Pump and Circumstance: 
Robert Boyle's Literary Technology," Social Studies of Science 14 (1984): esp. 490-497.  See also S. 
Shapin and S. Schaffer, "Seeing and Believing: The Experimental Production of Pneumatic Facts," in 
Leviathan and the Air-Pump: Hobbes, Boyle, and the Experimental Life (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1985), esp. 60-65.  This idea has also used by Robert Kohler in his analysis of work in genetics: “A 
strategy of literary disclosure may also have inspired the peculiar narrative form of the three monographs 
that Bridges and Morgan published…in which all the results were presented in chronological order, 
replicating the history of how mutants and maps had accreted.”  See R. E. Kohler, Lords of the Fly: 
Drosophila Genetics and the Experimental Life (London: University of Chicago Press, 1994), 75-77.   
51 In discussing these uses of history, I draw on Jardine, The Scenes of Inquiry, 123-124. 
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illustrating its reliability; in both of these ways, history-writing is used as a means of 
vindication.  This is very different from the type of legitimacy that is bestowed on a line 
of questioning when, for example, an author situates it within a historical account of the 
nature and purpose of the scientific community, thereby establishing its relevance.  A 
third type of legitimization is achieved through rationalization, when a contested 
proposition is supported by reference to historically established explicit norms.  And 
lastly, historical claims can be used as a means of authorization, as is the case when a 
proposition gains legitimacy through references to a canonical object or figure, such as a 
classic paper, or a founding father.  
Accounts of history are also used by practitioners of a new branch of a science to 
justify and establish the ascendancy of their faction over the field from which it 
emerged.52  A powerful form of this type of history-writing deploys the narrative plot 
structure of “supersessionism,” which involves three general moves:  first, the members 
of the new faction claim that their work is qualitatively different from that of their 
parental field; they then redefine the subject matter of the original field in terms of their 
new agenda; and once these redefinitions become established, they claim that the original 
field has failed where they succeed, and that they are thus in fact the true heirs of the 
original legitimate field.53  While this supersessionist plot structure has been primarily 
associated with religious historiography, Scott Gilbert shows that these are precisely the 
order and type of claims found in the historiography of genetics by geneticists.  This line 
of rhetoric commenced in the 1920s, when geneticists began to emphasize the qualitative 
differences between genetics and embryology.  Within a decade, the two fields were 
widely seen as having their own rules of evidence, exemplars, organisms, journals, and 
vocabulary.54  And with the rise of genetics in the interwar period, key hereditary 
phenomena came to be redefined in genetic terms: heredity was defined as the 
transmission of genes, no longer including development; studies of development were 
                                                
52 Martin, "Explaining John Freind's History of Physick," and S. Gilbert, "Bearing Crosses: A 
Historiography of Genetics and Embryology," American Journal of Medical Genetics 76 (1998). 
53 Gilbert, "Bearing Crosses," 169.   
54 Ibid.: 174; e.g., although the dominant research program in embryology in the late 1920s involved the 
transplantation and physical manipulation of embryos, Morgan’s The Theory of the Gene presented 
embryology as the study of gene expression—as a complement to genetics, which he characterized as the 
study of gene transmission.  
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said to focus on gene expression, rather than the rules by which complex structures form 
from simpler ones; and genetically based definitions of embryology replaced the 
previous morphological ones.55  As these reconceptualizations of key ideas became 
established, geneticists gained the conceptual resources needed to reject much of 
embryology; for when important biological questions were reconceived in these new 
genetic terms, embryologists were unable to provide satisfactory answers.  It is in this 
way that geneticists presented themselves as extending, completing, and supplanting the 
work of embryologists, thereby redefining embryology in terms of its replacement by 
genetics.56 
 
 
A Structural Outline and Précis of the Thesis 
 
Although historians and sociologists of science have identified rich and varied ways in 
which history and textbooks have been put to use, they have left many sources and 
questions untouched.  First, there has not yet been a systematic analysis of the uses of 
history-writing in university science textbooks.  Second, those studying the functions of 
textbooks have rarely analyzed actual texts or used them as primary sources in the study 
of twentieth-century scientific practice.57  Finally, and most importantly for this project, 
the scholarship on the scientific use of history has—as identified above—focused on just 
one type of history-writing: explicit statements about the past, in the form of narrative 
histories.   In building on these three areas in this thesis, I will question common 
conceptions of the nature of “history-writing” and what is conveyed in the textbook-
teaching of “the principles of genetics.”  With respect to the principles of genetics, I will 
                                                
55 Ibid.: 176. 
56 Note that this only a cursory summary of some of the main points in Gilbert’s detailed analysis of the 
supersessionism in genetics—an argument that does not lend itself to brief summary. 
57 The notable exceptions include a brief analysis of textbook language in Myers, "Textbooks and the 
Sociology of Scientific Knowledge," and two studies of how molecular genetics and Watson and Crick’s 
1953 hypothesis concerning DNA were assimilated into the scientific literature of genetics: B. Gaster, 
"Assimilation of Scientific Change: The Introduction of Molecular Genetics into Biology Textbooks," 
Social Studies of Science 20 (1990); and M. Winstanley, "Assimilation into the Literature of a Critical 
Advance in Molecular Biology," Social Studies of Science 6 (1976).  In addition, there is an excellent 
collection of articles dealing with mostly eighteenth- and nineteen-century chemistry textbooks in A. 
Lundgren and B. Bensaude-Vincent, eds., Communicating Chemistry: Textbooks and Their Audiences, 
1789-1939 (Canton, MA: Watson, 2000).  Note that twentieth-century school textbooks have been 
extensively studied; for an interesting study of the politics of education, see C. Cody, "The Politics of 
Textbook Publishing, Adoption, and Use," in Textbooks and Schooling in the United States, ed. D. L. 
Elliott and A. Woodward (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990).   
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show how and why we might think of them not only as “the laws of genetics proposed by 
geneticists,” in the sense meant by the common textbook title Principles of Genetics, but 
also as “that which is most basic to being a geneticist,” including a grasp of the 
conceptual order of the science and the categories of family resemblance on which it is 
based.  Regarding “history-writing,” I will argue that many representations of the past are 
not presented as such, and thus that the existing scholarship on the disciplinary uses of 
history, with its focus on narrative history-writing, only begins to illuminate the myriad 
ways in which scientists reconstruct and marshal history in the advancement of particular 
disciplinary agendas.  Identifying and analyzing latent deployments of the past, I will 
make a significant departure from the existing literature and develop a novel taxonomy 
of the rich forms and functions that history-writing takes and serves.  In this reorientation 
of previous approaches to the subject, I will push the boundaries on common conceptions 
of the “history” and the “writing” of history-writing, pointing the direction towards new 
lines of historiographical research that will allow us to better understand the ways in 
which the historicity of our past makes claims on us.  
The central argument in my analysis will be developed across four chapters, each 
of which will focus on a different type of history-writing, aspect of genetics, and 
disciplinary function.  In short, the chapters will progress from an analysis of manifest 
histories of genetics, to studies of various latent and embedded forms of the historical; 
and from the disciplining of the history of the science, to the disciplining of its students, 
conceptual order, and eras.  In other words, this thesis will be organized as an analytic 
narrative about uses of history.  However, I will attempt to develop this analysis in such a 
way that I concurrently present a historical narrative about the development of some 
aspects of the science of genetics: after first looking at the textbook histories of genetics 
that were written around the 1910s, I will explore the historical case-based style of 
teaching that was developed in the 1930s, followed by the use of history as a logic of 
organization that became ubiquitous by the 1950s, concluding with an analysis of the 
concept of “classical genetics” that was presented in the textbooks of the 1960s.   
Having roughly outlined the structure of my analysis, I think it useful to briefly 
discuss the substance of each chapter.  In Chapter 1, I will focus on the explicitly 
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historical claims about past scientists, experiments, theories, facts, and discoveries that 
were presented in the first generation of Anglo-American textbooks to be written after 
the rediscovery of Mendel’s laws.  I will show that during this early period in which 
“genetics” was not yet established as a discipline, authors presented radically different 
accounts of the nature of the study of heredity:  J. Arthur Thomson advanced a science 
based on knowledge of the fundamental units comprising the architecture of the 
hereditary material; William Bateson presented a science founded on the mathematical 
regularity of Mendel’s laws; and William E. Castle advocated a science focused on the 
coming-into-being of organisms.  Their different pictures of the science informed how 
the authors consolidated the disparate nineteenth-century studies of heredity; the same 
figures, theories, and discoveries were united into three distinct historical foundations, 
each of which provided support for a different future science.  Although this extensive 
heterogeneity was significantly reduced in the following generations of textbooks, as key 
features of “the history of genetics” became standardized, aspects of Thomson’s, 
Bateson’s, and Castle’s three different visions of past and future can be seen in the 
genetics of the following decades. 
 In the second chapter, I will shift from an analysis of the histories that were used 
to teach about the past, to an analysis of the historical, case-based method that was 
developed in the 1920s-1940s to convey “the science” of genetics.  Here, I will explore a 
type of history-writing in which the historicity of the history was not always apparent.  
Drawing on Kuhn’s idea of the exemplar, I will argue that history-writing did not only 
take place in explicitly historical claims about a past case, but rather extended into the 
illustrations, data tables, and problem-solving exercises that gave it substance.  My 
central contention will be that these features of the text together constituted “virtual 
historical environments,” which allowed students to learn and practice not only the 
principles that were studied by geneticists and were explicitly taught in the text, but also 
those that were followed by geneticists, and were taught only implicitly as tacit skills 
needed to follow, find, and understand the explicit principles.  Defining disciplines as 
including the sets of practices and institutions that make rules executable, I will suggest 
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that the virtual historical environments of textbooks were essential in the disciplinary 
reproduction of genetics. 
Chapter 3 will focus on the use and development of the “standard historical 
approach” to teaching in the 1930s-1950s, and how it was related to the conceptual order 
of genetics.  With this method of teaching, the textbook became a microcosm of the 
history of the discipline, bringing the student into the mindset of the geneticist by 
introducing topics in order of their historical development.  The first section of this 
chapter will trace the history of this approach, discussing geneticists’ ideas about the 
organization of textbooks and the significance of the wide-spread decision to begin 
teaching the science with Mendel’s laws.  In the second section, I will develop a case 
study of the early use of this historical approach in Principles of Genetics by L. C. Dunn 
and E. W. Sinnott.  Analyzing the literary devices used in implementing this approach, I 
will identify a dialectical narrative structure with which key twentieth century theories 
and discoveries were portrayed as extensions of Mendelism, and with which the inner 
logic and disciplinary coherence of genetics were presented.  The conceptual order of the 
science was not, however, stable, as I will show with a further case study of Principles of 
Genetics in the third section of this chapter.  Here, I will trace the ways in which the 
authors, over five editions, revised their presentation of the set of experiments, facts, and 
principles related to the chromosome theory of heredity, showing that the hierarchical 
organization of evidence and theory was highly malleable and could be rearranged to 
create very different presentations of the purpose of the science.  Taken together, the 
three sections of this chapter will show that history was constitutive of the organizational 
logic, narrative structure, and inner rationality of the science conveyed by genetics 
textbooks.   
 In chapter four, I will explore the sense of history embodied in use of the 
historiographical concept of “classical genetics” that was developed in textbooks of the 
1960s-1970s.  With this differentiation of the science into classical and modern eras, 
authors presented molecular genetics as a revolution in geneticists’ understanding of 
heredity.  But, as I will show, this idea of “classical genetics” was not merely an 
anachronistic description projected onto history.  The use of the term in the 1970s was, 
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rather, just one redefinition in a series of reappropriations of an idea that had developed 
over five decades.  Tracing the history of the conception and development of “classical” 
in the language of geneticists, I will discuss how and why it was used to refer to an 
exemplary case in the 1920s, an ideology in the 1920s, a philosophy of science in the 
1930s, a type of genetics in the 1950s, and a historical era in the 1960s.  I will argue that 
in all of these cases, “classical” was a politically powerful concept: at first used to define 
and establish sources of scientific authority, it was subsequently developed in arguments 
about the proper relationship between science and politics, and eventually served to 
establish the disciplinary identity and boundaries of the science.  Identifying these 
genealogical and functional connections is not, however, the primary purpose of this 
chapter.  The diversity in uses of “classical” is perhaps even more important.  In 
differentiating these various uses, I will suggest that the disciplinary power of this term—
which is derived from the authority of history—relied on the effacement of its historicity 
and the situations in which it was created and deployed.  
 In the concluding chapter, I will revisit the common notion that the use of history 
in science textbooks facilitates learning by giving life to the historical context in which 
facts and theories were developed.  Summarizing general aspects of my argument, I will 
suggest that this view is mistaken—that history-writing in genetics textbooks was not 
primarily about the past, but rather about the scientific community and its future.  I will 
outline some ways in which my analysis could be extended, and conclude with a brief 
reflection on the forms and functions of the writing of history.  
 
 
The History and Historiography of Genetics 
 
Although my primary aim in this thesis is to advance a novel taxonomy of the forms and 
functions of history-writing that can be applied generally, I hope that this analysis will be 
of particular value to those interested in the development of Anglo-American genetics in 
the twentieth century—a field that I chose to study for a variety of reasons.  At heart, this 
choice was motivated by my ethical and political interests in the relationship between 
genetics and contemporary medicine, and the manner in which geneticists’ modes of 
seeing life have shaped lay people’s conceptions of themselves and their bodies.  By 
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studying the early development of the ways in which geneticists presented their 
science—from the origin of “genetics” textbooks in the early 1900s, to the establishment 
of the textbook category of “classical genetics” in the mid-twentieth century—I hoped to 
develop a critical perspective on modern public understandings of the meaning of genetic 
knowledge.  In addition, I was intrigued by the visibility of the non-professional 
historiography of genetics: it seemed, for example, that its “founding father” story has a 
public status unlike those of other sciences, and that Genetics is unique amongst 
comparable scientific journals in its inclusion of a historically-oriented article in every 
issue.  Finally, the fact that geneticists have often characterized the subject matter of their 
science in historical terms made the field an aesthetically interesting focal point for 
research on the forms and functions of claims about history.58    
While an exploration of the above themes did not fall within the scope of this 
project, I attempt to extend the literature on the history of genetics in ways that will assist 
future work in these and other areas.  Thus, in concluding, it is perhaps worth noting just 
a few of the well-established lines of research on which I build.  In Chapter One, the 
significant body of scholarship on the debate between the biometricians and the 
Mendelians at the turn of the century provides background for my analysis of the history 
written by Bateson in Genetics and Eugenics.59  Identifying the ways in which Bateson’s 
textbook advanced a disciplinary framework that differed radically from that of J. Arthur 
                                                
58 See, e.g., T. Dobzhansky, "Biological Adaptation," The Scientific Monthly 55 (1942): 402, stating that 
the “gene embodies…the most fundamental, and yet frequently overlooked, attribute of the living matter: it 
carries its history within itself”; T. Dobzhansky, "Position Effects on Genes," Biological Review 11 (1936): 
382, describing the chromosome as “a harmonious system which reflects the history of the organism and is 
itself a determining factor of this history”; R. W. Gerard, "Units and Concepts of Biology," Science 125 
(1957): 431, describing genes and other biological units as “carriers of the past”; and  W. Johannsen, "The 
Genotype Conception of Heredity," American Naturalist 45 (1911): 139, characterizing the “genotype 
view” of an organism as “an ‘ahistoric’ view of the reactions of living beings,” as opposed to the 
“transmission view.”  See also, e.g., F. R. Lillie, "The Gene and the Ontogenetic Process," Science 66 
(1927): 367, and  L. C. Dunn, A Short History of Genetics: The Development of Some of the Main Lines of 
Thought, 1864-1939 (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1965), xii-xiii. 
59 See, e.g., P. J. Bowler, The Mendelian Revolution: The Emergence of Hereditarian Concepts in Modern 
Science and Society (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989), 68-73; W. B. Provine, The Origins 
of Theoretical Population Genetics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1971), Chapters 2, 3; K. Kim, 
Explaining Scientific Consensus: The Case of Mendelian Genetics (New York: Guilford Press, 1994); D. 
Mackenzie, Statistics in Britain (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1981); B. Norton, "Biology and 
Philosophy: The Methodological Foundations of Biometry," Journal of the History of Biology  (1975); and 
L. Farrell, "Controversy and Conflict in Science: The English Biometric School and Mendel's Laws," 
Social Studies of Science 5 (1975).  For contributions to this body of scholarship that provide excellent 
summaries of it, see D. J. Kevles, "Genetics in the United States and Great Britain 1890-1930: A Review 
with Speculations," Isis 71 (1980): esp. 441-445; and R. Olby, "The Dimensions of Scientific Controversy: 
The Biometric-Mendelian Debate," British Journal for the History of Science 22 (1988): esp. 301.  
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Thomson and William Castle, I also attempt to build on the excellent work that has been 
done on the struggle for authority between competing conceptualizations and approaches 
to the study of heredity in the early twentieth century.60  In addition, through a careful 
reconstruction of changing accounts of Mendel in the preface histories of these first-
generation genetics textbooks, I develop and clarify some oversights in the extensive 
literature addressing the representations and uses of his life and work.61  In the following 
two chapters, I extend the Mendel scholarship in a new direction, exploring the 
pedagogical functions of the Mendelian exemplar and the narrative devices used to 
present Mendel’s laws as the foundation of genetics.  In Chapter Three’s analysis of the 
“historical” ordering of textbooks, I also develop an analysis of textbook representations 
of the chromosome theory of heredity that builds on the valuable historical and 
philosophical literature on the rise of the chromosomal approach to genetics.62  Finally, 
in Chapter Four’s analysis of the conception and development of “classical genetics,” I 
attempt to provide a new insight into the significance of the work of two controversial 
geneticists who have been the subject of substantial research: T. D. Lysenko and Richard 
Goldschmidt.63 
                                                
60 See, e.g., R. Falk, "The Struggle of Genetics for Independence," Journal of the History of Biology 28 
(1995): 219-246; J. Harwood, Styles of Scientific Thought: The German Genetics Community 1900-1933 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993), esp. Part I; Kohler, Lords of the Fly, esp. Chapter 3; R. 
Olby, Origins of Mendelism (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1966); J. Sapp, "The Struggle for 
Authority in the Field of Heredity, 1900-1932: New Perspectives on the Rise of Genetics," Journal of the 
History of Biology 16 (1983): esp. 313-318; and J. Sapp, Beyond the Gene: Cytoplasmic Inheritance and 
the Struggle for Authority in Genetics (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987).  
61 See, e.g., Brannigan, "The Reification of Mendel"; Callender, "Gregor Mendel: An Opponent of Descent 
with Modification"; F. Di Trocchio, "Mendel's Experiments: A Reinterpretation," Journal of the History of 
Biology 24 (1991); Olby, "Mendel No Mendelian?"; and C. Zirkle, "Gregor Mendel and His Precursors," 
Isis 42 (1951). 
62 See, e.g., G. E. Allen, "T. H. Morgan and the Split between Embryology and Genetics, 1910-1935," in A 
History of Embryology, ed. T. J. Horder, J. A. Witkowski, and C. C. Wylie (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1983); S. G. Brush, "How Theories Became Knowledge: Morgan's Chromosome Theory 
of Heredity in America and Britain," Journal of the History of Biology 35 (2002): 503-506; A. G. Cock, 
"William Bateson's Rejection and Eventual Acceptance of the Chromosome Theory," Annals of Science 40 
(1983); J. Gayon and R. M. Burian, "France in the Era of Mendelism (1900-1930)," Comptes Rendus de 
l'Académie des Sciences, Paris, Sciences de la Vie 323 (2000); S. Gilbert, "Bearing Crosses: A 
Historiography of Genetics and Embryology," American Journal of Medical Genetics 76 (1998); S. 
Gilbert, "The Embryological Origins of the Gene Theory," Journal of the History of Biology 11 (1978); 
and Harwood, Styles of Scientific Thought, 33-45. 
63 See, e.g., Michael Dietrich, "On the Mutability of Genes and Geneticists," Perspectives on Science 4 
(1996): 321-345; Michael Dietrich, "From Gene to Genetic Hierarchy: Richard Goldschmidt and the 
Problem of the Gene," in The Concept of the Gene in Development and Evolution: Historical and 
Epistemological Perspectives, edited by P. J. Beurton, R. Falk and H. Rheinberger (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2000); Michael Dietrich, "From Hopeful Monsters to Homeotic Effects: Richard 
Goldschmidt's Integration of Development, Evolution, and Genetics," American Zoologist 40 (2000): 738-
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 In addition to building on existing areas of research, I attempt to contribute to the 
literature on the history of genetics by identifying reasons for rethinking some of its basic 
assumptions.  With my analysis of functions of the term “classical,” for example, I 
council for a more cautious use of a term that is generally used uncritically by historians, 
philosophers, and sociologists in their work on genetics.  Revealing vast heterogeneity in 
the subject matter characterized as “classical” by geneticists, I suggest that the 
historiographical use of “classical genetics” in contemporary critical scholarship reifies a 
category that should in fact be problematized.  In addition, I make a more general case 
for a reconceptualization of what is involved in doing “the science” of genetics.  In my 
analysis of the development of the concept of “classical genetics,” the “historical” 
presentation of the subject matter of genetics, and the framing and definition of the 
science with preface history, I identify various ways in which authors of textbooks were 
involved in creating new modes of ordering key scientific concepts and theories.  These 
chapters provide reason for rethinking the boundaries of scientific practice—for seeing 
the writing of textbooks and the writing of history as part of the “scientific” practices of 
geneticists.  Because an extensive exploration of the relationships between textbook, 
journal, and laboratory science was beyond the scope of my project, however, these 
claims are often made speculatively, indicating important areas for future research. 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                            
747; S. F. Gilbert, "Cellular Politics: Ernest Everett Just, Richard B. Goldschmidt, and the Attempt to 
Reconcile Embryology and Genetics," in The American Development of Biology, ed. R. Rainger, K. R. 
Benson and J. Maienschein (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1988); D. Joravsky, The 
Lysenko Affair (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1970); Z. Medvedev, The Rise and Fall of T. D. 
Lysenko (New York: Columbia University Press, 1969); and N. Roll-Hansen, The Lysenko Effect: The 
Politics of Science (Amherst: Humanity Books, 2005).  
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CHAPTER 1 
 
Textbook Histories: 
The Disciplining and Consolidation of the Study of Heredity 
 
 
 
Mendel’s studies were rediscovered in 1900 but their place in the life sciences was 
contested for decades, as the significance, importance, and meaning of Mendel’s methods 
and conclusions were established through their subsequent use and application.  The 
significance of “Mendel’s principles” was dependent on the ability of Mendelians to 
show the principles’ validity for a broad class of traits and organisms.  The importance of 
Mendel’s research methods was determined by the outcome of attempts to use them in a 
wide range of experiments.  And the general meaning of his work was established by the 
ways in which it was positioned and affiliated with respect to other research practices, 
theories, and teachings in the life sciences.  It was not just Mendelism, however, that was 
being shaped in the early twentieth century.  The nature of hereditary science was itself 
highly malleable in the years between the rediscovery of Mendel’s laws and the 
establishment of the chromosome theory of heredity.1 
In this chapter I will explore the consolidation of “the study of heredity” into 
“genetics” in the textbooks of the early 1900s, arguing that this disciplining of the 
science was in part achieved through history-writing.2  Textbook authors used explicit 
accounts of the history of hereditary science to identify important nineteenth century 
scientists as ancestors of the modern science and define the nature of their contributions, 
thereby establishing exemplars and key sources of authority.  These histories were also 
used to delegitimate past work, providing a “history of errors,” or “anti-canon,” that was 
                                                
1 For an overview of the competing lines of research during this period, see J. Sapp, "The Struggle for 
Authority in the Field of Heredity, 1900-1932: New Perspectives on the Rise of Genetics," Journal of the 
History of Biology 16 (1983): 313-318. 
2 NB: I will use the terms “the study of heredity” or “hereditary science” to refer to the field of inquiry and 
research as textbook authors did prior to the disciplinary deployments of “genetics.”  
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just as important as the presentation of positive exemplars.3  With both types of history-
writing, textbook authors presented a conception of what the science was about.  Once 
defined, the aim of the science directed the types of questions that its students asked, 
discouraging certain lines of inquiry.  The future of the science of heredity was thus 
guided by conceptions of its past and, as I will show, it was with competing accounts of 
history that the future was contested.  
This chapter will explore the explicit histories written in J. Arthur Thomson’s 
Heredity, William Bateson’s Mendel’s Principles of Heredity, and William Castle’s 
Genetics and Eugenics—authors and textbooks with significant roles in the formation of 
genetics.4  I will show that these authors had radically different conceptions of the nature 
of the study of heredity, and that their different conceptions of the science informed the 
ways in which they interpreted primary sources and reconstructed the contemporary 
historiography of their field.5  Thomson, Bateson, and Castle consolidated the same 
nineteenth century figures, theories, and discoveries into three distinct historical 
foundations, each of which provided support for a different type of hereditary science.  
Although this extensive historiographical heterogeneity was significantly reduced in 
subsequent generations of textbooks, as key features of “the history of genetics” became 
standardized, aspects of Thomson’s, Bateson’s, and Castle’s three different visions of the 
                                                
3 The idea of the anti-cannon comes from J. Rée, Philosophical Tales: An Essay on Philosophy and 
Literature (London: Methuen, 1987), 37-38.  Rée suggests that philosophy is unique in that it has an anti-
canon, “exemplary erroneousness is the strongest grounds for canonization,” and that works accused of 
error are not deleted from the canon, but rather elevated as “anti-classics.”  It is my contention that such an 
“anti-canon,” or history of errors, is equally important in the practice of science.  Gaston Bachelard 
identified this history of scientific errors as “lapsed history,” but did not see the ways in which it was used 
by modern science; for an overview of Bachelard’s position, see C. Chimisso, Gaston Bachelard: Critic of 
Science and the Imagination (London: Routledge, 2001), 98-99, 148-149. 
4 The other widely-distributed first generation Anglo-American textbooks were G. A. Reid, The Laws of 
Heredity (London: Methuen, 1910), and H. E. Walter, Genetics: An Introduction to the Study of Heredity, 
1st ed. (New York: Macmillan, 1913).  Walter’s textbook was in use for over thirty years, through four 
editions (1913, 1922, 1930, 1938) and numerous reprintings (e.g., 1915, 1916, 1925, 1928); its wide 
international circulation, including a translation into Japanese, was discussed by R. Clement, "Obituaries: 
Herbert Walter," The AUK 64 (1947).  For a brief description of “pioneer and standard” textbooks in this 
period, see W. E. Castle, "Some New Books on Genetics," Review of Genetics in Plant and Animal 
Improvement, by D. F. Jones,  Principles of Genetics, by E. W. Sinnott and L. C. Dunn, and Animal 
Genetics by F. A. E. Crew, Science 62 (1925): 567. 
5 Unfortunately the scope and purpose of this chapter make it infeasible to compare the histories written in 
the textbooks, the historical scholarship on which they were based, and the historical scholarship that was 
not consulted; this type of comparative analysis would certainly be interesting, and especially so for the 
second half of the century, when primary sources were rarely used by textbook authors, and both 
professional geneticists and professional historians were writing histories of genetics. 
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nature of the study of heredity—and its past and future—can be seen in the genetics of 
the following decades. 
 
 
J. Arthur Thomson and Weismannism:  Heredity as the Architecture of Germplasm 
 
At the turn of the twentieth century, Sir J. Arthur Thomson—Regius Professor of Natural 
History at the University of Aberdeen, and Lecturer on Zoology and Biology in the 
Royal Colleges of Physicians and Surgeons in Edinburgh—was regularly recruited by 
publishers to write textbooks for college courses in the natural sciences.  In this capacity 
he was very successful, authoring widely used texts for courses on heredity, sex 
determination, and general biology.6  Thomson’s Heredity, first published in 1908, was 
the first full-length textbook in English to deal with the topic of heredity after the 
rediscovery of Mendel’s laws. It was generally well received.  According to the review in 
Nature, “most of the facts on which we found our notions of heredity are set out lucidly, 
as are almost all the theories ever based on them.”7  In Science, it was said that Heredity 
“fulfils its purpose as an ‘introduction to the study of heredity’ excellently well.”8  And 
the reviewer for Botanical Gazette, describing it as “a broad and comprehensive 
treatment of the subject of heredity, a veritable mine of valuable data concisely presented 
and clearly discussed,” suggested that its value was not only pedagogical: “the worker in 
these fields will find it almost indispensable for reference.”9 
When Thomson wrote Heredity, he was “most widely recognized as the translator 
of Weismann’s works and the exponent of Weismannism,” and his textbook was seen in 
                                                
6 P. J. Bowler, "From Science to the Popularization of Science: The Career of J. Arthur Thomson," in 
Science and Beliefs: From Natural Philosophy to Natural Science, 1700-1900, ed. M. D. Eddy and D. 
Knight (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2005).  Thomson’s widely used textbooks include: P. Geddes and J. A. 
Thomson, The Evolution of Sex (New York: Humboldt, 1890); J. A. Thomson, Outlines of Zoology 
(Edinburgh: Young J. Pentland, 1892); P. Geddes and J. A. Thomson, Evolution (London: Williams and 
Norgate, 1911); P. Geddes and J. A. Thomson, Sex (New York: H. Holt, 1914); and J. A. Thomson and P. 
Geddes, Life: Outlines of General Biology (London: Harper & Brothers, 1931).  Note that many of these 
textbooks went through multiple editions.  For a discussion of the academic and publishing culture in 
which Thomson wrote these textbooks, see P. J. Bowler, "Experts and Publishers: Writing Popular Science 
in Early Twentieth-Century Britain, Writing Popular History of Science Now," British Journal for the 
History of Science 39 (2006).  
7 G. A. Reid, "Heredity," Review of Heredity, by J. A. Thomson, Nature 78 (1908): 361.  See also the 
positive reviews of the later editions: e.g., G. H. C., "Our Bookshelf," Review of Heredity, by J. A. 
Thomson, Nature 104 (1919).  
8 J. P. McMurrich, Review of Heredity, by J. A. Thomson, Science 28 (1908): 212. 
9 R. R. Gates, "Heredity," Review of Heredity, by J. A. Thomson, Botanical Gazette 47 (1909): 156. 
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this light.10  For example: Ernst Haeckel, under whom Thomson had trained, rejected 
Weismann’s theory of the continuity of the germplasm, but noted that Thomson “made a 
thoroughgoing defense of it in his important work Heredity.”11 The review of the 
textbook in Science criticized Thomson for believing “that heredity can be discussed and 
understood at present only on the assumption of the existence of such material bases of 
inheritance.”12  Even Thomson acknowledged his Weismannian orientation in the preface 
to the textbook: “I have tried to avoid partisan handling of any theme, though I have been 
at no pains to conceal my general adherence to what is called Weismannism.”13  Thus, it 
was generally recognized at the time of publication that some of Weismann’s theories 
were advocated in Heredity.  As I will show, however, the Weismannian character of the 
textbook extended beyond Thomson’s self-conscious advocacy, pervading his 
presentations of the nature of hereditary science and its history. 
In the introductory chapter of Heredity, Thomson traced the origins of hereditary 
science back to the ancients’ attempts to understand the Fates.  He wrote:  “In the olden 
days thoughtful men seemed to see the threads of life within the hands of the three sister 
Fates.”  Arguing that scientists “in the days of scientific enlightenment” still thought in 
terms of these three Fates, he suggested that the difference in the modern era was that the 
Fates had merely been reconceptualized as “heredity,” “function,” and “environment.”  
These were the three “factors that determine life.”  They were, according to Thomson, 
“the three sides of the biological prism by which, scientifically, we seek to analyze the 
light of life, never forgetting that there may be other components which we cannot deal 
with scientifically, just as there are rays of light our eyes can never see.”14  The scientific 
study of heredity was, according to Thomson, the modern manifestation of man’s never-
ending attempt to understand the nature of life.  This was the picture of the science’s past 
that introduced the study of heredity and was further developed in later accounts of the 
history of theories of heredity. 
                                                
10 Ibid.: 154.  For more on Weismann’s work and theories, see F. B. Churchill, "August Weismann and a 
Break from Tradition," Journal of the History of Biology 1 (1968).  
11 E. Haeckel, "Charles Darwin as an Anthropologist," in Darwin and Modern Science:  Essays in 
Commemoration of the Centenary of the Birth of Charles Darwin and of the Fiftieth Anniversary of the 
Publication of The Origin of Species, ed. A. C. Seward (Cambridge, England: University Press, 1909), 140. 
12 McMurrich, Review of Heredity, by J. A. Thomson: 211. 
13 J. A. Thomson, Heredity, 1st ed. (London: J. Murray, 1908), vii. 
14 Ibid., 3. 
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In a chapter devoted to “History of Theories of Heredity and Inheritance,” 
Thomson argued that the history of hereditary theory was the history of theories of the 
nature of the hereditary material.  Emphasizing that these theories were merely 
“supplemented by a theory of variation,” he developed a position that differed from that 
of many of his contemporaries who thought of heredity in terms of the study of 
evolution.15  On Thomson’s account, this conceptual hierarchy was misguided: “There 
would have been heredity even if there had been a monotonous world of Protists without 
any evolution at all, but there could not have been any evolution in the animate world 
without heredity.”  The physical basis of heredity was, according to Thomson, “a 
condition of all organic evolution.”16  And for this reason, the study of the germplasm 
was the most fundamental line of inquiry in the life sciences.  In a later discussion of the 
aims and requirements of a theory of heredity, he wrote: “The main object of a theory of 
heredity is to express in as simple terms as possible the nature of the genetic relation 
which binds generations together, and to interpret the facts of inheritance in terms of this 
relation.”17  Unlike some of his contemporaries who thought about “the nature of the 
genetic relation” in terms of phenotypic similarity, Thomson conceived of it in terms of 
germinal similarity.  And thus, he argued that biological research should be focused on 
“the architecture of inheritance…the manner in which the inheritance is organized within 
the germ-cells.”18  In advocating this view, Thomson appealed to the standards set in the 
physical sciences:  “Chemists frame hypothetical conceptions regarding the structure of 
chemical molecules…physicists make similar mental pictures—imaginary models—of 
the constitution of atoms and so on.  Can biologists do the same in regard to the material 
basis of inheritance?  This is the fundamental problem of inheritance.”19  In explaining 
what was required of such a model, he noted: “It must be harmonious with the large 
generalizations of inheritance, such as Mendel’s law or Galton’s law.”20  Thomson 
neither rejected Galton’s law nor saw Mendel’s law as the foundation of hereditary 
science, as his did his contemporary William Bateson, but rather saw them as 
                                                
15 Ibid., 397.  
16 Ibid., 4. 
17 Ibid., 395. 
18 Ibid., 396. 
19 Ibid.  
20 Ibid.  
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generalizations that needed to be understood in terms of the physical basis of heredity.  
Throughout the textbook, Thomson emphasized differences between the study of 
inheritance and the study of heredity.21  The study of inheritance, according to Thomson, 
aimed to “compare the characters of an organism with those of its parents and its 
offspring” and arrive at laws that captured the facts, such as Mendel’s and Galton’s laws: 
“It is, in the main, an observational and statistical study.” The study of heredity, on the 
other hand, tried to develop some conception of “the precise organic relation which binds 
generation to generation,” such as Weismann’s theory of the continuity of the 
germplasm.22  The life sciences, Thomson suggested, should be founded in the latter.  
Thomson’s ideas about how to explore the nature of life and how hereditary 
science should develop in the twentieth century were not only informed by his 
conception of the physical sciences, but also by a conception of their historical 
development.  In an introductory chapter, for example, he suggested: “one of the 
distinctive features of the nineteenth century has been a reduction in the number of 
supposed separate powers or entities.”23  Recounting a history in which the terms 
“Caloric”, “Light”, “Force”, and “Matter” had been resolved into “simpler” and “more 
precise” concepts, he concluded that “Heredity” needed to be similarly reconceptualized: 
In view of this progress…it cannot be a matter for surprise that a biologist 
should affirm that to speak of the ‘Principle of Heredity’ in organisms is 
like speaking of the ‘Principle of Horology’ in clocks. The sooner we get 
rid of such verbiage the better for clear thinking, since heredity is 
certainly no power, or force, or principle.24  
 
In this way, Thomson was attempting to distance hereditary theory from the vitalistic 
theories of the nineteenth century, which he explicitly criticized elsewhere:  “In the 
popular, if not also in the biological mind, there often lurks the idea of a hypothetical 
agent possessing the organism and uniting the congeries of its characters.”25  He 
proposed, and reiterated throughout the text, that the word “heredity” should be used as 
“a convenient term for the genetic relation between successive generations.”26  This 
                                                
21 Ibid., 4-6, 8-9, 13-16, 396-398. 
22 Ibid., 9 
23 Ibid., 7. 
24 Ibid., 7-8. 
25 Ibid., 4. 
26 Ibid., 6, 8. 
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would, according to Thomson, make the scientific terminology “quite objective” and “in 
line with what has occurred in other departments of science.”27  Thomson was not, 
however, merely removing the vitalistic tendencies in the language.  His claim that 
heredity was “no power, or force, or principle,” which he also repeated throughout the 
textbook, supported a picture of the science aimed at the discovery of the material 
architecture of heredity.28   
In the following chapters of the textbook, Thomson projected this 
conceptualization of the goals of hereditary science back onto the hereditary experiments 
and theories of the nineteenth century, constructing a past for his hereditary science.  The 
works of key nineteenth century figures were presented in ways that supported 
Thomson’s understanding of the importance and purpose of the science.  In a discussion 
of the elementary units of heredity, for example: 
It is interesting to notice that whether we consider Weismann’s theory of 
the determinants composing the germ-plasm, or the Mendelian theory of 
the segregation of characters in the germ-cells, or De Vries’s Mutation 
Theory, we are led to the theoretical conception of elementary units.  And 
again, we find the late Professor Weldon referring to Galton’s Law in the 
following terms: ‘The Galtonian theory postulated the presence of 
“elements” in the germ-cells of one generation, which are of two kinds.’29 
 
Here, and in individual chapters devoted to the work of Mendel, Francis Galton, and 
Hugo de Vries, Thomson identified Weismannian ideas in the theories of seminal 
historical figures.  
In the “Historical Note” that introduced a chapter on the statistical study of 
heredity, for example, Thomson described Francis Galton—well-known, amongst other 
things, for his work in biometrics—as the first person to approach the Darwinian problem 
from a statistical point of view.30  And in the chapter, which included extensive 
quotations from Galton’s Natural Inheritance (1889), he explained the law of ancestral 
inheritance and the ways in which it had been developed and used in the study of 
heredity.  It was not the specific predictions of the law, according to Thomson, that were 
                                                
27 Ibid., 8. 
28 Ibid., 6, 8. 
29 Ibid., 91. 
30 Ibid., 313.  Thomson’s presentation of this history was based on J. T. Metz, History of European 
Thought in the Nineteenth Century (London: Blackwood, 1903), esp. 618, which Thomson quoted.  For 
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most important: “it is quite legitimate to accept the general idea of this Law without 
accepting the fixity of the fractions of partial inheritance which it expresses.”31  He 
identified this “general idea” using the words of Karl Pearson, who had described the law 
as saying: “The degree to which a parental character affects offspring depends not only 
upon its development in the individual parent, but on its degree of development in the 
ancestors of that parent.”32   
Although Thomson frequently quoted Galton’s disciples in describing Galton’s 
law, his presentation was distinctly Weismannian.  At various points throughout the 
chapter, he discussed how the law’s statistical predictions about the distribution of traits 
in a group compared to the distribution of germplasm in reproduction.  For example, after 
discussing how parental hereditary contributions join in their progeny, he concluded:   
if the concept of the continuity of germ-plasm be correct, the contribution 
from the father is made up of the contributions of his two parents, and the 
contribution of the mother is made up of contributions from her two 
parents.  And so on backwards.  Thus we reach the idea, so often referred 
to in this volume, that an individual inheritance is a mosaic of ancestral 
combinations.33  
 
Here, Thomson did not mention Weismann explicitly, but presented Galton’s law as the 
conceptual extension of Weismannism, suggesting that from the Weismannian postulate, 
“the continuity of the germ-plasm,” the central concept in the law of ancestral inheritance 
followed.  When describing the significance of Galton’s law for the study of heredity, 
Thomson referred to individual organisms, stating that the law “formulates the share 
which the various ancestors have on an average in the inheritance of any given individual 
organism.”34  He did acknowledge, and emphasize, that Galton’s law was about 
statistical averages, not the materiality of individual cases: “This is a statistical 
conclusion, not a physiological interpretation.  It deals with average heritages and applies 
to masses rather than to the component individuals considered separately.”35  
Immediately after drawing this distinction, however, he attempted to diminish its 
importance: “But while Galton did not mean his Law to apply to individual cases, it must 
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32 Ibid., 329. 
33 Ibid., 323. 
34 Ibid.  
35 Ibid., 327; see also 326. 
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be approximately true of a large number of individual cases in any generation.”36  Here, 
and elsewhere in the chapter, Thomson tried to draw links between Galton’s statistical 
averages and the material heredity of individuals; it was in material bodies, not statistical 
averages, that his Weismannian theory of heredity was based.  Thus, he presented the 
“ancestral contributions” calculated by Galton’s law as though they were physical—a 
feature of the textbook that was noted in the review in Nature: “Readers of ‘Heredity’ 
will be sure to conceive a contribution as an actual something contributed to the germ-
plasm by the progenitor.”37  
In the conclusion to the chapter on the statistical method, Thomson discussed the 
possibility of translating Galton’s statistical conclusions into physiological conclusions.  
In response to A. D. Darbishire, an anti-Mendelian biometrician who had rejected the 
possibility of finding a physiological correlation to Galton’s statistical laws and argued 
that Galton’s law did not “pretend to account for anything,” Thomson wrote: “Galton’s 
statistical conclusion may ‘not pretend to account for anything,’ but there must be 
something in individual heredity to account for it.”  Thomson then defended those who 
had tried to apply Galton’s law to individual cases, suggesting that the germplasm of an 
individual might in fact contain contributions from all of its progenitors.38  And in the 
final section of the chapter, he made the link to Weismannism explicit, discussing 
whether Weismann’s or Mendel’s physiological theory fitted best with the law of 
ancestral inheritance.  Highlighting the lack of harmony between Galton’s law and 
Mendelism in several known cases, Thomson suggested that “a conceivable 
physiological interpretation” might be provided “along the lines of Weismann’s germinal 
selection of determinants.”39  In this way, he presented a potential alliance between 
Weismann and Galton—and between Weismannism and the statistical approach to 
heredity.40  In the following chapter on the experimental approach to heredity, he 
likewise linked Weismann to Mendel.   
                                                
36 Ibid.  
37 Reid, "Heredity," 361. 
38 Thomson, Heredity, 1st ed., 332-333. 
39 Ibid., 335. 
40 Although most reviews did not comment on this feature of the chapter, the review in Nature suggested 
that Thomson was inconsistent insofar as he supported incompatible aspects of Weismann’s and Galton’s 
theories: Reid, "Heredity," 361.   
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Although Thomson’s presentation of Mendel’s work was informed by the 
writings of the central British Mendelians, Bateson and R. C. Punnett, whom he quoted 
regularly, he did not describe the importance of Mendel’s work in the same way that they 
did.  Because Thomson was not primarily concerned with evolution, but rather with the 
material basis of life, he approached Mendelism from this perspective.  As in his 
discussion of Galton’s law, his account of Mendel’s work did not emphasize the 
discovery of constancy, order, or ratios—the central discoveries according to Bateson 
and Punnett.  He did not state that Mendelian phenomena were laws of nature, as some 
advocates of Mendelism did.  Rather, he characterized Mendel’s theory as “a very 
important conclusion…which is often briefly referred to as ‘Mendel’s Law’.”41  
According to Thomson, Mendel’s conclusion was not a law, but rather an interpretation: 
“Mendel discovered an important set of facts, and he also suggested a theoretical 
interpretation—the theory of gametic segregation.”42  On Thomson’s view, an 
“interpretation” was not a law, nor was it a sufficient conclusion.  In the first chapter of 
the textbook he had argued that hereditary science needed “to pass from a model of 
interpretation to a causal one,” and that biologists needed to replace “Principles of 
Heredity” with knowledge of the architecture of heredity.43  Arguing that Mendel’s 
“interpretation” was incomplete insofar as it failed to account for the material, causal 
mechanism by which segregation occurred, Thomson suggested that it be further 
elaborated.  He asked rhetorically: “Is this not a possible expression of a struggle among 
hereditary items or homologous determinants, and in line with Weismann’s theory of 
germinal selection?”44  Advocating this theory, Thomson provided a quote from 
Experimental Zoology, in which Morgan said that it seemed “highly probable” that “the 
chromosomes are the vehicles of the hereditary qualities.”45  
In suggesting a physiological account of segregation, Thomson broke with 
Bateson, who was committed to a dynamic and holistic view of the cell and was 
outspoken in his skepticism towards cytological approaches to heredity.  According to 
                                                
41 Thomson, Heredity, 1st ed., 337 (emphasis added). 
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45 Ibid.   Thomson was quoting T. H. Morgan, Experimental Zoology (New York: Macmillan, 1907), 72.  
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Bateson, Mendelism was not caused by the segregation and independent assortment of 
material particles located in the nucleus, which he saw as a morphological and 
reductionistic view; he described Mendelism as though it were the unit characters that 
were segregating, and only occasionally noted that it was really the “ultimate factors 
which cause those characters to be developed.”46  Thomson, however, nevertheless 
presented Bateson’s “elaborations” on Mendel’s work as evidence to support his 
cytological conception of segregation.  For example, after explaining Bateson’s research 
and theory of multiple segregating allelomorphs, Thomson suggested: “the added 
conception of allelomorphs or contrasted unit characters…seems to us to bring the 
Mendelian theory into close approximation to the Weismannian conception of the 
struggle and interaction and co-operation of determinants.”47  Here, Thomson tried to 
bring contemporary Mendelian research in line with Weismannian theory.  He reinforced 
this connection in his summary of Mendel’s work, stating that the idea that allelomorphs 
behaved “as if they were discrete units” was one of Mendel’s four original conclusions.48  
By emphasizing this aspect of Mendel’s thought, Thomson was able to later use 
Mendel’s results to support, by analogy, Weismann’s theory of determinants:  
Mendel’s discoveries lead us to regard the inheritance as built up of 
‘items,’ which may be inherited independently—e.g., unit characters 
corresponding to the ‘unit characters’ of the organism…These correspond 
to Weismann’s primary constituents or determinants—the germinal 
representative of the independently heritable and independently variable 
characters of the organism.49 
 
Drawing this parallel between their theories, Thomson connected Mendel with 
Weismann.  On this account, the most important consequence of Mendel’s discovery was 
not its contribution to knowledge of variation, the mechanism of evolution, or the 
mathematical order underlying heredity—as many of his contemporaries suggested—but 
rather its significance for the study of the architecture of heredity.50 
                                                
46 W. Bateson, Mendel's Principles of Heredity, 1st ed. (Cambridge, England: University Press, 1909), 11. 
47 Thomson, Heredity, 1st ed., 356. 
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 Thomson’s textbook did not go unnoticed by the British Mendelians, who 
understood the science of heredity and the significance of Mendel’s work in very 
different terms.  And the year after Heredity was published, R. C. Punnett added a 
scathing review of the textbook to a new edition of his widely-read Mendelism.51 
Describing Thomson’s treatment of the subject as “unsatisfactory and unsatisfying,” and 
providing extensive criticisms of what he considered to be its many errors, Punnett stated 
that it was written “without the knowledge which actual contact with the facts can only 
supply.”52  One of his main criticisms was that Thomson had failed to organize the 
material in a clear plan, which would have been acceptable in the nineteenth century, 
according to Punnett, because the “facts of heredity then formed a confused medley, 
without central thread or clue by which they could be related to one another.”  But with 
the rediscovery of Mendel’s laws, Punnett argued, the study of heredity had been given 
an order that should be represented in its textbooks.53  Presumably, the order Punnett had 
in mind was something like that found in the textbook he recommended in his preface—
Mendel’s Principles of Heredity, which was authored by his colleague William Bateson 
and published in 1909. 
 
 
William Bateson and Mendelism: Genetics as the Laws of Inheritance 
 
William Bateson was described as “the real founder of the science of genetics” by 
William Castle, and as the “vox clamantis in deserto” by L. C. Dunn.54  And he was, in 
fact, involved in all aspects of the earliest phase of the consolidation of genetics.55 It was 
Bateson who proposed the name “genetics” to mark the disciplinary independence of 
what had once been seen as a branch of physiology.  He introduced the terms 
“allelomorph,” “heterozygous,” and “homozygous,” giving names to concepts that 
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became essential for geneticists, and were often later associated with Mendel. 56  As 
director of the John Innes Horticultural Institute, he led one of the major British research 
programs on heredity and genetics.  His textbook, Mendel’s Principles of Heredity, was a 
standard throughout the first decades of the twentieth century, and was described by 
William Castle as “the authoritative interpretation of Mendelism.”57  A review in 
Botanical Gazette agreed, identifying it as “indispensable for reference by all students of 
heredity as a compendium of Mendelian phenomena.”58 
Mendel’s Principles did not just document Mendelism, however, but also 
polemically discredited other lines of research, presenting and advocating a new 
discipline of “genetics.”  When Bateson wrote the textbook, a decade-long conflict 
between British Mendelians and biometricians was coming to its end.  Of the presumably 
numerous causes of the conflict, the one that provided the terms in which it was 
conducted was a disagreement about the hereditary mechanism by which evolution 
occurred.59  Karl Pearson and W. F. R. Weldon, central figures in the British school of 
biometrics, argued that selection could shift the mean phenotype towards which a 
population regressed, thereby causing gradual evolution.  The statistical basis for this 
model came from Pearson’s modifications to Galton’s law of ancestral heredity, and the 
data was provided by Weldon’s experiments.  Bateson and his Mendelian colleagues 
vehemently rejected this model, arguing that evolution could only occur through saltative 
transmutation.  The results of Bateson’s morphological experiments in the 1890s 
suggested that evolution could not be a process of gradual adaptation, and the 
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rediscovery of Mendel’s work in 1900 provided evidence of the hereditary mechanism 
that could drive discontinuous evolution.  The disagreement between the Mendelians and 
biometricians turned into a significant conflict in the early 1900s, unfolding in the 
academic, public, and private domains.60  It took place in struggles over the control of 
scientific institutions, such as the Royal Society’s Evolution Committee: founded by 
Galton, and controlled by Weldon and Pearson in the late nineteenth century, the 
committee was taken over by Bateson in 1900.61  The controversy also surfaced in 
struggles over journals and publishing, such as when Pearson took extreme measures to 
prevent the publication of pro-Mendelian research in Biometrika.62  Throughout the 
conflict, Bateson used experimentation as a polemical tool with which to exclude 
biometricians from the field, denying the legitimacy of purely statistical approaches to 
heredity and evolution.63  And he continued to advance this position when writing about 
the history of hereditary science in Mendel’s Principles. 
The history of the study of evolution presented in Mendel’s Principles suggested 
that studies of the origin of species belonged within the domain of experimental studies 
of heredity, and outside the scope of statistical analysis and descriptive natural history.  
This division of fields was justified by two sets of historical claims.  In the first, Bateson 
identified evolutionary science as having its origins in the domain of naturalists using 
experimental science to study the possibility of common descent.  He argued that the 
phrases “evolution” and “origin of the species” should not be associated with Darwin, but 
rather with these naturalists working in the decades before the publication of Origin of 
the Species: “If we could ask those men to define the object of their experiments, their 
answer would be that they were seeking to determine the laws of hereditary transmission 
with the purpose of discovering the interrelationships of species.”  These naturalists, 
according to Bateson, observed the visible structures of organisms but were interested in 
the “hidden properties of living things” and had, by the mid-nineteenth century, 
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developed breeding techniques that brought them close to discovering the mathematical 
order hidden within hereditary phenomena.64   
Bateson’s presentation of the first half of the nineteenth century as an era of 
experimental breeders interested in the origin of species set up a second claim—that 
Darwinism took hold of the study of the species problem, leading naturalism into a 
period of darkness.  According to Bateson, “the experimental study of the species 
problem” was “in full activity” when Darwin published the Origin of the Species; but 
because Darwin showed that the theory of evolution was “plainly deducible from 
ordinary experience,” he made “the reality of the process…no longer doubtful.”  It was 
because of this “triumph of the evolutionary idea,” Bateson argued, that naturalists 
gradually lost their interest in experimental breeding.  After the 1860s, their work on the 
species problem was “practically abandoned” in years “marked by apathy characteristic 
of an age of faith.”65  Darwinism not only failed to provide a satisfactory account of 
evolution, but also stifled the progress of experimental breeding, leading to “years of 
wasted effort,” on Bateson’s account: “a separation was effected…between those who 
lead with theoretical opinion and those who…have retained an acquaintance with the 
facts,” or in other words, between statisticians and experimental researchers.66  Amongst 
the “grievous” consequences of this separation, he highlighted one: “the conclusion that 
evolution must proceed by insensible transformation of masses of individuals has 
become an established dogma.”67  
Bateson not only criticized Darwin, but also those who—following in the 
Darwinian tradition—advocated gradual evolution and pursued non-experimentally 
based studies of heredity.68  It was in this context that the biometricians were 
condemned: “Of the so-called investigations of heredity pursued by…Pearson and the 
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English Biometrical school it is now scarcely necessary to speak.”69  Their statistical 
method, according Bateson, “resulted only in the concealment of that order which it was 
ostensibly undertaken to reveal.”70  Those who later studied the history of science would 
find it “inexplicable that work so unsound in construction should have been respectfully 
received by the scientific world.”  The discovery of Mendelian segregation had made it 
“obvious” that their methods were “useless.”  Faced with these facts, biometricians had 
been forced to either “abandon their delusion” or “deny the truth of Mendelian facts.”  In 
“choosing the latter course” they had succeeded in delaying recognition of the value of 
Mendelism, but their denials had eventually “lost their dangerous character” and had 
come to be “regarded as merely formal.”71   
Bateson’s version of the history of biometrics was not undisputed, but neither was 
it seen as factional.  William Castle, a zoologist at Harvard who was not involved in the 
dispute, wrote in his book review: “The present work omits the controversial features of 
its predecessor, which happily are no longer required.”72  Bateson’s earlier text, Mendel’s 
Principles of Genetics: A Defence, had been seen as both a defense of the Mendelian 
approach and an attack on Weldon.  But in 1909, Castle noted without disagreement that 
Bateson merely censured biometricians “for persistently closing their eyes to the fact that 
Mendel has opened a path.”73  On Castle’s view, Bateson’s criticisms of biometrics were 
not polemical and factional, but reasonable.  
Thus far, I have shown that Bateson projected the early twentieth century conflict 
between biometricians and Mendelians onto the nineteenth century study of heredity.  He 
periodized the nineteenth century, dividing the work of naturalists into experimental and 
theoretical schools of thought.  He used history-writing, rather than overt argument, to 
suggest that the theory and statistical approach of Darwin and the Neo-Darwinians 
obstructed progress.  By delegitimating this line of research, he began to present a history 
of Mendelian science that was distinct from the general history of the hereditary sciences.  
                                                
69 Bateson, Mendel's Principles of Heredity, 1st ed., 6. 
70 Ibid., 6-7. 
71 Ibid., 7. 
72 Castle, Review of Mendel's Principles of Heredity, by W. Bateson: 482. 
73 Ibid. 
 41 
By partitioning the past, he began to identify disciplinary boundaries for the present and 
future—boundaries that he further defined in his historical discussion of Mendel.  
Bateson’s account of nineteenth century naturalists and Darwinian theory 
provided the stage on which he elevated Mendel and Mendelian genetics.  According to 
Bateson, the early hybridizers’ work on evolution and the species problem culminated in 
the experiments of Mendel.  Bateson presented Mendel as someone interested in solving 
the question of the origin of species—not as someone trying to discover the laws that 
govern heredity, as he would be presented in the next decade.  Bateson supported this 
account with a quotation of Mendel saying, “This much I do see, that nature cannot get 
on further with species-making in this way.  There must be something more behind.”74  
Bateson, who read this statement as implying that Mendel was interested in developing 
an alternative to Darwinism, then concluded: “With the views of Darwin which at that 
time were coming into prominence Mendel did not find himself in full agreement, and he 
embarked on his experiments with peas.”75  The claim that Mendel set out to challenge 
Darwin’s theory set up an opposition between the ideas of Mendel and Darwin, thereby 
creating a historical precedent for the Mendelians’ conflict with the Darwinian 
biometricians.  In addition, it allowed Bateson to define the aspects of Mendel’s work 
that he hoped modern studies would emulate.   
According to Bateson, Mendel had realized that the early hybridizers’ failure to 
reach “definite and consistent conclusions was due to a want of precise and continued 
analysis.”  Explaining that Mendel had therefore started with pure-breeding and 
homogenous materials, studied each character separately, divided the generations into 
clear groups, and recorded the results from each individual separately, Bateson identified 
the basic steps of the breeding experiments he was advocating.76  He emphasized that it 
was this systematic experimental approach that had allowed Mendel to discover the laws 
of segregation and independent assortment, stating that the connection between the 
experimental data and the 3:1 and 9:3:3:1 ratios was obvious: “The conclusion which 
Mendel drew from these observations is one which will suggest itself to anyone who 
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reflects on the facts.”77  Bateson further suggested that these ratios clearly indicated the 
operation of a universal orderly system, and that it was also obvious that this system 
involved independently segregating units.  The ratios were, according to Bateson, 
“exactly what would be expected” if the germ cells were carrying either the dominant or 
recessive character but not both.78  This account of history “naturalized” the meaning of 
Mendel’s data and the significance of his laws, suggesting that they would have been 
apparent to any neutral observer at anytime—that it was only the dogma of the 
Darwinian age that prevented this recognition.  The naturalization of this knowledge was 
supported by the story of the rediscovery of Mendel.  The simultaneous and independent 
discovery of the same phenomena in three countries suggested that these truths were 
natural features of the world, independent of culture and waiting to be rediscovered.79  
Mendel’s studies were paradigmatic of the experimental biology Bateson 
advocated, and provided strong support for his attempts to reorient the study of the 
biological sciences.80 Bateson did note, however, that the reasons why nineteenth century 
naturalists pursued their studies were not the same as the reasons for which he was 
advocating Mendelian research. He explained that while he shared their interests in the 
mechanism of evolution, he had developed a different set of primary concerns:  “The 
time has now come when appeals for the vigorous prosecution of this method should 
rather be based on other grounds.  It is as directly contributing to pure physiological 
science that genetics can present the strongest claim.”81  As he explained in the preface to 
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the textbook, Mendelian research would continue to have relevance for “the great 
problems of Biology…especially that of Evolution, and the nature of Variation.”82  But, 
Bateson suggested, the future importance of genetics had to do with its ability to reveal 
the order of heredity: “we have reached a point from which classes of phenomena 
hitherto proverbial for the seeming irregularity can be recognized as parts of a consistent 
whole.”83  According to Bateson, the “fact of segregation was the essential discovery 
which Mendel made,” and it was significant for two reasons: because it explained 
“discontinuity” in the variation of animals and plants, and more importantly, because it 
identified “regularity” in hereditary transmission.84  Through the application of the 
principle of segregation, the “vast medley of seemingly capricious facts” of heredity was 
being “shaped into an orderly and consistent whole.”85  Genetics had become “an 
organized branch of physiological science” that was disclosing “a new world of intricate 
order previously undreamt of.”86   
In addition to defining the significance of Mendel’s laws in the context of studies 
of heredity, Bateson spoke about their meaning for the life sciences in general.  He 
argued that Mendel’s experiments and the science of genetics would place biology on a 
new scientific foundation, comparable to those of physical sciences.  About Mendel’s 
laws he wrote, "The experiments which led to this advance are worthy to rank with those 
which laid the foundation of the atomic laws of chemistry."87  Through Mendel’s 
discovery, the science of heredity was becoming a science based in physical laws, thus 
providing a foundation for biology: “workers in various departments of biology will 
realize that here at last is common ground.”88 
                                                                                                                                            
understood, making his work appear revolutionary for its time.  But, as I have shown here, Bateson did not 
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82 Bateson, Mendel's Principles of Heredity, 1st ed., vi. 
83 Ibid., v. 
84 Ibid., 13.   
85 Ibid., 17.  He reiterated this point throughout the text.  See, e.g., Bateson, Mendel's Principles of 
Heredity, 1st ed., 5: “every fragment of solid evidence will quickly take its place in the development of a 
coordinated structure.”  
86 Bateson, Mendel's Principles of Heredity, 1st ed., 17. 
87 Bateson, as quoted in Thomson, Heredity, 1st ed., 336; see also: “The breeding-pen is to us what the 
test-tube is to the chemist—an instrument whereby we examine the nature of our organisms and determine 
empirically their genetic properties.”   
88 Bateson, Mendel's Principles of Heredity, 1st ed., 4. 
 44 
Bateson did not only use history-writing to promote a vision of Mendel’s work 
and exclude certain traditions and ideas from the study of heredity, but also to identify 
who was part of the scientific tradition and why.  It was in this way that he further 
defined the goals and aims of the future science.  On his account, only a few notable 
advances were made between 1870-1900, the most important being attributable to 
Galton, Weismann, and De Vries.  By identifying what he saw as their important 
contributions, Bateson shaped them into the historical foundation of future Mendelian 
science.  He praised Weismann, for example, on the grounds that he had challenged 
advocates of the inheritance of acquired characteristics to provide experimental proof for 
their theory.  It was Weismann’s challenge to the commonly accepted dogma of Darwin 
and his contemporaries that revealed the “utter inadequacy” of the evidence on which 
these beliefs were based.  This was, according to Bateson, Weismann’s only contribution 
to the science of heredity: “Weismann’s contribution, though negative, has greatly 
simplified the practical investigation of genetic problems.”89  He did not identify any 
positive proposals made by Weismann, such as his theories concerning the continuity of 
the germplasm and hereditary determinants—the proposals for which he was most well 
known, and the ideas around which Thomson had based his textbook.  Bateson was 
committed to a holistic view of the gametic cell, and rejected the chromosomal theory of 
inheritance as well as Weismann’s suggestion that the germplasm was particulate.  
Bateson, and many of his contemporaries, saw these ideas as related to the 
preformationist theories of the nineteenth century.  Thus he distanced his new science, 
and its historical foundations, from these apparently old-fashioned ideas; he removed 
Weismann’s work from the nineteenth century studies of cytoplasm, and placed it instead 
within the experimental study of the cause of variation.  Bateson brought Weismann, but 
not most of his theories, into the historical foundations of Mendelian science.  
Mendel’s Principles also identified Galton as a key figure in the history of the 
modern science of genetics.  While Bateson criticized the biometricians’ extensions of 
Galton’s work, he described Galton’s work in a manner amenable to his conception of 
genetics.  According to Bateson, Galton made key contributions insofar as he sought to 
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develop “exact knowledge of heredity” and formulated a mathematical model that 
quantified the hereditary relationship between generations: “He pointed out that the 
phenomena manifested regularity, and he made the first comprehensive attempt to 
determine the rules they obey.”90  Bateson emphasized the mathematical predictions 
made by Galton’s law: “It was through his work and influence that the existence of some 
order pervading the facts became generally recognized.”91  Here, Bateson described 
Galton’s work in the same terms that he used to discuss Mendel’s. Presenting Galton as 
someone who sought to find law-like order in heredity and proposed such a law, Bateson 
brought Galton into the history of the modern science of Mendelism.  With these claims, 
he presented a picture of Galton’s work that differed significantly from Thomson’s.  
Whereas Thomson highlighted Galton’s law of ancestral heredity because of its bearing 
on questions about the material basis of heredity, Bateson commended Galton for 
attempting to identify mathematical ratios beneath the surface of heredity. Whereas 
Thomson presented the mathematical generalizations of Galton’s law as its greatest 
weakness, Bateson treated them as being one of its most significant strengths.  Thomson 
had hoped that the law, which had been designed to identify phenotypic patterns between 
averaged generations, might be expanded to identify germplasm patterns between 
individuals.  Bateson, on the other hand, thought that there was little such 
correspondence: acknowledging that there was “admittedly a statistical accord between 
Galton’s theory and some facts of heredity,” he argued, “no one familiar with breeding or 
even with the literature of breeding could possibly accept that theory as a literal or 
adequate presentation of the facts.”92  Their presentations of the law were shaped by their 
visions of the purpose of hereditary science.  On Bateson’s account, Galton’s law was not 
a conceptual extension of Weismannism, but rather an early step towards a hereditary 
science based on physical laws. 
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William E. Castle and Evolution:  Genetics as the Coming into Being of Organisms 
 
At the time of Weldon’s death in 1906, the Biometry-Mendelism controversy was dying 
down in Britain, and Mendelian research was growing rapidly in the United States, where 
it received support from research foundations that had been established in the 1890s, the 
growing interest and involvement of American farms and breeders, and government 
funding for agricultural research made possible by the Adams Act of 1906.  This 
institutional wealth not only provided a direct stimulus for research, but also created an 
environment in which advocates of different methodological and theoretical orientations 
often cooperated.  The US quickly became the center of progress in Mendelian research; 
by 1907, British Mendelians were avidly reading American journals, such as The 
American Naturalist and Science.93 
The disciplinary development of genetics in the US was significantly shaped by 
the work of William E. Castle, head of the Bussey Institution at Harvard.94  Like Bateson 
in Britain, Castle was involved in every aspect of the institutionalization of genetics.  In 
1903, he published what would soon after be considered the first scientific journal article 
on genetics in the United States, and in 1909, he published a widely-celebrated article 
proving the validity of Weismann’s distinction between germ and somatic tissues.  He 
was the first to use Drosophila for any extensive laboratory experiments, and introduced 
the organism to Morgan, who subsequently led the Drosophila revolution in genetics.  
Castle also pioneered the use of mice in genetics, supervising the use of mice as a 
research subject by Little, who was later largely responsible for turning the mouse into a 
standard experimental animal in biology and genetics.95  As a professor at Harvard, 
Castle taught one of the first university courses in the US devoted to genetics, “Genetics 
                                                
93 On the institutionalization of genetics in the United States, see Kevles, "Genetics in the United States 
and Great Britain 1890-1930," 450-455; Sapp, "The Struggle for Authority in the Field of Heredity, 1900-
1932," 332-341; J. Harwood, Styles of Scientific Thought: The German Genetics Community 1900-1933 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993), 143-145; and C. Rosenberg, "The Social Environment of 
Scientific Innovation: Factors in the Development of Genetics in the United States," in No Other Gods 
(London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997).  
94 Castle’s contributions and importance are discussed in L. C. Dunn, "William Ernest Castle, 25 October 
1867–3 June 1962," Biographical Memoirs of the National Academy of Sciences 38 (1965). 
95 R. E. Kohler, Lords of the Fly: Drosophila Genetics and the Experimental Life (London: University of 
Chicago Press, 1994), 23; and K. Rader, "The Mouse People: Murine Genetics Work at the Bussey 
Institution, 1909-1936," Journal of the History of Biology 31 (1998): esp. 327-329, 553-554.  See also K. 
Rader, Making Mice (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004). 
 47 
and Eugenics,” which drew 134 undergraduate and graduate students in 1912-1913.96  
And three years later, he published the first edition of a textbook with the same name, 
Genetics and Eugenics, which was reprinted twice within the year and went through four 
editions by 1931.97  This textbook was, according to a review for Science by eminent 
Cold Spring Harbor geneticist C. B. Davenport, “probably the standard college text-book 
covering the whole field in a broad fashion,” and it was used widely through the 1930s.98  
But even after his textbook ceased to be used, Castle’s influence on the teaching of 
genetics continued through the work of his students; L. C. Dunn, for example, co-
authored Principles of Genetics, the standard textbook of the 1930s-1950s.99  
The introduction to Genetics and Eugenics began with a definition: “Genetics 
may be defined as the science which deals with the coming into being of organisms.”100  
While Castle did not fully explain whether he meant individual organisms or types of 
organisms, he clarified his position when he stated that genetics “does not refer…to the 
first creation of organic beings, but rather to the present and every-day creation of new 
individuals or new races.”101  With this definition of genetics, Castle presented a 
substantive connection between the coming into being of new individuals and the coming 
into being of new races—between ontogeny and phylogeny.  He did not propose the 
connection as strongly as Haeckel in his theory of recapitulation, but did suggest that the 
two were both the subject of the same science.  His conception of hereditary science 
differed radically from that of Thomson and Bateson: genetics was not about the 
germplasm or the constancy of nature, according to Castle, but rather about 
development—whether on the scale of individuals, or species.   
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In conceptualizing, structuring, and promoting his account of genetics as a 
science of “coming into being,” Castle used and reshaped the idea of evolution.  In 
contrast to Bateson and Thomson who, for different reasons, saw studies of heredity as 
providing the foundation of the life sciences, Castle suggested: “From the philosophical 
standpoint genetics is only a subdivision of evolution.”102  To understand how and why 
Castle presented a different picture, we must note that this statement was not only about 
the disciplinary place of genetics in the life sciences, but also about the way in which he 
envisioned what it was that geneticists studied.  In both respects, his claim was unlike 
those of Thomson or Bateson, for Castle was not only referring to Darwin’s theory of 
organic evolution when he spoke of evolution.  His account of the history of the theory of 
evolution redefined its basic content.  Like Bateson, Castle emphasized that Darwin was 
not the first to propose a theory of evolution: “the idea of organic evolution had often 
been suggested before his time.”103  In Castle’s textbook, however, this statement was not 
part of a criticism of Darwinian theory.  Castle was, rather, broadening the notion of 
evolution, and thus setting up very different relationships between studies of evolution 
and studies of genetics.  According to Castle, the evolutionary idea was hundreds of 
years old, originating in theories about the inorganic world:   
The principle of evolution had long been recognized in relation to 
inorganic things.  In chemistry, physics, and astronomy, the constancy and 
indestructibility of matter were fully established.  It was recognized that 
more complex states of matter…may arise out of the simple 
‘elements’…and that out of such compounds the elements may by suitable 
means be recovered again unchanged and in the original proportions.104   
 
Here, Castle suggested that the study of “evolution” was the study of one of the most 
fundamental processes in the organic and inorganic world.  This was a point that he 
reiterated throughout the textbook.  For example: “the evolution theory teaches…that all 
things, organic and inorganic, are constantly undergoing change, yet nothing wholly new 
comes into being, for everything new arises out of something which existed before.”105  
Given this broad sense of the nature of evolution, Castle defined the theory of evolution, 
with emphasis, as: “an attempt to explain the present condition of the world in terms of 
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simpler pre-existing conditions.”106  With evolution conceived in these terms, the study 
of genetics became just one way of thinking about how complexity emerged out of 
elements that remained in some sense the same.  In this presentation of genetics, Castle 
highlighted an aspect of genetics that Thomson also thought was central—the partial 
constancy of the germplasm beneath the somatic change.  But whereas Thomson saw the 
partial continuity of the germplasm as germinal stability over time, Castle saw this as 
gradual but constant change.107  
Castle’s organization of subject matter in Genetics and Eugenics was based on his 
interpretation of the nature of evolutionary theory and its relation to his conception of 
genetics as a science of “coming into being.”  Thus the first six chapters discussed, in 
order, Darwin’s theory of evolution, other contributions to the theory of evolution, 
research on acquired characters, Weismann’s theory of heredity, the study of variation, 
and mutation theory.  These ideas were presented as a continuous, rational, conceptual 
development: Darwin proposed the theory of natural selection, this theory needed an 
account of the origins of variation, Lamarck’s theory of acquired characteristics provided 
one, Weismann disproved Lamarck’s theory and developed an alternative account based 
on modification of germ cells, and De Vries built on Weismann’s account with his theory 
of mutation.  Placing this disparate set of theories into a linear narrative, Castle framed 
each one in terms of its relation to evolutionary theory.  For example, the chapter on 
Weismann began by focusing on the emergence of new organisms: “Weismann believed 
that a new type of organism arises only in consequence of the origin of a new type of 
cell.”108  The chapter on mutation likewise opened with new species: “The theory that 
new races and species originate discontinuously, and not gradually, has received its 
strongest support from the work of the Dutch botanist, Hugo de Vries.”109  And the 
chapter on acquired characters began by defining Lamarck as “the greatest evolutionist 
before Darwin.”110  In these chapters, Castle brought key historical figures from the 
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nineteenth century into a narrative about knowledge of evolution and the coming into 
being of organisms.  He did not only present the progression of ideas about evolution as a 
logical narrative, but also as a historical one, even when the ideas discussed in the 
chapters were not in chronological order.  For example: some of the ideas discussed in 
the second and third chapters, such as Lamarck’s theory of inherited characters, were 
developed prior to Darwin’s theory of evolution, which was the focus of the first chapter.  
However, Lamarck’s theory was presented in terms of its relevance in a post-Darwinian 
era.  Consequently, these chapters read like a historical progression of ideas about the 
ways in which change and complexity originate.   
Castle provided extensive accounts of the history of the subject matter, including 
extended and sometimes multiple-page quotations from both primary scientific sources, 
such as Darwin’s and Lamarck’s works, and histories of science, such as H. F. Osborn’s 
1893 From the Greeks to Darwin and R. H. Lock’s 1906 Recent Progress in the Study of 
Variation, Heredity and Evolution.  For example:  he included a three page quotation 
from Darwin’s Variation of Animals and Plants under Domestication, in order to provide 
the student with a sense of “how some of these evidences first presented themselves to 
Darwin’s mind and how he came later to value them.”111  In addition, Castle provided a 
step-by-step explanation of how Darwin’s ideas developed, beginning with his original 
formulation of the theory of natural selection in Origin of the Species, and ending with 
Darwin’s later speculations about the cause and inheritance of variation.  The extensive 
use of primary and secondary sources in Castle’s historical claims did not, however, 
mean that he did not shape and present key nineteenth century figures in line with his 
vision of the discipline of genetics.  On the contrary, he “disciplined” many of the same 
figures as Thomson and Bateson.  And his focus on “coming into being”, rather than 
statistical or material constancy, involved reinterpreting the work of Mendel, Weismann, 
and Darwin in ways that Bateson and Thomson had not.   
Castle’s account of Mendel’s experiments was nearly antithetical to Bateson’s on 
several key points.112  While both authors located Mendel’s work within the tradition of 
experimental hybridization, they disagreed about whether Mendel’s work and results 
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were particularly unique.  Castle suggested that the idea of segregation had been first 
proposed in France by Charles Naudin, “who made a comprehensive survey of the facts 
of hybridization and came very near to expressing the generalization which Mendel 
reached four years later.”  According to Castle:  
This idea of the segregation of potentialities in the germ-cells of the 
hybrid was adopted by Mendel.  He added to it the conception that the 
segregation applies to single potentialities or characteristics rather than to 
all the potentialities of a species at once, and the result is what we call 
Mendel’s Law.113   
 
On this account, Mendel’s work was not unique and he did not deserve credit for the 
laws that bore his name.  Castle was thus able to conclude: “Mendel was so little known 
when his discovery was published that it attracted little attention and was soon 
forgotten.”114  Unlike Bateson’s account of history, in which Darwinian dogma blinded 
naturalists to the significance of Mendel’s paper, Castle’s interpretation of Mendel’s 
work did not require an extensive explanation of why it was unnoticed.  He not only 
broke with Bateson on the status of Mendel as a founding father, but also on the nature of 
scientific discovery.  He used the example of Mendel to emphasize the communal aspect 
of scientific discovery: “Like all great discoveries it was not made out of hand, nor as the 
result of one man’s work alone.”115  Mendel was not presented as a lone monk working 
in isolation, as in Bateson’s textbook, but rather as someone working within a historical 
tradition: “Mendel added one final touch to the work of his predecessors as summarized 
by Naudin.”116  On Castle’s account, Mendel merely made the next small step in a long-
standing historical development of ideas.  The degree to which Castle and Bateson 
differed on Mendel is epitomized in their understanding of Mendel’s approach.  
Contradicting one of Bateson’s central claims, Castle wrote: “Had Mendel lived forty 
years later than he did, he would doubtless have been a devotee of biometry, for he had a 
mathematical type of mind.”117  
In addition to downplaying the importance of Mendel, Castle praised the late-
nineteenth century period that Bateson had characterized as being an era of dogmatism 
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and darkness.  Because Castle thought that Mendel’s law of heredity seemed “to require 
for its explanation some such system of determinants as Weismann had hypothecated and 
located in the chromosomes,” Weismannism occupied a central place in his textbook.  
Castle presented the period from 1880 to 1900 as being marked by “extreme speculation 
concerning evolution” which “found its culmination in Weismann’s brilliant essays.”118  
It is useful to note, by way of contrast, that Bateson had said that Weismann merely 
“deserves mention” for his “useful work” that revealed the “utter inadequacy” of 
evidence for the Darwinians’ theory of acquired characters. Whereas Bateson focused on 
the negative proof provided by Weismann’s work, the proof against acquired characters, 
Castle focused on Weismann claims about the nature of the germplasm—the distinction 
between the germplasm and the somatic cells.119  Here, Castle agreed with Thomson 
about the consequence of Weismann’s work, but the reasons why Castle valued it and the 
ways in which he historically situated it were very different.  Whereas Thomson focused 
on Weismann’s contributions to the architecture of inheritance, Castle presented 
Weismann’s theory of the determinants as an answer to the problem of the origin of 
change—a central problem for genetics, especially when it was conceptualized as the 
study of the continual transformation of the organic world.   
Although the protagonists of Bateson’s and Thomson’s accounts of history appear 
very differently in Genetics and Eugenics, Castle used many of the same narrative 
devices that they used.  For example: the similarity between his Darwin and the 
Mendelians’ Mendel is striking.  In Bateson’s account, Mendel’s work was ignored 
because Darwinian “dogma” caused “apathy characteristic of an age of faith.”120  In 
Castle’s account, it was Darwin who suffered this fate: “Darwin lived in a time 
particularly inhospitable to the idea of organic evolution, partly because of theological, 
and partly because of scientific dogma.”121  Whereas Bateson suggested that the 
importance of Mendel’s paper would have been immediately recognized in the pre-
Darwinian era, Castle wrote of Darwin’s theory:  “Had the idea been brought forward 
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centuries before accompanied by proofs such as Darwin advanced in its support, it 
undoubtedly would have met more ready acceptance than it found in the last century.”122  
Bateson characterized Mendel as following in the tradition of experimental hybridizers 
and succeeding where they failed because he “surmised that their failure…was due to a 
want of precise and continued analysis.”123  Similarly, Castle stated that Darwin’s 
predecessors had “formulated more or less clearly the same line of explanation which he 
adopted,” but “had failed to put it to the test of long-continued and detailed observation 
and experiment, which alone sufficed firmly to establish it.”124  The similarity between 
the Mendel and Darwin stories continues beyond the details about Mendel himself.  
Whereas the simultaneous discovery of segregation by Correns, De Vries, and 
Tschermak was a key aspect of Bateson’s account of Mendelian history, Castle focused 
on the fact that Darwin and Wallace independently developed theories “containing 
precisely the same explanation of organic adaptations” and decided to simultaneously 
publish their papers.125  In these ways, Castle’s history conveyed many of the same 
naturalizing claims about geneticists’ knowledge that Bateson promoted.  They were, 
however, advanced in support of very different visions of the nature of the discipline of 
genetics.   
 
 
Historiography and “Textbook History” 
 
While the primary aim in this chapter is to show how Thomson, Bateson, and Castle used 
history-writing to advance their very different conceptions of the nature of the study of 
heredity, it is worth noting that all three employed historiographical forms that have 
generalizable features.  “Periodizing” history, for example, draws chronological 
boundaries that define the scientific tradition.  Through periodization, the theories, 
practices, and institutions of a science are defined, presented, and established through the 
selective recruitment of the past.  This is often achieved with accounts of revolution and 
momentous discovery—narratives in which founding fathers are separated from their 
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scientific culture and cast in terms of the practices and ideas of the present. Kuhn 
described this process: 
Partly by selection and partly by distortion, the scientists of earlier ages 
are implicitly represented as having worked upon the same set of fixed 
problems and in accordance with the same set of fixed canons that the 
most recent revolution in scientific theory and method has made seem 
scientific.126   
 
As a retrospective rationalization of doctrines, practices, or ideas whose formation was in 
fact mediated by other means, periodization brings the past into the interpretive 
framework of the local scientific culture.  Periodizing accounts can often be 
complemented by “naturalizing” histories, in which scientific theory and discovery are 
presented as corresponding to human-independent facts about the world.  Here, history-
writing is used to suggest that the world speaks for itself—that the facts determine their 
interpretation.  Human-dependent factors, such as culture, are presented as obstacles that 
get in the way of science.  Naturalization can be achieved through a form of history-
writing that Bachelard named “recurrent history.”127  In recurrent history, the sanctioned 
past is arranged in a more or less continual sequence, as that which led to the present and 
anticipated it.  The present is both the culmination of the past and the standpoint from 
which its rationality is understood.  Through this type of naturalizing narrative, the 
history of a discipline can be reconstructed so as to “normalize” the stance of a particular 
faction.128  These naturalizing histories can also be used to support “fatalizing” accounts 
of scientific progress: by making the unveiling of truth appear natural, history-writing 
can make it also appear inevitable.  In both periodizing and naturalizing accounts of 
history, “framing” is involved.  By showing how ideas and theories are related—and 
what problems are most basic—“framing” accounts define the meaning and significance 
of past evidence and discoveries.  Historical figures and ideas are presented as fitting into 
a particular order; and the student, by studying this order, learns an interpretive 
framework.  It is worth noting that each of these three narrative devices acts on a 
different aspect of the science’s historicity.  Periodization treats the science 
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diachronologically, creating boundaries that divide its past into characteristically distinct 
eras.  Naturalization takes the science out of time, disassociating its knowledge from the 
historical context in which it was developed.  Framing projects present-day meaning onto 
past ideas and work, anachronistically shaping their significance.   
My analysis of the use of these three general historiographical forms in the early 
science of heredity has thus far revealed extensive heterogeneity in the first generation of 
genetics textbook histories—a finding that appears in conflict with Kuhn’s claim that 
“textbook history” is standardized according to the norms of normal science. It is 
possible, however, that my finding has little to say against the common Kuhnian view, 
for it could be the case that Kuhn is right in suggesting that discrepancies are eliminated 
as the science becomes more established.  And a brief review of second and third 
generation genetics textbooks does, in fact, seem to exonerate Kuhn: much of the 
substantial heterogeneity in the first generation of genetics textbooks was gradually 
eliminated through the standardization of the Mendel story.   
In the 1920s-1950s, most genetics textbooks claimed that the development of 
modern genetics began with Mendel.129  There were some exceptions, such as the fourth 
editions of Thomson’s Heredity and H. E. Walter’s Genetics—textbooks first written 
before 1915. But these were anomalies, and the 1938 edition of Walter’s textbook was 
one of the last that presented Mendel’s work as the basis for only one of five avenues by 
which to study genetics.  Most authors presented Mendel as the “founding father” and 
                                                
129 Mendel was presented as the founding father of genetics in T. H. Morgan, The Physical Basis of 
Heredity (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott, 1919); E. W. Sinnott and L. C. Dunn, Principles of Genetics, 1st, 
2nd, and 3rd eds. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1925, 1932, 1939);  E. W. Sinnott, L. C. Dunn, and Th. 
Dobzhansky, Principles of Genetics, 4th and 5th eds. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1950, 1958); N. Fasten, 
Principles of Genetics and Eugenics: A Study of Heredity and Variation in Plants, Animals, and Man 
(Boston: Ginn and Company, 1935); A. F. Shull, Heredity, 1st, 2nd, 3rd, and 4th eds. (New York: 
McGraw-Hill, 1926, 1931, 1938, 1948); A. H. Sturtevant and G. W. Beadle, An Introduction to Genetics 
(London: Saunders, 1939); L. H. Snyder, The Principles of Heredity, 1st, 2nd, 3rd, and 4th eds. (Boston: D. 
C. Heath, 1935, 1940, 1946, 1951); L. H. Snyder and P. R. David, The Principles of Heredity, 5th ed. 
(Boston: D. C. Heath, 1957); E. Altenburg, Genetics, 1st and Rev. eds. (New York: H. Holt, 1945, 1957); 
A. M. Winchester, Genetics: A Survey of the Principles of Heredity, 1st, 2nd, and 3rd eds. (Boston: 
Houghton Mifflin, 1951, 1958, 1961); A. M. Srb and R. D. Owen, General Genetics, 1st ed. (San 
Francisco: W. H. Freeman, 1952); A. M. Srb, R. D. Owen, and R. S. Edgar, General Genetics, 2nd ed. (San 
Francisco: W. H. Freeman, 1965); W. Hovanitz, Textbook of Genetics (New York: Elsevier Press, 1953); 
and E. O. Dodson, Genetics: The Modern Science of Heredity (Philadelphia: W. B. Saunders, 1956).  
 56 
included various tributes to his work.130  The frontispiece chosen by Cyril D. Darlington 
and Kenneth Mather, for example, showed a page from Mendel’s notebooks on which 
the results of a breeding experiment and ratio were written.131  In Sinnott and Dunn’s The 
Principles of Genetics, the frontispiece was a photograph of Mendel’s garden, captioned, 
“The birthplace of genetics.”132  Irwin H. Herskowitz’s Genetics contained a translation 
of part of a letter from Mendel to Nägeli.133  And Edward C. Colin included translations 
of “Mendel’s Autobiography” and “page one of his paper on peas” in his Elements of 
Genetics.134  Photographs of Mendel were standard, and were occasionally displayed in 
the frontispiece.135  And it was not unusual for textbooks to include translations of 
Mendel’s paper.136  The general attitude towards Mendel was well stated in the opening 
line of William Hovanitz’s Textbook of Genetics: “Genetics as a branch of learning had 
its origin in the experimental and analytical mind of Gregor Mendel.”137  By the 1940s, 
key disciplinary terms introduced by Wilhelm Johannsen and Bateson—such as the 
distinctions between phenotype and genotype, and homozygous and heterozygous—were 
being presented as part of Mendel’s conclusions.138  
Almost all of the second and third generations of textbooks highlighted Mendel’s 
humble origins, the greatness of his discovery, and the justice in the fact that the world 
eventually came to recognize his genius.  In these ways, the Mendel story became 
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standardized in form of the heroic historiographical tradition.139  However, like many of 
the founding father histories written in the nineteenth century, the Mendel story also 
included a feature of the pragmatic historiography of the enlightenment: the rationality of 
Mendel’s approach was regularly identified as the key to his success, implying that his 
discovery was the inevitable outcome of rational science.  During the second half of the 
twentieth century, this fatalization of his discovery was explicitly articulated.  In the 
widely used Heredity and Development, for example, J. A. Moore described the 
rediscovery of Mendel’s laws:   
This is another example of a frequent happening in science.  When the 
field is ‘ready,’ the discovery is certain to be made. If Mendel had never 
lived, the history of genetics would not have been greatly different. About 
the year 1900, either he would be rediscovered or, had he never lived, 
others would reach essentially the same conclusions as he had in 1866. 
His work was unappreciated in his own lifetime, for biologists in 1866 
had neither the background nor the prescience to understand the 
significance of what he had accomplished.140 
 
Heroic and fatalizing accounts of the founding of disciplines often exist in conflict.  This 
is because the heroic founding father narrative creates an image of a discovery that 
sprang from the mind of genius working outside the realm of normal science—an image 
in which the discovery might not have been made without the founding father, and is 
therefore historically contingent.  In contrast to this picture is that created by a fatalizing 
account of scientific discoveries, which suggests that they are inevitable—that the 
rationality of science governs and guarantees the progress of science.  Because of this 
conflict, disciplinary origin narratives that rely on both types of claims are often 
internally incoherent.  In the specific case of the Mendel story, however, this conflict is 
averted.  What is unique about the Mendel founding father story is that it does not claim 
that he actually “founded” genetics.  Mendel’s status is not based on the claim that he 
was the prime cause of genetics, but rather that he was the first geneticist—a geneticist 
before the time of genetics.  With the story of long neglect and simultaneous rediscovery, 
Mendel’s heroic status of genius is justified at the same time that his discoveries are 
fatalized.  
                                                
139 For a brief overview of five “epochs” of historiography—doxographic, erudite (or Humanist), 
pragmatic (or Enlightened), heroic (or Romantic), positivist (or Modern)—see N. Jardine, The Scenes of 
Inquiry: On the Reality of Questions in the Sciences (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991), 126-130. 
140 J. A. Moore, Heredity and Development, 1st ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1963), 45. 
 58 
The heroic periodization and fatalized naturalization of Mendel’s work became a 
standard feature of genetics textbooks by the mid-twentieth century.  But where histories 
become standardized on the surface, instability can continue unseen underneath, and a 
brief look at some later textbooks suggests that “the history of genetics” was not as stable 
as it might seem.  Despite the consensus about Mendel’s status as founding father, the 
meaning of Mendel’s work and the historical context in which it was situated continued 
to change throughout the first half of the twentieth century.  In A. F. Shull’s Heredity, for 
example, there were significant revisions between the first edition of 1926, and the fourth 
edition of 1948.  In the first, Mendel’s work was discussed in relation to that of Darwin, 
and Shull focused on the fact that Mendel had discovered laws of heredity.141  Few 
changes were made in the second edition, but in the third, Darwin was replaced by the 
German botanist Joseph Gottlieb Kölreuter, who was presented—along with Mendel—as 
using hybridization experiments to study “the processes of heredity.”142  In the fourth 
edition, Mendel and Kölreuter were again refashioned, and presented as working on 
“particulate inheritance.”143  This recontextualization of Mendel corresponded with 
reinterpretations of the significance of his work.  By the 1920s, key aspects of Bateson’s 
presentation of Mendel were no longer included.  For example: Mendel’s work was no 
longer presented in the context of evolutionary debates about variation and the origin of 
new species.  Rather, as stated in Principles of Genetics: “The results which Mendel 
obtained…were chiefly important in showing that inheritance…was subject to certain 
definite rules or laws.”144  This understanding of his work continued throughout the 
1920s and 1930s.  But by the 1940s, textbook authors began to focus on the gene.  In the 
1945 edition of Edgar Altenburg’s Genetics, for example: “Mendel clearly demonstrated 
by his crosses that the hereditary material of a plant or animal consists of separable 
units—the units we now call genes.”145  W. R. Singleton made a similar suggestion in 
Elementary Genetics, justifying the anachronism of the claim: “We can properly say that 
Mendel discovered the gene.  It was not so named until many years later, but Mendel 
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discovered it just as truly as Columbus discovered America, which also was not so 
named until many years later.”146  Similar shifts, towards an emphasis on the gene, also 
occurred with respect to other nineteenth century scientists.  For example: in the 1925 
edition of Principles of Genetics, a discussion of many nineteenth century scientists 
briefly mentioned Weismann because of his important rejection of the theory of the 
inheritance of acquired characteristics; by the time of the 1958 edition, however, 
Weismann was one of the few historical figures discussed in the textbook, his germplasm 
theory was presented as a precursor to the theory of the gene, and he was described as 
“the forerunner of modern genetics.”147  Thus, the nineteenth century work of Mendel 
and Weismann was reinterpreted as it was recruited into the conceptual framework of 
gene-oriented genetics. 
The use of Mendel for disciplinary purposes has not gone unnoticed by 
geneticists, nor has it escaped the attention of historians.  As early as 1936, statistician 
and geneticist R. A. Fisher criticized Bateson’s “polemical use of the rediscovery,” 
concluding: 
Each generation, perhaps, found in Mendel's paper only what it expected 
to find; in the first period a repetition of the hybridization results 
commonly reported, in the second a discovery in inheritance supposedly 
difficult to reconcile with continuous evolution.  Each generation, 
therefore, ignored what did not confirm its own expectations.148 
 
In this article, Fisher also advanced the controversial suggestion that Mendel had 
falsified some of his data.  And since the 1960s, a steady flow of scholarship by 
geneticists and historians has addressed the topic in detail.149  There has also been 
substantial disagreement about whether Mendel discovered and articulated the laws of 
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inheritance that carry his name—whether or not Mendel was a Mendelian.150  Points of 
significant contention include Mendel’s intentions, his conclusions, and the ways in 
which his work has been misinterpreted and used by geneticists in the twentieth century.   
The variety and persistence of arguments about the “real” Mendel are indicative 
of the degree to which statements about founding fathers are part of scientific discourse.  
Disagreements about the nature of the Mendel’s discovery were not merely 
disagreements about the past, but rather were part of arguments about productive and 
legitimate modes of practice and explanation.  Claims about Mendel’s experiments and 
discoveries were used to identify and establish acceptable methods of inquiry, to attribute 
significance to experimental data, and to articulate procedures by which evidence could 
be evaluated.  Representations of Mendel’s work were used to define the nature and 
tradition of the science of genetics.151  As I have indicated in this chapter, the meaning of 
Mendelism was gradually reshaped over the early decades of the twentieth century: 
whereas Bateson, Punnett, and the early Mendelians saw Mendelism and Darwinism in 
conflict, the geneticists of the synthesis made them compatible.  This was not, however, 
the only point of conflict in this period.  In addition, divergent and conflicting interests in 
heredity and evolution caused arguments about the purpose and future direction of 
genetics, the legitimacy of competing methods for gathering data, and the meaning of 
data collected: embryologists and geneticists disagreed about whether Mendelian genes 
controlled all or only superficial characteristics of the organism; and population 
geneticists disagreed with experimental geneticists about the value of data collected in 
the laboratory versus that in the field.  I suspect that an analysis of textbooks will find 
these disagreements beneath the surface of the seemingly standardized history, reflected 
in subtle differences in accounts of Mendel's intentions and conclusions.  Thus, I suggest 
that it is not the standardization of history in textbooks, as Kuhn suggested, but rather the 
appearance of standardization that gives history-writing its disciplining power.  It is 
similarities in surface, belying underlying substantive differences, that imbue textbook 
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histories with normative weight—with the authority of tradition.  By organizing the past 
and present into a coordinated foundation for the future of the discipline, history-writing 
projects a coherent purpose onto the science that defines and guides its “natural” course 
of progress.  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
In general, a discipline cannot be defined by reference to its subject domain alone.  While 
some disciplines can be more or less identified by their content or methods, such clear 
demarcation is unusual.  Disciplinary boundaries are frequently disputed and require 
enforcement.  Thus, a discipline emerges and maintains itself by wielding power over 
these boundaries, defining the terms in which its relationships with other sciences are 
seen.  Through claims about a science’s past, a picture of its purpose and relation to other 
sciences is presented. Given that the significance of facts—the way in which data is 
constituted as evidence—is dependent on what counts as “the problem” of a science, 
history-writing allows for an articulation of the discipline’s methods of investigation and 
modes of interpretation.  The ordering of ideas and theories, hierarchically or in 
networks, shapes their meaning.  The student who is taught to see key historical figures 
and ideas as fitting into a particular order is inculcated into an interpretative framework.  
Thus the writing of history does not only help discipline the science’s past, but also 
provides the student with a way of seeing that will shape future interpretations of 
significance and meaning. 
In this chapter, I have explored the histories told in three influential first 
generation genetics textbooks in order to study and explore the relationship between 
history-writing and the establishment of genetics as an independent branch of biology.  I 
have found that history-writing situated the science within several narratives of scientific 
progress.  The most prominent account presented the development of the science from 
within.  A second, externalist, narrative located genetics within the development of the 
life sciences, characterizing it as either a branch or the future foundation of biology.  And 
the third discussed the general nature of scientific inquiry and scientific laws, situating 
the principles of genetics within an account of the development of quantification and 
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predictive models in the physical sciences.  With these historical contextualizations of 
the discipline, textbooks defined the nature of genetics—as a field of inquiry, as a 
discipline within the life sciences, and as a type of science.  These forms of history-
writing periodized, naturalized, and framed the research, theories, and discoveries of 
hereditary science.  They were used to recruit past theories and thinkers into modern 
formulations of the science, demonstrate the validity and invalidity of practices and 
theories, make the knowledge and progress of genetics appear inevitable, and define the 
conceptual coherence that unified genetics as a science.  At times, these uses were 
motivated by controversy and factional interests.  Bateson’s account of history, for 
example, was clearly meant to discredit the biometricians on the one hand, and legitimate 
and naturalize the rise of Mendelism on the other.  These intentionally polemical uses of 
history have not, however, been the focus of my analysis.  Rather, I have tried to 
illustrate that Kuhnian claims about the functions of disciplinary histories do not go far 
enough in challenging the common view that history could be removed from the teaching 
of science.  The functions of historical claims are not limited to those of truncated and 
distorted presentistic histories, by which past scientists appear to have worked on “the 
same set of fixed canons that the most recent revolution in scientific theory and method 
has made seem scientific” and students “come to feel like participants in a long-standing 
historical tradition.”152  The more subtle disciplinary functions are performed by 
historical accounts that convey, order, and attribute significance to past facts, theories, 
and practices pertaining to the study of heredity—histories that position a science in 
relation to other sciences.  Focusing on these functions, I have argued that a textbook’s 
account of a science’s history is not a frame in which the science is presented and from 
which it can be removed.  It is, rather, deeply embedded in the teaching of the discipline, 
and thereby inextricably connected with scientific practice. 
I have shown that there was little standardization in the first generation of 
“genetics” textbooks.  Bateson, Thomson, and Castle each presented what could be 
considered as being a discipline that was distinct from that of the others.  Their histories 
referred to many of the same historical figures and theories, but established very different 
                                                
152 Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 138.  
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visions of the basic nature of the study of heredity.  The work of Weismann, Galton, and 
Mendel was interpreted and shaped to fit distinct and coherent visions of the history and 
purpose of the study of heredity.  Weismann, for example, was seen as doing something 
different by Thomson, Bateson, and Castle: as illuminating the architecture of the 
hereditary material, disproving the theory of the inheritance of acquired characteristics, 
and identifying the causes of change in individuals and species, respectively.  Galton’s 
law of ancestral heredity was similarly read in three ways: as a conceptualization of 
ancestry in terms of the continuity between generations, an attempt to discover 
mathematical order in heredity, and a contribution to the theory of evolution.  And 
Mendel’s law of segregation was interpreted as either the identification of the particulate 
nature of the germplasm, the discovery of mathematical order in heredity, or a way of 
thinking about the mechanism of evolution.  Although these various readings of what 
were agreed to be foundational works were not in and of themselves incommensurable, 
they remained distinct in the first generation of genetics textbooks.  Each was created by 
and involved in the operation of a disciplinary framework that characterized the 
significance of past research, theories, and practices in ways that aligned them with a 
vision of the future of the science, thereby governing the path of its development.  For 
Bateson, genetics was a science devoted to discovering laws and mathematical order.  On 
Thomson’s understanding, it was a search to identify the materiality and architecture of 
inheritance.  And Castle saw it as an attempt to understand the process of the coming into 
being of new lives and types of life.  These different understandings of the purpose of 
genetics corresponded with different ways of establishing order within the science—of 
deciding which evidence supported which theory, what concepts were most fundamental, 
and how genetics was situated in relation to other sciences.   
Exploring three disciplinary frameworks in the early twentieth century, I have 
indicated the nature of the historical contingency and the interpretation implicit in the 
science that later took Mendel’s laws as its foundation.  Whether Mendelian segregation 
was a law to which there were exceptions, or a group of exceptions to the norm, was not 
decided by reference to features of the world, but rather by aspects of scientific culture—
by ways of attributing meaning and significance to facts.  Bateson recognized that there 
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were innumerable cases of breeding that did not clearly segregate, and characterized 
these cases as exceptions to a rule.  Thomson, looking at the same data, concluded that it 
was Mendelian segregation that was an exception.  This difference in interpretation did 
not arise from disagreement about the percentage of traits that exhibited segregation, but 
rather from the authors’ very different ideas of what genetics was about.  For Bateson, 
genetics was a science devoted to finding constant laws in biology comparable to those in 
the physical sciences.  On this account, Mendelian segregation naturally provided the 
foundation on which the discipline would be built.  But for Thomson, who thought of the 
science as the study of the material basis of heredity, there was no compelling reason to 
think of Mendel’s laws as the core of the discipline.  Mendelian phenomena were helpful 
insofar as they illuminated the nature of the architecture of the germplasm.   
Presentations of the science of genetics in subsequent generations included 
aspects of Thomson’s, Bateson’s, Castle’s interpretive frameworks.  The extent of their 
synthesis cannot be addressed here, but it is worth briefly noting a few points.  Bateson’s 
vision of the conceptual structure of genetics was adopted in most textbooks, which 
began with Mendel’s principles, and proceeded step by step through apparent exceptions, 
modifying principles, and actual exceptions; the physical basis of heredity was often 
discussed only insofar as it was necessary to explain the principles of genetics.  In this 
way, students were brought to see Mendel’s laws as the conceptual foundation of the 
discipline.  The interpretation of these laws, however, was very much informed by 
Thomson’s Weismannism.  Mendelian segregation was understood as a physical event 
regarding genes in the chromosomes; and the gene was conceptualized as the most basic 
unit in the architecture of inheritance.  And with the rise of the evolutionary synthesis, 
Castle’s emphasis on life and the “coming into being” of organisms made its way into the 
super-structure of many textbooks.  Introductory chapters contextualized the study of 
genetics within discussions of the nature of life.153  
In a general introduction to science that was published shortly after the first 
edition of Heredity, Thomson wrote that a science “is defined not by its subject matter, 
                                                
153 See, e.g., Srb and Owen, General Genetics, 1st ed., which began with a chapter “Inherent Patterns in 
Living Things,” discussing the fundamental unity of life; and Sinnott, Dunn, and Dobzhansky, Principles 
of Genetics, 5th ed., in which “Heredity and the Continuity of Life” replaced “Genetics, the Science of 
Heredity and Variation” as the first chapter.  In these textbooks, “life” became an organizing trope. 
 65 
but by the categories under which it thinks of that subject matter” and by “its point of 
view—the particular kind of question it asks."154  It has been an aim of this chapter to 
explore how the categories and field of potential questions for geneticists came into 
existence during the early twentieth century.  My contention is that history-writing was 
not merely a way of presenting the discipline, but rather was an essential tool involved in 
its creation.  It was through history-writing that proper methods of investigation and 
interpretation were articulated and demonstrated, and that questions were endowed with 
significance.  This is not merely to say that historical contextualization made some 
questions seem more pressing than others, but also and more importantly, that it was 
constitutive of the reality of questions.  The way in which the discipline was pictured—
the way its history was seen—limited what could and could not be seen as potential 
questions.  In the following chapter, I will further explore this theme in a study of how 
the students’ epistemic stance was shaped through the use of historical exemplars. 
                                                
154 J. A. Thomson, Introduction to Science (New York: H. Holt, 1911), 229. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
Virtual Historical Environments: 
Principles, Exemplars, and the Enculturation of Students 
 
 
 
Is what we call “obeying a rule” something that it would be possible for only one 
man to do, and to do only once in his life? 
  
Ludwig Wittgenstein, in Philosophical Investigations.1  
 
 
They have said that to make a general principle worth anything, you must give it a 
body.  You must show in which way and how far it would be applied actually in an 
actual system.  You must show how it has gradually emerged as the felt 
reconciliation of concrete instances…Finally, you must show its historic relations to 
other principles often of very different dates and origins. 
 
Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr., in an address to the Harvard Law School.2 
 
 
 
In this chapter, I will discuss the use of a type of history-writing that did not take the 
form of “a history” of genetics.  Looking beyond historical claims that were presented as 
history, I will investigate the writing of historical cases with which authors taught what 
they conceived of as their science.  I will look not only at how “the principles of 
genetics” were taught, but also at the ways in which the student gained the tacit skills 
needed to understand and use these principles.  Exploring the relationship between 
historical cases and principles, I will ask how and why history-writing became central to 
the pedagogical, disciplining environment created in and by textbooks.   
                                                
1 L. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, trans. G. E. M. Anscombe, 3rd ed. (Oxford: Blackwell, 
2001), §199 (emphasis original). 
2 O. W. Holmes Jr., "The Harvard Law School [Justice Holmes' Oration at the 'Quarter-Millennial' 
Celebration of Harvard University on the 5th of November, 1886]," Law Quarterly Review 3 (1887): 121. 
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In developing my argument, I will draw on Thomas Kuhn’s analysis of 
exemplars, which is not only analytically helpful in understanding the scientific functions 
of history-writing, but also substantively connected to the use of historical cases in the 
teaching of science.3  The arguments about exemplars articulated in Structure of 
Scientific Revolutions were inspired by Kuhn’s experiences teaching cases from the 
history of physics at Harvard.4  His course was part of a curriculum being developed in 
the 1940s by the university’s president, James Conant, who believed that a realistic 
understanding of the “tactics and strategy of science” was essential for all citizens of a 
democracy, and that the nature of science could be best conveyed with the case-study 
method used at Harvard’s Schools of Law, Medicine and Business.  This method was 
originally introduced and developed at the Law School, by Professor Christopher 
Columbus Langdell during his time as Dean (1870-1895), as a solution to the problem of 
how to present a tangled web of legal precedents as a principled or doctrinal system of 
law.5  According to Langdell, “the best, if not the only way of mastering the doctrine 
effectively is by studying the cases in which it is embodied.”6  This method of teaching 
was then adopted in the Harvard Medical School at the turn of the century, and in the 
Business School at its founding in 1911.7  It was in the context of this intellectual legacy 
that Kuhn followed Conant’s curriculum and taught physics using the case-study method; 
and it was from this experience that Kuhn went on to argue that shared exemplars 
provided the foundation of scientific communities and the empirical content of scientific 
laws.  Thus, when I bring Kuhn’s conception of exemplars to bear on the functions of 
history-writing in the teaching of science in the 1930s, it is genealogically related ideas 
                                                
3 Note that Kuhn introduced the term “exemplar” in the postscript to the second edition of The Structure of 
Scientific Revolutions to clarify to clarify what he saw as “the most novel and least understood aspect of 
this book”—his conception of a scientific paradigm as a set of shared examples, or “concrete problem-
solutions that students encounter from the start of their scientific education.”  See T. Kuhn, The Structure 
of Scientific Revolutions, 2nd ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970), 186-187.  Much of this 
analysis was originally articulated in Chapter 4, Normal Science as Puzzle-Solving, and Chapter 5, The 
Priority of Paradigm. 
4 Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, vii.  
5 J. Forrester, "If P, Then What?  Thinking in Cases," History of the Human Sciences 9 (1996): 15. 
6 C. C. Langdell, A Selection of Cases on the Law of Contracts (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 1871), vii, as quoted in Forrester, "If P, Then What?  Thinking in Cases," 15, which drew my 
attention to the work of Langdell.   
7 Forrester, "If P, Then What?  Thinking in Cases," 15-16. 
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that are brought together.8  Before I develop my study, however, I will first identify some 
of the key points of Kuhn’s analysis.  
According to Kuhn, there are two forms in which students encounter exemplars.  
The first is in portrayals of good science.  These can be model lines of though, such as 
Aristotle's analysis of motion, Ptolemy's computations of planetary positions, Lavoisier's 
application of the chemical balance, or Maxwell's mathematization of the 
electromagnetic field.9  Or alternatively, they can be entire books or papers, such Lyell’s 
Geology, Lavoisier's Traité Elémentaire de Chimie, or Newton's Principia and Opticks.10  
These models of good science not only contain theories, laws, and principles, but also 
show how they are used to solve important problems, particularly when the solution 
involves a new experimental or mathematical approach (e.g., the chemical balance in 
Traité Elémentaire de Chimie, or the calculus in Principia Mathematica).  An exemplar 
is not constituted in a model experiment alone, however, but rather relies on problem-
solving exercises that correspond to the model—“the problem-solutions…at the ends of 
chapters in science texts.”11  These exercises allow the student to practice using the law 
or principle derived; and more importantly, they define the types of problems that can be 
solved using the law or principle.  Thus, although the historicity of the problems is not 
always explicit, they must be understood as crucial components of the historical 
exemplars that are used in the teaching of the science.   
Kuhn identifies three general functions fulfilled by exemplars in scientific 
practice: they suggest new puzzles, provide a method for solving them, and serve as the 
standard by which the quality of a proposed solution can be measured.12  By studying 
exemplars, the beginning student learns how to see a new problem as similar to the 
                                                
8 For more on this history, see J. Harvey, "History of Science, History and Science, and Natural Sciences: 
Undergraduate Teaching of the History of Science at Harvard, 1938-1970," Isis 90 (1999); M. A. Dennis, 
"Historiography of Science: An American Perspective," in Science in the Twentieth Century, ed. J. Krige 
and D. Pestre (United Kingdom: Harwood Academic Publishers, 1997), 10-22; Forrester, "If P, Then 
What?  Thinking in Cases," esp. 6-16; and E. A. Melia, "Science, Values and Education," 443-459.  
Although Conant focused on teaching science to non-scientists, his ideas impacted the general teaching of 
science to scientists; for example, Conant’s On Understanding Science and Science and Common Sense 
were cited in the first chapter of a widely used college biology textbook: W. C. Beaver, General Biology, 
5th ed. (St. Louis: C. V. Mosby, 1958), 31.  
9 Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 23.  
10 Ibid., 10. 
11 Ibid., 187. 
12 Ibid., 35-42. 
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exemplar, and how to apply the principles used in the exemplar to the new problem.  
However, the judgments of similarity that provide the foundation for this exemplar-based 
reasoning do not correspond to inherent similarities between cases, according to Kuhn, 
but rather are a matter of social agreement.  In support of this claim, Kuhn discusses the 
process by which a child learns to recognize geese, ducks, and swans.13  He argues that 
the child learns “to apply symbolic labels to nature without anything like definitions or 
correspondence rules.”14  Concepts and objects in the world are constituted together in 
this process of learning by ostention; and Kuhn suggests that the learning of scientific 
concepts and laws is similar.  To learn an exemplar is to internalize a new way of seeing: 
what was once seen as a stone on the end of a string becomes a pendulum.  Students 
learn the concepts of space, time, mass, and force as they internalize the corresponding 
Newtonian exemplars, and in this way they come to see Newtonian objects for the first 
time.15  The similarity between the various cases in which a given scientific principle or 
law applies is like the similarity between geese: “shared examples have essential 
cognitive functions prior to a specification of criteria with respect to which they are 
exemplary.”16  Kuhn argues that they are socially agreed-upon similarities that cannot be 
fully captured by criteria or rules.  In this way, his account of exemplars rejects aspects 
of the conventional picture of scientific laws and the process by which they are applied. 
On Kuhn’s picture, textbooks must be understood as tools for teaching the student 
the similarity relationships that undergird scientific practice.  One of the ways in which 
textbooks do this is by teaching beginning scientists how to ‘simplify’ a complex 
problem—to isolate the aspects of the complex problem that will allow it to be seen as 
similar to the paradigmatic case.  By demonstrating how to reconceptualize a new 
problem in terms of an old, the textbook exemplar enables scientists to see new puzzle-
situations in terms of familiar puzzles, and hence enables them to see potential solutions 
to their new puzzles.  The student does not learn the theory by merely memorizing 
formulas or rules, but rather grasps the theory by learning how to apply it properly to 
                                                
13 T. Kuhn, "Second Thoughts on Paradigms," in The Structure of Scientific Theories, ed. F. Suppe 
(London: University of Illinois Press, 1974), 473-482. 
14 Ibid., 475. 
15 Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 118-128. 
16 Kuhn, "Second Thoughts on Paradigms," 477. 
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solve the standard problems.17  Given the nature of the similarity relationships on which 
scientific practice is based, textbooks cannot separate facts from method of investigation; 
students learn both together, “as samples of accepted achievement.”18 
Kuhn not only rejects the conventional picture of the way in which rules are 
learned and applied, but also the traditional presumption that theories and laws determine 
the empirical content of science.  If the key determinant in the acceptability of a proposed 
puzzle-solution is its similarity to the paradigmatic puzzle-solutions—and that perception 
of similarity cannot be reduced to rules—the science does not consist fundamentally of 
its laws, but rather is defined centrally by its exemplars:  "In the absence of such 
exemplars, the laws and theories...would have little empirical content."19  This means that 
learning a science involves acquiring a new way of seeing—acquiring the ability to 
group problems according to the theoretical principles that are relevant to those 
problems.  It is thus these "similarity groupings" of mature scientists that distinguish 
them from students.  It is shared exemplars, rather than a complex system of rules, that 
unifies a scientific community.20 
Kuhn’s idea of shared exemplars as the basis of a scientific community provides 
the conceptual starting point of this chapter, which begins with the observation that 
detailed accounts of Mendel’s experiments occupy a central place in almost all genetics 
textbooks of the second quarter of the twentieth century, and proceeds by exploring the 
functions and importance of these reconstructions of history that are not presented as 
accounts of the past.21  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
17 Ibid., 471. 
18 T. Kuhn, "Discussion," in Scientific Change, ed. A. C. Crombie (London: Heinemann, 1963), 391. 
19 Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 188. 
20 For a more extensive discussion of Kuhn’s claims about scientific training, exemplars and similarity 
relations, see the second chapter of B. Barnes, T. S. Kuhn and Social Science (London: Macmillan, 1982), 
16-40.  See also Forrester, "If P, Then What?  Thinking in Cases," esp. 8-10. 
21 On the uses and functions of statements about key experiments that are made in scientists’ accounts of 
the past, see G. N. Gilbert and M. Mulkay, "Experiments Are the Key: Participants' Histories and 
Historians' Histories of Science," Isis 75 (1984). 
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The Presentation of Past Experiments as a Virtual Historical Environment:   
Teaching rule-finding, or, how to see with the principles of geneticists 
 
 
When R. C. Punnett predicted of Mendel’s work, “the lucidity of the exposition will 
always give it high rank among the classics of biological literature,” he was right.22  
Mendel’s experiments with peas were described in almost all genetics textbooks 
published after the mid-1920s.23  Often, these descriptions were complemented by a 
translation of Mendel’s papers—a historical exemplar that was first used in Bateson’s 
Mendel’s Principles of Heredity: A Defense (1902), in which Mendel’s writings 
accounted for almost one third of the pages, and remained a popular feature of textbooks 
written through the 1950s.24  One of the common reasons authors gave for presenting 
Mendel’s work was that it provided the student with a model of scientific ideals.  Robert 
King, for example, wrote: “the present-day geneticist need only follow the example set 
by the elegant experimentation of Gregor Mendel.”25  In general, three features of 
Mendel’s work were identified as key to his success: his simplification of the problem of 
heredity,26 his organization of his experimental results,27 and his attention to the 
                                                
22 R. C. Punnett, Mendelism, 3rd ed. (London: Macmillan, 1911), 7. 
23 See, e.g., H. E. Walter, Genetics: An Introduction to the Study of Heredity, Rev., 3rd, and 4th eds. (New 
York: Macmillan, 1922, 1930, 1938); E. W. Sinnott et al., Principles of Genetics, 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, and 5th 
eds. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1925, 1932, 1939, 1950, 1958); A. F. Shull, Heredity, 2nd, 3rd, and 4th 
eds. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1931, 1938, 1948); A. H. Sturtevant and G. W. Beadle, An Introduction to 
Genetics (London: Saunders, 1939); E. Altenburg, Genetics, 1st and Rev. eds. (New York: H. Holt, 1945, 
1957); A. M. Winchester, Genetics: A Survey of the Principles of Heredity, 1st, 2nd, 3rd eds. (Boston: 
Houghton Mifflin, 1951, 1958, 1966); W. R. Singleton, Elementary Genetics (New York: D. Van 
Nostrand, 1962); and R. C. King, Genetics, 1st and 2nd eds. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1962, 
1965).  Note that in the first edition of some of these textbooks—e.g., Shull’s Heredity and Walter’s 
Genetics—Mendel’s experiments were not described.  
24 See, e.g., W. E. Castle, Genetics and Eugenics: A Text-book for Students of Biology and a Reference 
Book for Animal and Plant Breeders, 1st ed. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1916), Appendix; 
E. O. Dodson, Genetics: The Modern Science of Heredity (Philadelphia: W. B. Saunders, 1956), Appendix 
A; and Sinnott, Dunn, and Dobzhansky, Principles, 4th and 5th eds., Appendix.  Note that reviews 
generally praised authors for providing the student with access to Mendel’s work.  See, e.g., "A Text-Book 
of Genetics," Review of Genetics and Eugenics, by W. E. Castle, Nature 99 (1917): 203: “An excellent 
feature is an appendix containing a translation of Mendel’s paper, which ought to be carefully digested by 
every student.”  See also E. Caspari, Review of Principles of Genetics, by E. W. Sinnott, L. C. Dunn, and 
Th. Dobzhansky, Science 112 (1950): 725: “It is to be hoped that many teachers will make use of this 
opportunity to introduce to their students the beautifully clear logic and presentation and the great 
experimental skill of Gregor Mendel.” 
25 King, Genetics, 1st ed., 69.  
26 E.g., Sinnott and Dunn, Principles of Genetics, 1st ed., 37-38: “Where earlier investigators had made 
general observations upon the animal or plant as a whole…Mendel instead still further simplified the 
problem by confining his attention to a single character at a time.”  See also T. H. Morgan, The Physical 
Basis of Heredity (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott, 1919), 19. 
27 E.g., Sinnott and Dunn, Principles of Genetics, 1st ed., 38-39: “In tracing these characteristics from 
generation to generation a careful technique and a thorough system of recording observations became 
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importance of quantification in designing and carrying out the experiments.28  Mendel 
was an exemplary scientist according to Edmund Sinnott and L. C. Dunn, who explained 
the general concepts “scientific law” and “scientific method” by reference to his work: 
“Mendel’s discovery of these first laws of inheritance led through precisely the steps of 
observation and experiment, classification, tentative explanation or hypothesis, testing, 
and final deduction which have been outlined.”29  
Detailed accounts of Mendel’s work were not just included to illustrate scientific 
ideals, however; more crucially, they were used in the teaching “the principles” of 
genetics.  In the 1920s, textbook authors often explained their pedagogical aims in 
introductions to their textbooks, and in Principles of Genetics (1925), Sinnott and Dunn 
explained why they believed that an understanding of the principles could “best be 
gained by the student through a process which is somewhat similar to that employed in 
their original discovery.”30  Their use of the historical case method was connected to 
their understanding of the nature of the principles of genetics which, according to Sinnott 
and Dunn, could not be learned as facts alone: “There is a common feeling that…by 
virtue of ‘knowing the book’ one acquires all of the knowledge of the subject which it is 
necessary to have.  Such beliefs have little to justify them.”31  They suggested that an 
understanding of the principles was essentially different from remembering a corpus of 
information:  “No text is or can be complete or final; nor, if it were, would an 
understanding of the subject be gained by committing the whole book to memory.”32  In 
other words, the discipline of genetics could not be reproduced through the mere 
                                                                                                                                            
necessary…This involved the task of keeping full and precise pedigree records of all plants studied.”  See 
also Morgan, The Physical Basis of Heredity, 19.  
28 According to Sinnott and Dunn, Principles of Genetics, 1st ed., 37, Mendel was the first to “reduce the 
phenomena to a measurable basis” and employ “the exact quantitative methods used so successfully in 
many other science.”  See also Morgan, The Physical Basis of Heredity, 16-17; and L. H. Snyder and P. R. 
David, The Principles of Heredity, 5th ed. (Boston: D. C. Heath, 1957), 14.   
29 Sinnott and Dunn, Principles of Genetics, 1st ed., 37. This explanation of the importance of including 
Mendel’s work was made in textbooks through the 1950s.  See, e.g., E. C. Colin, Elements of Genetics: 
Mendel's Laws of Heredity with Special Application to Man, 3rd ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1956), xiv: 
“The experiments of Mendel constitute a brilliant example of the application of the scientific method to a 
specific problem.”  Note that Colin’s attention to “the historical facts concerning Mendel and his work” 
was noted in a review of an earlier edition: E. L. Powers, Jr., Review of Elements of Genetics, by E. C. 
Colin, The American Midland Naturalist 26 (1941): 699. 
30 Sinnott and Dunn, Principles of Genetics, 1st ed., xvii.  
31 Ibid.  These types of claims were also made by biologists reviewing biology textbooks: see, e.g., C. E. 
McClung, "Scientific Books:  Elementary Biological Texts," Science 94 (1941): 392. 
32 Sinnott and Dunn, Principles of Genetics, 1st ed., xvii. 
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transmission of its dogma.  True knowledge, according to Sinnott and Dunn, “grows in 
the minds of those who discover for themselves new facts and relationships.”33  Students 
of genetics did not need to develop a new “world-view” or “episteme,” but rather an 
epistemic stance; genetics was a localized approach for a specific problem of knowledge, 
and it was with historical exemplars—with the temporality of discovery embedded into 
the structure of the textbook—that the student developed this ability to think with the 
geneticists’ approach.34   
The historical case-study approach, whereby the student re-lived the discovery of 
the principles, was widely adopted in the 1930s-1940s, and its value came to be seen as 
common sense by many geneticists.  In the Science review of Edgar Altenburg’s 1945 
Genetics, for example, Curt Stern compared two ways of presenting a theory: (a) 
statement of theorem followed by experimental proof, versus (b) statement of experiment 
followed by deduction of theory.  According to Stern, “While the information supplied is 
identical in both sequences, the latter seems better suited to convey the exciting pleasure 
of the discovery and organically makes possible a historical treatment with its humanistic 
implications.”35  Stern’s review criticized Altenburg for choosing the former, as did the 
review of the textbook in Quarterly Review of Biology:  
To the reviewers the presentation of major theories…as cut-and-dried 
facts robs the book of a part of its value and interest…It seems preferable 
in such a course to cultivate an appreciation of scientific method by 
focusing attention on the actual steps by which such theories have been 
built up, leading up to the theory inductively rather than stating it as a 
premise.36   
 
Textbook author Irwin H. Herskowitz agreed, and adopted the historical case-method in 
the 1962 and 1965 editions of Genetics.  As he explained: “Whenever feasible, genetic 
principles are derived scientifically—by recognizing and stating a problem, designing 
                                                
33 Ibid.  (emphasis original).  See also, e.g., the similar organic language in C. Stern, Review of Genetics, 
by E. Altenburg, Science 102 (1945): 515. 
34 The concept of the “episteme” comes from M. Foucault, The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the 
Human Sciences (London: Tavistock Publications, 1970), e.g., xxii; that of the “world-view” is developed 
throughout A. Koyré, From the Closed World to the Infinite Universe (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 
1957).  
35 Stern, Review of Genetics, by E. Altenburg: 515.  While geneticists’ beliefs about the “humanistic 
implications” of teaching with historical cases lies outside the focus of this study, it is worth noting their 
apparent connection to several pedagogical projects advanced at Harvard in the first half of the twentieth 
century.  For a detailed treatment of this history, see Melia, "Science, Values and Education."  
36 R. F. Kimball and E. S. Gersh, "Genetics and Cytology," Review of Genetics, by E. Altenburg, 
Quarterly Review of Biology 21 (1946): 80. 
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appropriate experiments to test hypotheses, analyzing the experimental results, and 
drawing conclusions.”37  
The historical case-study approach not only allowed students to learn by 
discovery, but also helped them develop a new way of visualizing organisms.  The idea 
that genetics was a way of seeing was first articulated by Bateson in Mendel’s Principles.  
It was necessary to overcome the “habit of looking on the bodies of animal and plants as 
single structures,” he argued: “So soon as the mind becomes thoroughly accustomed to 
the fact that all individuals…are double”—or, made up of pairs of factors—“it becomes 
easier to think in Mendelian terms.”38  Bateson and the early Mendelians saw training in 
genetics as the internalization of a new way of seeing, in which the single structure of the 
organism was replaced by its underlying double gametic structure.39  Once the mind had 
been trained, they argued, “the world of gametes…comes naturally and persistently 
before the mind.”  By learning to “penetrate behind the visible appearances of the 
individual,” the student could see “the definite systems” from which it originated.40  In 
the 1920s, Bateson’s language of “seeing-through” was regularly used in genetics 
textbooks.  Sinnott and Dunn’s Principles of Genetics, for example, emphasized the 
visual character of geneticists’ knowledge in a discussion of the nature of scientific laws 
and Mendel’s work.  Mendel was praised for his ability to find the “constant 
relationships” and “fundamental order” in phenomena that “appear at first sight to be 
irregular and unpredictable.”  According to this line of explanation that was developed at 
length, it was Mendel’s ability to see order through the apparent disorder—“to see certain 
simple relationships which underlie the facts”—that allowed him to discover the first two 
                                                
37 I. H. Herskowitz, Genetics, 1st and 2nd eds. (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1962, 1965), v. 
38 W. Bateson, Mendel's Principles of Heredity, 1st ed. (Cambridge, England: University Press, 1909), 56 
(emphasis original). 
39 See also, e.g., Punnett, Mendelism, 3rd ed., Chapter One, esp. 5: “Since a zygote arises from the yoking 
together of two separate gametes, the individual so formed must be regarded throughout its life as a double 
structure…But when the zygote in its turn comes to form gametes, the partnership is broken and the 
process reversed.  The component parts of the dual structure are resolved with the formation of a set of 
single structures, the gametes.”  
40 Bateson, Mendel's Principles of Heredity, 1st ed., 56. Bateson’s approach is described as the “method by 
which the process of segregation is visualized,” in R. R. Gates, "Mendelism," Review of Mendel's 
Principles of Heredity, by W. Bateson, and Mendelism, by R. C. Punnett, Botanical Gazette 48 (1909): 62. 
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laws of genetics.41  Insofar as the importance of Mendel’s work was conceptualized in 
terms of his ability to see beneath a deceptive veneer, the approach of the geneticist was 
thought of as distinctively and importantly visual.  This emphasis on the visual character 
of the principles continued through the 1960s, and was manifest in the centrality of 
illustrations in textbooks.  According to Adrian Srb and Ray Owen, for example: “The 
figures and tables are meant to be an integral part of our presentation of genetics; they 
should be considered in context and not as isolated embellishments.”42   
The figures and tables that were written as part of the Mendel case-study, and 
were used to inculcate the geneticists’ way of seeing, were standardized early in the 
development of the teaching tradition.  From the 1920s onwards, authors relied heavily 
on three types of pedigree maps—which I will identify as “abstract,” “schematic,” and 
“illustrated”—all of which were copied from the first generation textbooks of Bateson 
and Punnett.43  These three types of maps were similar in that they all represented the 
potential genetic relationships between parental and filial generations, but there were two 
variables in their presentation of this potential: the manner of representing the genes, 
which ranged from symbolic to embodied, and the aspect of Mendel’s laws that was 
emphasized, which ranged from specific basic ratios to general pictures of the process.   
 
 
                                                
41 Sinnott and Dunn, Principles of Genetics, 1st ed., 36; see also 42, where Sinnott and Dunn state that 
Mendel’s key revelation was his realization that appearance could not be taken as indicative of genetic 
constitution. 
42 A. M. Srb, R. D. Owen, and R. S. Edgar, General Genetics, 2nd ed. (San Francisco: W. H. Freeman, 
1965), vii.  See also, e.g., A. M. Srb and R. D. Owen, General Genetics, 1st ed. (San Francisco: W. H. 
Freeman, 1952), vi.  These illustrations were described as “valuable” and “particularly effective” in G. 
Pontecorvo, Review of General Genetics, by A. M. Srb and R. D. Owen, Nature 171 (1953): 1039. 
43 Note that the standardization of these figures and tables—the copying of Bateson’s and Punnett’s 
textbooks by later authors—is a use of history, discussed briefly in the Introduction, that is outside the 
scope of this chapter. 
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Figure 1: Abstract Pedigree Map.44  
 
The “abstract” pedigree maps (see Figure 1) were unique in that they carried self-
fertilization to the F4 generation, thereby indicating the broader pattern that would 
emerge in the self-crossing of all subsequent generations’ homozygous dominant, 
homozygous recessive, and heterozygous lines.45  They showed the student how to think 
about the process of segregation at the scale of an infinite series of filial generations, and 
how to think about genes in simple symbolic terms. The next type of figure, the 
“schematic” map (see Figure 2), removed the amateriality and atemporality of the             
. 
 
Figure 2: Schematic Pedigree Map.46 
                                                
44 J. A. Thomson, Heredity, 1st ed. (London: J. Murray, 1908), 343.   
45 This type of figure, originally from Punnett’s Mendelism, was widely used: see, e.g., Bateson, Mendel's 
Principles of Heredity, 1st ed., 11; A. F. Shull, Heredity, 1st ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1926), 49; 
Walter, Genetics, Rev. ed., 104; and Walter, Genetics, 4th ed., 61. 
46 Bateson, Mendel's Principles of Heredity, 1st ed., 12.   
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abstract representation; it gave bodies to the genes, and focused on the specific moment 
in segregation that most interested the geneticist—the formation of the 1:2:1 genotypic 
ratio, with its corresponding 3:1 phenotypic ratio.47  In addition, unlike the “abstract” 
map, it showed the phenotypic results of crossing heterozygous and homozygous 
members of the F2 generation.  With this type of pedigree map, the student visualized the 
genes as things combining into one of a limited number of potential patterns, creating 
one of two phenotypes: D, or R.  The third type of figure, the “illustrated map” (see 
Figure 3), mirrored the schematic map’s F1 and F2 generations, but represented incomplete 
dominance and located the genes and the law of segregation in the world of organisms.48  
 
 
Figure 3: Illustrated Pedigree Map.49 
 
                                                
47 These “schemes” (Punnett) or variations of them were regularly used in other textbooks: see, e.g., W. E. 
Castle, Genetics and Eugenics: A Text-book for Students of Biology and a Reference Book for Animal and 
Plant Breeders, 2nd ed. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1920), 141; King, Genetics, 1st ed., 
70; and Walter, Genetics, 4th ed., 60. 
48 This figure or variations of it were used by many authors:  see, e.g., Altenburg, Genetics, Rev. ed., 31, 
41; N. Fasten, Principles of Genetics and Eugenics: A Study of Heredity and Variation in Plants, Animals, 
and Man (Boston: Ginn and Company, 1935), 193, 195, 219, 220; Shull, Heredity, 1st ed., 47, 51; Sinnott 
and Dunn, Principles of Genetics, 1st ed., 41, 42, 46, 86; Srb and Owen, General Genetics, 1st ed., 20; 
Thomson, Heredity, 1st ed., Figure 37; and M. W. Strickberger, Genetics, 1st ed. (New York: Macmillan, 
1968), 154.  Note that in Castle, Genetics and Eugenics, 2nd ed., there were more than 150 such figures, 
most of which were photographs of mice in the form of the ‘Illustrated Pedigree Map.’ 
49 Morgan, The Physical Basis of Heredity, Figure 3/Plate 2.   
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It connected the abstract law and its schematic representation to what the student saw in 
life, providing the visual surface, the “somatic conditions,” of a phenomenon that had 
been unveiled in the previous maps.  It emphasized the identity between the apparent 
single structures of the organisms and the underlying double structures of reality.                 
While students using the textbooks of Bateson and Punnett in the 1910s learned 
how to see through hereditary phenomena by synthesizing these three types of maps, 
students in the following decade had this work done for them by their textbooks.  In the 
1920s, new types of figures were introduced that either juxtaposed (see Figure 4) or 
superimposed (see Figure 5) the “schematic” and “illustrated” pedigree maps.50   
 
 
 
Figure 4: Juxtaposition of   
Schematic and Illustrated Maps.51 
Figure 5: Superimposition of  
Schematic and Illustrated Maps.52 
 
                                                
50 This style was first used in Morgan, The Physical Basis of Heredity, e.g., 20, 81, 83, 89, 90.  These fly 
diagrams were widely reproduced: see, e.g., R. C. Punnett, Mendelism, 5th ed. (London: Macmillan, 1919), 
Fig. 31, Fig. 32; Fasten, Principles of Genetics and Eugenics, 217, 218, 232, 233; Sinnott and Dunn, 
Principles of Genetics, 1st ed., 163, 164, 202, 204, 216; and Sturtevant and Beadle, An Introduction to 
Genetics, 25, 26.  Variations of them were also adopted: see, e.g., Sinnott and Dunn, Principles of 
Genetics, 1st ed., 48, 157; and Winchester, Genetics, 1st ed., 60, 62, 66.  
51 Morgan, The Physical Basis of Heredity, Figure 2/Plate1. 
52 Ibid., 65. 
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I have thus far focused on the ways in which illustrations were used to help the 
student visualize the movement of genes according to Mendel’s laws, but this was not 
their only function.  In addition, they were employed to help the student determine the 
potential outcomes of a cross.  Particularly when dealing with the independent 
assortment of two or three pairs of genes, the mathematics could be confusing.  One of 
the most widely employed mathematical aids was the “Punnett Square.”53  This form of 
illustration not only simplified the process of determining the potential genotypic 
combinations, but also allowed for the representation of the phenotypic ratios that could 
be expected to result from the cross (see Figure 6, where a cross between Cr and cR is 
shown to result in a 9:7 phenotypic ratio—a modification of 9:3:3:1).  This style of 
diagram, which was introduced by Punnett in 1905, soon after became ubiquitous in 
chapters on Mendel’s laws.  Although Castle referred to them as “the ingenious 
checkerboard method devised by Punnett,” they were generally just called “Punnett 
Squares.”54   Thus they were not presented as “a method,” but rather as the natural way 
of calculating the outcome of crosses, their historicity buried in the textbook.55                     
.   
 
Figure 6: “Diagram” of Inheritance, or Punnett Square.56 
                                                
53 Punnett called these “diagrams” in R. C. Punnett, Mendelism, 1st ed. (Cambridge, England: Macmillan 
and Bowes, 1905), but they were later named after him.  They were widely used: see, e.g., Castle, Genetics 
and Eugenics, 2nd ed., 116; Morgan, The Physical Basis of Heredity, 60-63, 68, 71; and Sinnott and Dunn, 
Principles of Genetics, 1st ed., 93, 97, 103, 105, 107, 109. 
54 Castle, Genetics and Eugenics, 1st ed., 104. 
55 Note that the Punnett Square was just one method for calculating the outcome of crosses: Sturtevant and 
Beadle, who wanted to emphasize the mathematical nature of genetics in their 1939 textbook, 
complemented Punnett Squares with a pedigree map that employed algebra to calculate the outcome of 
multi-gene crosses.  See e.g., Sturtevant and Beadle, An Introduction to Genetics, 54, 55.  However, this 
math-intensive type of diagram did not gain greater currency, and the Punnett Square remained the 
dominant method. 
56 Bateson, Mendel's Principles of Heredity, 1st ed., 89.  
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In the 1920s, Sinnott and Dunn further developed their function, combining them with T. 
H. Morgan’s superimposed schematic and illustrated maps (see Figure 7).  This synthesis 
of representations, which was widely adopted in the 1930s and 1940s, allowed the 
student to visualize the organisms, their underlying genotypes and potential gametes, and 
the theoretically predicted phenotypic and genotypic ratios.57  
 
 
Figure 7: Synthesis of Various Illustrations.58 
 
 
 
While the illustrations of Mendel’s laws took many forms, they were all similar in 
that they were designed to teach the student to think and see in terms of potential 
phenotypic and genotypic ratios—a central feature of genetics, according to textbook 
authors and geneticists later reflecting on the history of their science.  In An Introduction 
to Genetics, for example, A. H. Sturtevant and George W. Beadle stated: “Genetics is a 
                                                
57 See, e.g., L. H. Snyder, The Principles of Heredity, 2nd ed. (Boston: D. C. Heath, 1940), 14, 46, 49, 50, 
52, 53, 55, 57, 80, 81, 88; Sturtevant and Beadle, An Introduction to Genetics, 53, 57; Altenburg, Genetics, 
1st ed., 55; Winchester, Genetics, 1st ed., 74, 76; and Strickberger, Genetics, 1st ed., 101, 111. 
58 Sinnott and Dunn, Principles of Genetics, 1st ed., 69; see also 53, 54, 71, 91 146.  
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quantitative subject.  It deals with ratios, with measurements, and with the geometrical 
relationships of chromosomes.”59  At the end of the textbook, the authors returned to this 
point: “As indicated in Chapter 1 and repeatedly thereafter in this book, genetics is to a 
large extent a science of ratios.”60  J. A. Detlefsen agreed in a textbook review in Science, 
criticizing the author for trying to “reduce mathematical formulae to a minimum”:  
Underlying all distributions of characters in assortive matings are certain 
elementary principles based on probabilities and the theory of simple 
sampling.  When the student looks upon a Mendelian population in these 
terms, he has the advantage of a general fundamental law rather than the 
knowledge of an individual case.61  
 
Sinnott, Dunn, and Dobzhansky likewise thought that the student’s default type of 
thinking should be one of ratio-finding: “In connection with answers to these problems, 
we should emphasize that where solutions can be stated in terms of exact ratios or 
probability, this should always be done, even when it is not specifically called for.”62  
The terms “ratio” and “law” were often used interchangeably.  Mendel’s law of 
segregation was generally presented as the law that in the most simple case produced a 
3:1 phenotypic or 1:2:1 genotypic ratio; and Mendel’s law of independent assortment 
was that which produced a 9:3:3:1 phenotypic ratio.  These ratios were the neutral 
position—the standard against which “exceptions” were defined.  They could be altered 
by various factors, but the results were framed as mere modifications of these ratios.  For 
example, the 3:1 phenotypic ratio could become a 1:2:1, or the 9:3:3:1 could become a 
9:7.  The student had to be able to see the 1:2 inside the 3, or the 3:3:1 inside the 7.  
Depending on variations in dominance within pairs of alleles, or interaction between 
allelic pairs, the ratio of phenotypes could break down along the lines of the underlying 
genotypes.  Several authors used illustrations with a variety of columns to show how the 
                                                
59 Sturtevant and Beadle, An Introduction to Genetics, 11. See also Dunn’s claims about “the ordering 
influence of the kind of thinking characteristic of genetics,” in L. C. Dunn, A Short History of Genetics: 
The Development of Some of the Main Lines of Thought, 1864-1939 (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1965), 212.  
Dunn also discusses the importance of “ratios” on page 32. 
60 Sturtevant and Beadle, An Introduction to Genetics, 367.  
61 J. A. Detlefsen, Review of Genetics: An Introduction to the Study of Heredity, by H. E. Walter, Science 
56 (1922): 146. 
62 Sinnott, Dunn, and Dobzhansky, Principles of Genetics, 5th ed., viii (emphasis added). 
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standard phenotypic ratios corresponded with the genotypic, and how the 9:3:3:1 ratio 
could take other forms (see Figure 8).63  
 
Figure 8: Variations of the 9:3:3:1 ratio.64 
In teaching the students to recognize the standard ratios, authors often referred to 
tables of experimental data from historically significant experiments (see Figure 9). 
These tables—which were presented as though they contained raw, rather than selected, 
historical data—played a central role in placing the student on the trajectory by which. the 
 
Figure 9:  Experimental Data Table.65 
 
                                                
63 See, e.g., Snyder, The Principles of Heredity, 2nd ed., 59; and Winchester, Genetics, 1st ed., 82, and 3rd 
ed., 96.  Variations of this were used in Shull, Heredity, 4th ed., 117, 121, and other tabular forms of 
representing the modified ratios were used in Strickberger, Genetics, 1st ed., 191-194.  Note that ratios also 
played an important role in the narrative structure of textbooks—a topic that I will discuss in Chapter 3. 
64 Walter, Genetics, 4th ed., 82.   
65 Morgan, The Physical Basis of Heredity, 24.  
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ratios, and the principles of genetics, had been discovered.66  The authors would walk the 
students through Mendel’s experiments, and provide them with tables of his experimental 
results; in this way they would demonstrate how Mendel interpreted the data, identified 
the 3:1 and 9:3:3:1 ratios, and formulated the principles of segregation and independent 
assortment.  They would then present the students with data collected in the early 1900s 
by Correns, Tschermak, Hurst, Bateson and other historically significant figures.  These 
tables were said to show the correspondence between the mathematical predictions and 
the geneticists’ data.  In Principles of Genetics, for example: “This ratio [3:1]—and the 
same is true of the other mendelian ratios—merely indicated what may be expected on 
the basis of probability.  Experience, agreeing with theoretical expectation, has shown 
that the larger the number of individuals raised, the closer the F2 ratio approaches ¾:¼, a 
fact strikingly emphasized in the table just cited.”67  In this way, tables containing data 
from replications of Mendel’s experiments at the turn of the century were presented as 
verifications of his conclusions. 
Textbooks also included tables of data gathered in early twentieth-century 
experiments testing the validity of Mendel’s laws on other organisms.68  These tables 
were used as part of the narrative by which the student experienced the development of 
the science, discovering apparent exceptions to Mendel’s principles, and finding ways of 
resolving them.  In General Genetics, for example, Srb, Owen and Edgar provided a 
detailed description of some experiments that Morgan conducted after finding a white-
eyed male in a population of red-eyed Drosophila.69   They explained that crossing the 
white-eyed male with a red-eyed female produced all red-eyed F1 generation, which 
suggested that “white-eye” was a standard recessive gene, but that when Morgan crossed 
                                                
66 See, e.g., Sinnott et al., Principles of Genetics, 1st ed., 44, 47; 2nd ed., 45, 48; 3rd ed., 45, 47; 4th ed., 
38, 42; 5th ed., 38; Walter, Genetics, Rev. ed., 100; 4th ed., 60-6; Strickberger, Genetics, 1st ed., 101; W. 
Hovanitz, Textbook of Genetics (New York: Elsevier Press, 1953), 32-33; C. M. M. Begg, An Introduction 
to Genetics (London: The English Universities Press, 1959), 40; Srb, Owen, and Edgar, General Genetics, 
2nd ed., 5; and Winchester, Genetics, 3rd ed., 71. 
67 Sinnott and Dunn, Principles of Genetics, 1st ed., 47, where they also stated: “Later work on peas by 
other investigators has completely confirmed Mendel’s results.”  NB: the term “mendelian” was not 
capitalized in the first edition of Principles of Genetics. 
68 See, e.g., Hovanitz, Textbook of Genetics, 50, 59; Begg, An Introduction to Genetics, 54, 57; Dodson, 
Genetics, 35; L. H. Snyder, The Principles of Heredity, 1st ed. (Boston: D. C. Heath, 1935), 79; Snyder, 
The Principles of Heredity, 2nd ed., 93; Srb and Owen, General Genetics, 1st ed., 23; and Srb, Owen, and 
Edgar, General Genetics, 2nd ed., 19, 36, 55, 57. 
69 Srb, Owen, and Edgar, General Genetics, 2nd ed., 35-37.  See also, e.g., Snyder, The Principles of 
Heredity, 1st ed., 64-68. 
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the F1 generation, he found an anomaly:  “In the F2 generation there were 3,470 red-eyed 
flies and 782 white-eyed ones.  The data fit rather badly the ratio we might expect, but 
for the moment we might accept the numbers as representing a Mendelian 3:1 ratio with 
some shortage in the recessive class.”70  Describing Morgan’s subsequent experiments, 
which confirmed that there was in fact a deviation from the 3:1 ratio, and presenting the 
data he obtained, Srb and Owen guided the student through Morgan’s line of thought.  It 
was in this way that the student learned of, or “discovered,” sex-linkage.71  According to 
A. F. Shull, an author of numerous popular genetics and biology textbooks, this use of 
experimental data was standard in the 1930s: “The traditional method has been to present 
experimental results,” and then “formulate a scheme of gene operations which will 
logically explain them.”72  Herskowitz explained his use of this method in the 
introduction to Genetics: “The presentation is designed to encourage the reader to use his 
power of inductive reasoning to arrive at the primary generalizations of genetics on the 
basis of experimental evidence.”73  Thus, data tables performed an important narrative 
function in the historical case-studies of genetics textbooks, challenging established 
theory and thereby driving the student’s “discovery” of new principles.74   
 Historical data did not just serve an important narrative function, however, but 
also and more importantly was used in teaching the student to see key ratios amidst 
experimental results.  For example, after a discussion of one of Mendel’s experiments 
that resulted in a 24:25:22:26 phenotypic ratio, Sturtevant and Beadle wrote: “It is clear 
that, in each case, the four possible classes of gametes were produced in equal 
numbers…giving a 1:1:1:1 ratio.”75  Elsewhere, they described a 315:108:101:32 ratio as 
“obviously a close agreement with the expected 9:3:3:1.”76  This type of statement—
proclaiming that it was self-evident that experimentally-derived ratios corresponded with 
given ideal ratios—was common in genetics textbooks, and was involved in showing the 
student how to see ratios amidst the data.  In addition, they defined what counted as 
                                                
70  Srb, Owen, and Edgar, General Genetics, 2nd ed., 36. 
71  Ibid., 37.  
72 Shull, Heredity, 3rd ed., vii-viii.  Shull’s Principles of Animal Biology received an excellent review in 
McClung, "Scientific Books:  Elementary Biological Texts." 
73 I. H. Herskowitz, Genetics, 1st and 2nd eds., v. 
74 In Chapter 3, I will discuss this exception-overcome-by-extension narrative device in greater depth.   
75 Sturtevant and Beadle, An Introduction to Genetics, 52.  
76 Ibid., 55. 
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“agreement” between the theoretical and experimental results.  In textbooks of the 1930s, 
there was no explicit rule or norm that defined or quantified this relationship.77  Rather, 
agreement was a matter of reasonable disagreement.78  It was a judgment, and the 
knowledge needed to make such judgments was not taught explicitly.  Instead, textbooks 
showed what counted as reasonable disagreement with examples, and it was in this 
capacity that data tables, which compared theoretical predictions with experimental 
findings, played another crucial role.  The tables were models demonstrating cases of 
acceptable agreement, thereby conveying historically agreed-upon conventions.  Thus, 
they did not represent a natural order, but rather presented the social order of genetics.79  
They provided the basis for the analogical reasoning by which the student could perform 
judgments about agreement in other cases.  They taught the tacit skills of judgment 
needed to decide whether a specific set of data corresponded with the action of general 
principle—whether a given case counted as a case of a general rule.  Insofar as the tables 
conveyed aspects of the geneticists’ culture that were necessary for understanding and 
making use of the principles, the tables cannot be properly understood as offering mere 
support for them.  They were, rather, essential pieces of theory.  By studying them, the 
student learned what to expect from the principles of genetics.  He came to understand 
how they were applied to, and supported by, data.  As Kuhn suggested, “An acquaintance 
with the tables is part of an acquaintance with the theory itself. Without the tables, the 
theory would be essentially incomplete.”80  
In addition to helping define the principles of genetics, experimental data in 
textbooks contributed to the presentation of the disciplinary identity of genetics.  
Textbooks in the 1920s and 1930s highlighted the mathematical character of the 
principles.  In Morgan’s The Physical Basis of Heredity, for example: “They [Mendel’s 
                                                
77 It was not until the 1940s that the “Chi-square” method for testing the “goodness of fit” became a 
common feature of textbooks.  Sinnott and Dunn added it to their third edition in 1939, and Snyder added it 
to his second edition in 1940.  With the Chi-Square test, the students were given a statistical rule that 
defined whether their data followed a genetic rule.  Whether this introduction of a rule to follow a rule 
closed the problem of judgment is a question that lies outside my present focus. 
78 In making this argument, I draw on the analyses developed in T. Kuhn, "The Function of Measurement 
in Modern Physical Science," Isis 52 (1961): 165-167; and Barnes, T. S. Kuhn and Social Science, 20-22.   
79 Barnes, T. S. Kuhn and Social Science, 21.  Barnes also notes that the authority of the model of 
agreement does not come from its correspondence with facts about the data and predictions, but rather 
comes from the fact that the  model is located in the textbook—that it has the collective support of the 
scientific community. 
80 Kuhn, "The Function of Measurement in Modern Physical Science," 166. 
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laws] rest on numerical data, and are therefore quantitative and can be turned into 
mathematical form wherever it seems desirable.”81  Morgan and his contemporaries 
regularly demonstrated this fact by translating crosses into algebraic terms.  In Genetics: 
An Introduction to the Study of Heredity, H. E. Walter wrote of Mendel’s experiments:  
These crosses may be expressed as follows:—Tall, T, x dwarf, t, = tall, 
T(t)…When now the hybrids, T(t), were crossed together, the result 
algebraically expressed was as follows: —  
  T + t (all possible egg characters) 
  T + t (all possible sperm characters) 
TT + Tt 
          Tt + tt 
TT + 2T(t) + tt 
That is, one of the possible four cases is dwarf, tt, in character and the 
other three are apparently tall, although only one of the three is pure tall, 
TT.82 
 
The quantitative foundation of Mendel’s generalizations was crucial for the identity of 
genetics, because it justified the geneticist’s decision to refer to them as ‘laws.’  Morgan 
emphasized this in the introduction to his textbook:  
Despite the fact that the use of this word ‘law’ has been much abused in 
popular writing we need not apologize for using it here, because the 
postulates in question have been established by the same scientific 
procedure that chemists and physicists make use of, viz., by deductions 
from quantitative data.83  
 
In these ways, genetics was presented as being grounded in quantification.  But this 
explicit quantification of heredity relied on the authors’ ability to first teach tacit skills of 
qualitative judgment and evaluation.84 
To briefly summarize my analysis of the use of historical case-studies in the 
teaching of Mendel’s principles:  Mendel was presented as an exemplary, or model, 
scientist in most genetics textbooks, and in this capacity his work came to serve as one of 
the discipline’s most important exemplars.  Geneticists believed that Mendel’s principles 
were best “illustrated by typical examples from the experiments of Mendel and later 
                                                
81 Morgan, The Physical Basis of Heredity, 16.  See also, e.g., Kimball and Gersh, "Genetics and 
Cytology," 80, which criticized Altenburg’s failure to discuss the statistical treatment of data:  “Since 
Genetics is frequently the only course in college where the student applies quantitative methods in biology, 
this omission seems most unfortunate.” 
82 Walter, Genetics, Rev. ed., 99 (emphasis added).  See also, e.g., Walter, Genetics, 4th ed., 59. 
83 Morgan, The Physical Basis of Heredity, 16-17. 
84 This general idea comes from Kuhn, "The Function of Measurement in Modern Physical Science,” in 
which he argues that significant qualitative work is the prerequisite for quantification in the physical 
sciences. 
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investigators,” and thus taught genetics through ostention.85  Representations of “classic” 
experiments, in detailed descriptions and in illustrations, allowed the students to learn 
and practice not only those principles that were espoused by geneticists and explicitly 
taught as rules in the text, but also the tacit skills that were needed to follow, find, or 
understand these rules.  By making students follow the steps by which the principles 
were discovered, textbooks taught the discipline of genetics, in addition to its dogma.  
With pedigree maps and tables of experimental results, which appeared to present 
uninterpreted data but were in fact constructed through careful historical selection, the 
authors brought the student into a way of seeing organisms and hereditary phenomena.  
They showed the student how to find a ratio in the midst of experimental data, and how 
to judge whether the experimental ratio agreed with the theoretical.  Ratio-finding was 
central to the science, for it was in this skill that the quantitative and visual aspects of 
genetics came together.  In a sense, the Mendelian exemplars taught translation.  They 
showed the student how to translate breeding experiments into pedigree maps, schematic 
pedigree maps into organisms, experimental data into theoretical ratios, and Mendel's 
laws into algebraic equations.  In teaching these forms of translation, or ways of seeing 
one thing as being like another, the Mendelian exemplar taught some of the family 
resemblances that were crucial to the culture of geneticists.  In other words: the detailed 
descriptions of Mendel’s experiments and the accompanying illustrations and data were a 
virtual historical environment—a reconstruction of the past in which the student was 
socialized, developing the experientially-based, tacit skills needed to see, discriminate, 
and evaluate with the geneticists’ approach. 
 
 
Problem-Solving in—and as—a Virtual Historical Laboratory:   
Teaching rule-following, or, how to apply the principles of genetics 
 
Thus far I have focused on how narrative and illustrative features of the textbooks were 
used to bring the student into the process of discovering the principles of genetics.  But it 
was not only these features of textbooks that were used to create a virtual historical 
environment in which the student developed the tacit skills of the geneticist.  As Kuhn 
                                                
85 Sinnott and Dunn, Principles of Genetics, 1st ed., 40.  See also, e.g., Castle, Genetics and Eugenics, 1st 
ed., 88: “Mendel’s law may best be explained with the aid of examples.”  
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suggested in his analysis of exemplars, problem-solving exercises played an essential 
role in the historical case-study method of teaching, and most geneticists agreed with 
Dunn in 1965 when he wrote: “Genetics…can be learned by imitating the steps by which 
its principles were established, that is by deriving such results from sets of numerical 
data in the form of problems, and vice versa, by predicting the outcome of experiments 
from a knowledge of principles.”86  The important point here is that “imitating the steps” 
of discovery was seen as comparable to problem-solving—to deriving principles from 
data, and predicting data from principles.  To show how and why problem-solving 
exercises functioned and were seen to function in this way, and to illustrate the broader 
historical significance of this understanding of their capabilities, I will turn to the origin 
of their use in genetics textbooks: the 1925 edition Principles of Genetics, by Sinnott and 
Dunn. 
As discussed earlier in this chapter, Sinnott and Dunn articulated their 
pedagogical aims in the introduction to Principles.  Learning genetics was not a matter of 
learning facts.  It was, rather, the enculturation into an approach, which required 
“considerable practice of the reasoning faculty by which deductions are made, and 
applied or tested on many similar cases.”87  Emphasizing the importance of the repetitive 
practice of reasoning and thinking in cases, Sinnott and Dunn wrote: “It is only in this 
way that the process of inheritance can be understood.  The learning of facts alone cannot 
accomplish this.”88  To bring the student into the process of discovering and working 
with the principles, Sinnott and Dunn created problem-solving exercises, which they 
explained: “As an aid to such a comprehension of the science of genetics, this book 
includes problems of three types, which form an integral part of the subject matter.”  
These problems took the form of “Questions,” “Reference Assignments,” and 
“Problems.”  Of these, the Problems—which were problem-solving exercises—were 
meant to “provide opportunity for practicing and extending the methods and applying the 
theories outlined in the text.”89  The authors conceived of problem-solving as a form of 
                                                
86 Dunn, A Short History of Genetics, 208. 
87 Sinnott and Dunn, Principles of Genetics, 1st ed., xvii. 
88 Ibid. (emphasis original).  Castle articulated a similar goal for his textbook in his comments about 
knowledge and independent thinking: Castle, Genetics and Eugenics, 1st ed., preface. 
89 Sinnott and Dunn, Principles of Genetics, 1st ed., xvii. 
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virtual laboratory work: “Nearly all of them…may be most profitably studied as 
laboratory exercises under the guidance of an instructor.”90  And controversially, in 
explaining what was novel about their textbook, they suggested that these pen and paper 
exercises allowed for a type of laboratory practice that was in some ways better than the 
experimental laboratory.   
The Problems are designed chiefly for laboratory practice.  Counting corn 
kernels, breeding fruit flies and measuring larvae are valuable laboratory 
exercises, but for imparting a thorough understanding and mastery of the 
principles of genetics, and particularly those of mendelian heredity, the 
experience of the authors has found nothing equal to persistent drill in 
solving a wide diversity of problems.91 
 
This use of problem-solving marked a significant departure from the textbooks 
established in the first quarter of the twentieth century, which rarely included problems.92  
Sinnott and Dunn thought that the exercises were “perhaps the most novel feature” of 
their textbook, which they highlighted in its subtitle, Principles of Genetics: An 
Elementary Text, with Problems.   
Although the review in Nature identified Sinnott and Dunn’s problems, questions, 
and assignments as “an innovation in this class of book,” and praised the problems as “on 
the whole excellent,” the use of problem-solving as a teaching technique in Principles of 
Genetics—and the claim that it could provide a substitute for some types of laboratory 
experience—was not immediately well received in the broader community.93  In one 
generally positive review of the textbook that praised it for its uniquely “balanced 
presentation of the subject as a whole,” Francis Wenninger, zoologist at Notre Dame and 
associate editor for general biology at the American Midland Naturalist, commented: “A 
feature of the book that is especially desirable is the questions for thought and discussion 
and the reference assignments.”94  Given that Sinnott and Dunn had drawn attention to 
                                                
90 Ibid., xviii (emphasis added). 
91 Ibid., x. 
92 Problem-solving exercises were not included in any of the standard textbooks before the late 1920s: 
Thomson, Heredity, 1st ed.; Bateson Mendel’s Principles, 1st ed.; Castle, Genetics and Eugenics, 1st, 2nd, 
and 3rd eds.; Walter, Genetics, 1st and Rev eds.; and Shull, Heredity, 1st ed. 
93 "Our Bookshelf," Review of Principles of Genetics, by E. W. Sinnott and L. C. Dunn, Nature 117 
(1926): 336. 
94 F. J. Wenninger, Review of Principles of Genetics, by E. W. Sinnott and L. C. Dunn, The American 
Midland Naturalist 10 (1926): 135.  Although the author of the review is only identified as “F. W.”, 
Francis Wenninger became associate editor of general biology in 1930, according to  R. P. McIntosh, 
"American Midland Naturalist: The Life History of a Journal," American Midland Naturalist 123 (1990). 
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their use of problems, questions, and references assignments, the omission of the 
“problems” from the list of features that were “especially desirable” suggests that 
Wenninger did not see them as noteworthy—that either he did not notice them, or that he 
did not think they were worth criticism or praise.  Other reviewers were openly skeptical 
about their value.  Castle, under whom Dunn did his graduate studies at Harvard, 
disagreed about the utility and effect of engagement in problem-solving.  In his review of 
the first edition of Principles of Genetics, Castle noted that “much attention” had been 
give to the preparation of problems, but he backed away from praising this method of 
teaching when he said that it was “perhaps a worth-while way to try to get the student to 
think.”95  This hedged praise turned to criticism when he continued: “it is doubtful 
whether it is in any sense a fair substitute for a laboratory course in which the student 
handles the live material, gathers his own data and feels his way along toward 
conclusions.”  Castle explained his reasoning: “Most biological problems involve…other 
powers of the mind than those used in arithmetic…For training in scientific method the 
student should…be given real problems, rather than hypothetical ones.”96  Castle wrote 
this review of Principles of Genetics less than a year after his Outline for a Laboratory 
Course in Genetics was first published, complementing the third edition of his widely 
used Genetics and Eugenics.  Presumably, Castle had his “real” problems in mind when 
criticizing Sinnott and Dunn’s problem-solving exercises and arguing that laboratory 
experiments were essential.  On this issue, the basic assumptions of geneticists were 
clearly divided, as is evident from Charles Davenport’s praise for Castle’s manual: 
As a teacher he [Castle] has seen the need of bringing the student into 
firsthand contact with the phenomena of genetics and so he has prepared 
an outline for a laboratory course in genetics.  By use of the rapidly 
breeding banana fly and of dried ears of corn he has been able to bring 
students into contact with the methods and results of genetics…This 
‘outline’ will do much to put genetics on a proper pedagogic basis.97   
 
                                                                                                                                            
Given that the book reviews were written by the journal’s editors, it seems likely that this review was 
written by Wenninger.   
95 W. E. Castle, "Some New Books on Genetics," Review of Genetics in Plant and Animal Improvement, 
by D. F. Jones,  Principles of Genetics, by E. W. Sinnott and L. C. Dunn, and Animal Genetics by F. A. E. 
Crew, Science 62 (1925): 568. 
96 Ibid. 
97 C. B. Davenport, Review of Genetics and Eugenics, by W. E. Castle, Science 61 (1925): 542. 
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Here, Davenport’s position was antithetical to that articulated by Sinnott and Dunn, who 
had specifically identified “breeding fruit flies” and “counting corn kernels” as 
insufficient ways of teaching the fundamentals of genetics.98  Thus the use of problem-
solving exercises in the 1920s was a matter of significant disagreement; geneticists had 
very different basic conceptions of what it meant to practice and apply the principles of 
genetics, and of what could be gained through engagement in problem-solving.  
As the case-study method of teaching science gained ground in the 1930s, the 
general reception of Sinnott and Dunn’s problem-solving exercises showed signs of 
change.  In a review of the second edition in Science, for example, Albert Blakeslee 
commented with surprise at the great number of problems to be found at the end of each 
chapter, and the addition of more than 400 problems to the appendix: “The problem 
method seems to have met with success at the hands of the authors since the number of 
problems given is increased over the earlier edition.  They should help the student to a 
more thorough grasp of the subject as is the case with ‘original’ problems in text-books 
of geometry.”99  While Blakeslee’s review was not an overt endorsement of the method 
of teaching—insofar as it was partly descriptive, rather than evaluative—it is indicative 
of a general shift in many authors’ sense of the perceived value of problem-solving.  For 
example: a student of Castle, H. E. Walter, whose Genetics had been in print since 1913, 
introduced a book of problems into the second printing of its third edition (1931), 
explaining that he only did so because his publisher had assured him that they “would not 
be entirely unwelcome.”100  A. W. Lindsey likewise included problem-solving in his A 
Textbook of Genetics (1932), explaining: “So far as I know, Sinnott and Dunn in their 
Principles of Genetics (McGraw-Hill, 1925) are the only writers who have previously 
included this type of material in a textbook; it is a pleasure to acknowledge their good 
example.”101  In the 1930s, Shull added problems into his Heredity, which was first 
published in 1926 without problems.  And new textbooks, such as Sturtevant and 
Beadle’s An Introduction to Genetics, were often written with problem-solving sections 
                                                
98 Sinnott and Dunn, Principles of Genetics, 1st ed., x. 
99 A. F. Blakeslee, Review of Principles of Genetics, by E. W. Sinnott and L. C. Dunn and Recent 
Advances in Plant Genetics, by F. W. Sansome and J. Philip, Science 77 (1933): 285 (emphasis added). 
100 H. E. Walter, One Hundred and One Problems to Accompany Genetics (New York: Macmillan, 1931), i. 
101 A. W. Lindsey, A Textbook of Genetics (New York: Macmillan, 1932), viii.  The problem-solving 
method was widely seen as an “innovation” of Sinnott and Dunn: see, e.g., "Our Bookshelf," 336. 
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and praised on these grounds.102  Problem-solving was beginning to be seen as a way of 
using the principles, as Sturtevant and Beadle explained: “Genetics also resembles other 
mathematically developed subjects, in that facility in the use and understanding of its 
principles comes only from using them.  The problems at the end of each chapter are 
designed to give this practice.  The student will find that it is important that they be 
actually solved.”103   
By the time Sinnott and Dunn published the third edition of Principles of 
Genetics in 1939, the language used in reviews had changed dramatically.  Plant 
taxonomist Theodore Just, for example, wrote of this edition: “The many problems now 
appended to each chapter should prove a splendid means for the student to test his 
understanding of genetics.”104   A review of Laurence Snyder’s popular The Principles of 
Heredity stated: “The problems given at the ends of the chapters are well chosen and 
together with the selected references will be very helpful to the discriminating 
teacher.”105  And in a review of Altenburg’s Genetics, Stern wrote: “Numerous problems 
furnish an opportunity for applying knowledge gained from the text.”106  The form of 
these claims, as descriptions of fact, suggests that the value of the problems was not in 
question.  These statements were not an answer to the question, ‘Can the use of problems 
accomplish the necessary goals,’ but rather, ‘Does the text contain the problems that 
accomplish the necessary goals?’  It was taken as given that problem-solving furnished 
an opportunity for applying and working with the principles of genetics. Problem-solving 
was seen as “the surest way to a proper understanding of the subject.”107  These exercises 
thus became a staple feature of introductory college textbooks, regardless of their 
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104 T. Just, Review of Principles of Genetics, by E. W. Sinnott and L. C. Dunn, The American Midland 
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105 L. J. Cole, "Genetics Texts," Review of The Principles of Heredity, by L. H. Snyder and Principles of 
Genetics and Eugenics, by N. Fasten, Science 83 (1936): 373. 
106 Stern, Review of Genetics, by E. Altenburg: 515.  A review Quarterly Review of Biology agreed about 
the value of its “well constructed problems”: Kimball and Gersh, "Genetics and Cytology," 79. 
107 Begg, An Introduction to Genetics, v.  See also Srb, Owen, and Edgar, General Genetics, 2nd ed., vii: 
“We continue to believe in the importance of problem-solving as a way to facilitate the student’s mastery 
of genetics.” 
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conceptualization and presentation of the nature of the science.108  The titles of textbooks 
no longer mentioned the fact that they included problems.109  Presumably this was 
because the inclusion of problems was not notable in a culture that saw them as essential, 
as was stated in a review of the 1950 edition of Principles of Genetics:  “Today more 
than ever before, it is essential that a student build for himself a solid foundation of 
fundamental principles and their applications…An indispensable feature of any such text 
is the inclusion of a well-balanced set of problems which will efficiently and clearly 
demonstrate, by means of student participation, the workings of these principles.”110  In 
the preface to one of the most popular textbooks of the 1960s, General Genetics, and in a 
review of this textbook, it was agreed: “genetics is essentially a ‘problem-solving’ kind 
of science.”111 
In a scientific culture in which textbooks were thought to bring students into the 
experience of discovery, introductory courses did not necessarily need to be 
complemented by “a laboratory course in which the student handles the live material, 
gathers his own data and feels his way along toward conclusions.”112  The essential 
complement to historical case-studies was instead provided by problem-solving in the 
1920s-1950s.  The only laboratory manuals for introductory courses published in this 
period were written before 1925, and by first generation geneticists: Babcock and 
Collins, Castle, Hurst, and Morgan.113  In addition, it was very rare for a textbook to 
                                                
108 E.g., problem-solving exercises were used in the “logically” organized textbooks, such as Sturtevant 
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York: McGraw-Hill, 1918); T. H. Morgan, Laboratory Directions for an Elementary Course in Genetics 
(New York: H. Holt, 1923); W. E. Castle, Outline for a Laboratory Course in Genetics: Recommended for 
Use in Connection with the Text-Book Genetics and Eugenics (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
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include suggestions for laboratory work.114  The type of hands-on experience that Castle 
had seen as necessary no longer provided the first step in the disciplining of the student’s 
mind.  Both authors and reviewers agreed that problem-solving exercises were the best 
way to “initiate aspiring students”—that they could convey knowledge that could not be 
explicitly articulated.115  In the preface to the widely-used The Principles of Genetics, for 
example, Snyder iterated and reiterated that problem-solving provided the student with 
“much material” that was not in “the text itself.”116  Stern likewise agreed that “numerous 
problems…include additional information” in a review of Altenburg’s Genetics.117  The 
nature of this additional knowledge conveyed by problem-solving was identified in W. R. 
Singleton’s Elementary Genetics: “The text leads the student directly into the geneticist’s 
approach, working with clues and solving problems.”118  The implicit historical 
recreation of the laboratory in the problems was highlighted by Srb and Owen, who saw 
their problem-solving exercises as an experimental environment: “We have been 
particularly concerned to confront the student with actual experimental situations for his 
interpretation.”119   
To briefly summarize, my argument in this section is that the use of problem-
solving exercises in genetics textbooks was the use of a form of history that performed a 
key function in the disciplinary reproduction of genetics.  These exercises were not mere 
                                                                                                                                            
1924); and C. C. Hurst, Experiments in Genetics (Cambridge, England: University Press, 1925).  After 
1925, the only manuals listed for this period were written by Castle and were designed for more advanced 
courses:  W. E. Castle, The Genetics of Domestic Rabbits: A Manual for Students of Mammalian Genetics, 
and an Aid to Rabbit Breeders and Fur Farmers (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1930); and 
W. E. Castle, Manual for a Laboratory Course in Genetics, to Accompany the Textbook Mammalian 
Genetics (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1940).  Note however that in the 1960s-1970s, 
several manuals were again published, but these were most often for more advanced molecular genetics 
experiments: M. W. Strickberger, Experiments in Genetics with Drosophila (New York: Wiley, 1962); R. 
C. Clowes and W. Hayes, Experiments in Microbial Genetics (New York: Wiley, 1968); G. A. Hudock, 
Experiments in Modern Genetics (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1967); D. P. Snustad and D. S. Dean, 
Genetics Experiments with Bacterial Viruses (San Francisco: W. H. Freeman, 1971); and J. H. Miller, 
Experiments in Molecular Genetics (Cold Spring Harbor, NY: Cold Spring Harbor Laboratory, 1972).   
114 Of all the textbooks in this period that I have surveyed, only two contained suggestions for laboratory 
work: “Laboratory Methods for Class Work on Drosophila” in Sturtevant and Beadle, An Introduction to 
Genetics, Appendix; and “Laboratory Exercises in Genetics” in Colin, Elements of Genetics, 3rd ed., 463-
476.  
115 Walter, Genetics, 4th ed., 338.   
116 Snyder, The Principles of Heredity, 2nd ed., viii.  See also Snyder and David, The Principles of 
Heredity, 5th ed., vii: “It should be re-emphasized that the problems provide valuable source of factual and 
thought-provoking material supplementary to the discussion in the text” (emphasis added).  
117 Stern, Review of Genetics, by E. Altenburg: 515. 
118 Singleton, Elementary Genetics, dust jacket.  
119 Srb and Owen, General Genetics, 1st ed., vi.   
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tools for testing and reinforcing the student’s understanding of the material, nor were 
they created as a way to prepare the student for the types of standardized exams that were 
becoming more common during this period.  Rather, they were introduced in the 1920s 
as a complement to the case histories, which were designed to allow students to 
experience the development of key discoveries; Sinnott and Dunn argued that problem-
solving, more than laboratory work, allowed students to develop a true understanding and 
grasp of the principles of genetics and the geneticists’ approach.  This solution to the 
problem of how to teach genetics was at first met with skepticism and criticism, but was 
gradually adopted for the reasons first articulated by Sinnott and Dunn, as geneticists 
came to agree that these pen and paper exercises were the best way for novice students to 
use, practice, and interact with the principles.  Thus the problems not only served the 
crucial functions that Kuhn identified in his analysis of exemplars, but also allowed for 
an important development in the reproductive mechanism of the discipline of genetics: as 
part of the virtual historical environments created in and by textbooks, problem-solving 
exercises allowed geneticists to begin socializing and enculturating their students without 
the physical infrastructure of a laboratory. 
 
 
A Comparative Survey: 
History, problem-solving, and laboratories in physics and the life sciences 
 
To gain a sense of whether the use of virtual historical environments in introductory 
genetics textbooks was part of a broader trend in the teaching of science in the 1920s-
1950s, I surveyed comparable textbooks from a few other fields.  In the life sciences, I 
found very few similarities on the main points of my analysis.  Botany textbooks, for 
example, rarely had the manifest uses of history that were characteristic of most genetics 
textbooks of the time:  while there were a few botany textbooks that included historical 
details about the development of the science,120 and at least one “unconventional” 
textbook that was organized along historical lines,121 the vast majority did not present the 
                                                
120  See, e.g., E. W. Sinnott, Botany: Principles and Problems, 1st, 2nd, and 3rd eds. (London: McGraw 
Hill, 1923, 1929, 1935); and J. W. Mavor, General Biology (New York: Macmillan, 1936). 
121 See, e.g., A. W. Haupt, An Introduction to Botany, 1st ed. (London: McGraw-Hill, 1938), viii: “The 
organization…represents a departure from the conventional plan followed in most textbooks of general 
botany,” in that it “follows the historical development of botany.”  
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material in a historical manner or even contain historical accounts of the science.122  
Instead, they were generally organized according to conceptual or analytic schemes.123  
One reason for this was that botanists had very different conceptions of the value of 
historical presentation.  For example: A. J. Eames and L. H. MacDaniels, authors of 
popular textbook An Introduction to Plant Anatomy, explained that they did not “pretend 
to present the historical development,” but rather provided a brief historical outline in the 
last chapter, because “the beginning student may best make use of it only when he has 
acquired an understanding of the subject matter.”124  On this point, the botanists’ position 
was antithetical to that of most geneticists, and the distance between the two grew greater 
as years passed.  By the time Eames and MacDaniels wrote the second edition of their 
textbook, they believed that even a limited treatment of history was not justified:  
because history was “not essential to the student gaining a working knowledge of plant 
anatomy,” they removed the historical chapter entirely.125  Thus, with respect to manifest 
uses of history, introductory botany textbooks differed significantly from their 
historically-laden counterparts in genetics.  
The teaching of botany also differed from that of genetics in that it did not rely on 
problem-solving exercises in the 1920s-1950s.  One of the few popular textbooks with 
problem-solving in the 1920s—Sinnott’s Botany: Principles and Problems—no longer 
contained them in the third edition of 1935, which kept only the “Questions for Thought 
                                                
122 See, e.g., A. G. Tansley, Elements of Plant Biology, 1st and 2nd eds. (London: George Allen & Unwin, 
1922, 1935); G. M. Smith et al., A Textbook of General Botany, 3rd ed. (New York: Macmillan, 1935); W. 
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124 Eames and MacDaniels, An Introduction to Plant Anatomy, 1st ed., preface. 
125 A. J. Eames and L. H. MacDaniels, An Introduction to Plant Anatomy, 2nd ed. (New York: McGraw-
Hill, 1947), vii. 
 97 
and Discussion.”126  And while a few other textbooks also included “questions” at the 
end of each chapter,127 they were not as numerous or as valued as the problem-solving 
sections of genetics textbooks, and the vast majority of botany textbooks did not contain 
any.128  This was perhaps related to the fact that botany textbooks were usually designed 
to be used in conjunction with actual laboratory experiments.  Often, textbook authors 
wrote or collaborated on the production of laboratory manuals to accompany their 
textbooks.129  When they did not, they generally included suggestions for laboratory 
work, either at the end of each chapter or in an appendix.130  And the few authors who 
did not write lab manuals or include lab exercises in their textbooks usually stated that 
they expected the teacher to use the book alongside laboratory work.131  To appreciate 
the difference between botany and genetics in this respect, it is important to note that 
laboratory work was not just seen as being an important part of a botany course.  It was, 
rather, considered to be foundational, as was explained by the authors of Plant Biology: 
“It is assumed that the use of most of the chapters will be preceded by laboratory 
exercises adequate to give the student a feeling of the reality of the subject matter with 
which he is dealing and to foster the spirit of inquiry and self instruction.”132  This 
sentiment was shared by Eames and MacDaniels, who explained: “Training which results 
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in independence…is, of course, secured only by laboratory practice.  On such practice 
the authors believe emphasis should be placed, and not on lectures, text study, nor, in the 
beginning, on reading.”133  It was lived experience that provided the foundation for 
knowledge of botany, according to the authors of Textbook of Botany: “The textbook has 
been written primarily to supplement what is observed and discussed.”134  It was not only 
in botany that introductory textbooks and the laboratory were interconnected.  Many of 
the popular zoology and general biology textbooks were also written with accompanying 
laboratory guides.135  For example: J. W. Mavor’s “very widely used” General Biology 
and Laboratory Exercises in General Biology provided the teacher with a curriculum that 
aligned lab work with chapters in the textbook, as did the “splendid” Principles of 
Biology and its companion volume Laboratory Studies in Biology.136  Occasionally, 
authors tried to synthesize a textbook with a laboratory guide, as was the case in the well-
received Guide to Zoological Experience and Practical Problems in Botany.137  
According to one review: “Laboratory directions are organically interwoven into the 
Guide, and it would we difficult to decide where ‘laboratory manual’ ends and ‘textbook’ 
begins, if one wished to make such a distinction.”138  In addition, laboratory manuals for 
                                                
133 Eames and MacDaniels, An Introduction to Plant Anatomy, 1st ed., preface.  See also Eames and 
MacDaniels, An Introduction to Plant Anatomy, 2nd ed., ix. 
134 Transeau, Sampson, and Tiffany, Textbook of Botany, viii.  See also E. N. Transeau, General Botany, 
an Introductory Course for Colleges and Advanced Classes in Secondary Schools (Yonkers-on-Hudson, 
NY: World Book Company, 1923), preface. 
135 See, e.g., W. C. Curtis and M. J. Guthrie, Laboratory Directions in General Zoology, 1st ed. (New 
York: Wiley, 1925); N. Fasten, General Zoology Laboratory Outlines (Corvallis, OR: OSC Cooperative 
Association, 1941); F. G. Hall and A. S. Pearse, Laboratory Manual for General Zoology (Zoology 1) 
(Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1929); R. W. Hegner, Directions for Laboratory and Field Work in 
Zoology, for Use in Connection with Practical Zoology (New York: Macmillan, 1930); H. H. Newman, 
Laboratory Guide and Review Manual for General Zoology (New York: Macmillan, 1929); G. E. Potter, 
Laboratory Manual for Introductory Zoology (One-Semester Course) (St. Louis: C. V. Mosby, 1941); K. 
M. Roehl and H. H. Newman, A Laboratory Manual for General Zoology (New York: Macmillan, 1936); 
K. A. Stiles, Laboratory Explorations in General Zoology (New York: Macmillan, 1943); T. I. Storer, 
Laboratory Manual for General Zoology, 1st ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1944); and H. J. Van Cleave, 
H. R. Linville, and H. A. Kelly, Biological Principles in General Zoology: A Laboratory Manual (New 
York: Ginn and Company, 1930). 
136 R. B. Gordon, Review of Principles of Biology, by W. G. Whaley et al., The Scientific Monthly 79 
(1954): 253; and B. Glass, Review of A Brief Biology, by J. W. Mavor, and A Laboratory Manual for a 
Brief Course in Biology, by J. W. Mavor, Quarterly Review of Biology 24 (1949): 345. 
137 See, e.g., Robbins and Isenbarger, Practical Problems in Botany, vi, where the authors explain that the 
textbook was written as “a series of problems and subproblems” in which the student worked through the 
144 lab exercises that were interwoven into the chapters of the textbook.  
138 R. Gillette, Review of Guide to Zoological Experiences, by J. L. Metcalf and C. W. Creaser, Quarterly 
Review of Biology 26 (1951): 74.  See also the review of Practical Problems in Botany:  E. B. Matzke and 
S. F. Trelease, "Recent Botanical Books," Science 85 (1937): 19. 
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zoology were frequently published independently of any particular textbook.139  Thus, it 
seems that the sciences of botany, zoology, and general biology had few of the features 
of genetics that I have identified and discussed in this chapter. 
A brief study of physics textbook likewise finds little in common with the virtual 
historical environments of genetics textbooks.  Very few authors of physics textbooks 
attempted to employ a historical approach to teaching, although some physicists 
interested in pedagogy had suggested that it might prove to be a valuable approach.140  
And while physics textbooks generally included numerous problem-solving exercises,141 
and the use of problems was so pervasive that it attracted the interests of physicists 
interested in pedagogy,142 the form and function of these problems were fundamentally 
different from those in genetics textbooks.  Whereas geneticists saw quantification as an 
essential feature of their problem-solving exercises, physicists were interested in 
minimizing the quantitative aspect of theirs.  For example: Thomas Cope, professor at 
the University of Pennsylvania and active member of Association of Physics Teachers, 
suggested that textbook authors should write problems that involved “rigorous thinking 
without arithmetic,” or “semi-quantitative, physical problems.”143  H. K. Schilling, head 
of the Physics Department at Penn State, agreed and proposed that physics teachers 
should use “stripped” problems—“problems which, divested of nearly all mathematical, 
stand bare physically.”  He argued that this type of problem allowed students to practice 
                                                
139 See, e.g., H. L. Bruner, Laboratory Directions in College Zoology, 1st ed. (New York: Macmillan, 
1928); G. A. Drew, A Laboratory Manual of Invertebrate Zoology, 3rd ed. (Philadelphia: W. B. Saunders, 
1920); L. H. Hyman, A Laboratory Manual for Elementary Zoology, 2nd ed. (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1926); H. D. Reed and B. P. Young, Laboratory Studies in Zoology, 1st ed. (New York: 
McGraw-Hill, 1930); C. P. Sigerfoos, Laboratory Directions in General Zoology, 9th ed. (Minneapolis: 
Perine, 1921); and H. V. P. Wilson and R. E. Coker, Laboratory Guide in General Zoology (Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 1925). 
140 J. C. Hubbard, "Trends in Physics Teaching. Some Recent Texts," Science 95 (1942): esp. 411. 
141 See, e.g., J. A. Eldridge, College Physics (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1940); W. Winiger, 
Fundamentals of College Physics (New York: American Book Company, 1940); and N. H. Black, An 
Introductory Course in College Physics (New York: Macmillan, 1941).  See also K. Lark-Horovitz, 
"Physics Teaching and the Text-Books," Science 88 (1938); and Hubbard, "Trends in Physics Teaching. 
Some Recent Texts." 
142 See, e.g., C. J. Lapp, "The Effectiveness of Mathematical Versus Physical Solutions in Problem 
Solving in College Physics," American Journal of Physics 8 (1940): 241: “A perusal of the catalog 
descriptions of the courses in general physics offered by institutions of college grade gives direct, strong 
evidence that problem solving is held to be one of the potent learning devices used in instruction.”  Lapp 
later carried out a two-year study to test the validity of what he saw as the long-held “but unsubstantiated” 
belief in the value of problem-solving in physics teaching; he concluded that problem-solving was in fact a 
valuable teaching tool.  See C. J. Lapp, "The Effectiveness of Problem Solving in Producing Achievement 
in College Physics," American Journal of Physics 9 (1941).  
143 T. D. Cope, "Problems in Physics Textbooks," American Journal of Physics 5 (1937): 89.  
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the “thought processes involved in the application of fundamental principles and 
concepts to particular physical situations.”144  The use of “stripped” problems was also 
advocated by C. P. Lapp, who published research on their value in American Journal of 
Physics.145  Thus, geneticists and physicists had very different ideas about the ideal form 
of problem-solving exercises.  In addition, and perhaps more importantly, these exercises 
were meant to serve very different functions.  Whereas geneticists thought that problem-
solving could replace laboratory work in some introductory courses, physicists continued 
to see actual experiments as essential.146  Textbooks were expected to prepare students 
for “the usual laboratory experiments of the general physics course.”147  Problem-solving 
was merely meant to complement experiments: “Each chapter concludes with a list of 
suggested laboratory experiments and a goodly assortment of questions and 
problems.”148  On some accounts, the discipline’s reproduction was essentially rooted in 
the laboratory.  For example: in a review of two popular manuals—A Laboratory Manual 
of Experiments in Physics, by Ingersoll and Martin, and General Physics for the 
Laboratory, by Taylor, Watson and Howe—it was suggested that “an effective course in 
general physics” could “be offered with a manual like either of these, perhaps reshaped a 
little, as the core textbook with a shelf of the usual texts in general physics at hand for 
collateral reading.”149  Thus some physicists—much like some botanists and zoologists, 
and unlike geneticists—thought that their textbooks could be replaced by lab manuals.  
The laboratory was seen as a central place of teaching, as a 1942 article on trends in 
physics teaching concluded: “there has never been a time when the importance of 
laboratory points of view…have been more clearly recognized.”150 
                                                
144 H. K. Schilling, "'Stripped Problems' Tests," American Journal of Physics 9 (1941): 124. 
145 Lapp, "The Effectiveness of Mathematical Versus Physical Solutions in Problem Solving in College 
Physics." 
146 G. F. Hull, "Text-Books in Physics," Science 89 (1939): 154: “The teaching of physics depends on 
three factors, the teacher, the laboratory equipment, the textbook.”  
147 Hubbard, "Trends in Physics Teaching. Some Recent Texts," 411. 
148 Ibid. 
149 T. D. Cope, "Text-Books of Physics," Science 97 (1943): 556.  See also, e.g., the “preface” and 
“announcement” in L. L. Loeb, A Laboratory Manual of Electricity and Magnetism (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 1941).   
150 Hubbard, "Trends in Physics Teaching. Some Recent Texts," 412.  This claim was not, however, 
entirely uncontested.  Several studies were conducted in the 1950s to compare learning achieved through 
lecture-only versus lecture and laboratory courses; they are discussed in V. W. Miles and W. C. V. 
Deventer, "The Teaching of Science at the College and University Level," Review of Educational Research 
31 (1961).  
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While brief, my survey suggests that genetics in the 1920s-1950s was unlike 
botany and zoology, from which it had emerged, and unlike physics, which geneticists 
emulated in differentiating their field from the life sciences.   Although exemplars 
certainly played an important role in the teaching of these other sciences, they were not 
developed into virtual historical environments or used as replacements for the laboratory.  
It thus seems that geneticists might have developed a unique form of case-based teaching 
and disciplinary reproduction in the 1920s, but to draw such a conclusion would require a 
more extensive analysis than is feasible or suitable in this chapter. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
Although textbooks are designed as educational tools, the specific goals they serve 
cannot be uniformly characterized.  Textbooks can be written to convey a body of 
theories, facts, and ideas; or alternatively, to inculcate a way of seeing, an approach to a 
type of problem, or a grasp of the ways a scientific law is used.  In the 1920s, the 
teaching of genetics was itself seen as an emerging science, and authors such as Sinnott 
and Dunn actively tried to develop a solution to what Castle described as the “problem of 
how successfully to teach genetics.”151  The problem was not just methodological, but 
also arose from uncertainty about the purpose of teaching genetics, according to Stern.152  
In this chapter, I have argued that the 1920s marked the beginning of a style of 
teaching that later became standardized whereby two types of virtual historical 
environments were written into genetics textbooks—in presentations of past experiments, 
and in problem-solving exercises.  Together, these features of the textbook constituted 
the exemplars with which the principles of genetics were taught.  Although the historicity 
of the past experiments was always explicit while that of the problems was not, these two 
parts of the textbook were designed together to allow the student to practice the path by 
which the principles had been discovered, tested, applied, and modified.  They placed the 
student in an environment wherein past events could be reenacted.  In this way, 
                                                
151 Castle, "Some New Books on Genetics," 567.  See also Sinnott and Dunn, Principles of Genetics, 1st 
ed., ix. 
152 Stern, Review of Genetics, by E. Altenburg: 514: “The  purpose of a college course in genetics is less 
well defined than that of many other courses.”  According to Stern, a course in genetics was not a 
“prerequisite for advanced work in fields other than genetics itself,” whereas anatomy and physical 
chemistry were professionally useful for physicians and chemists. 
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geneticists taught their students how to think in cases—how to find and follow rules, and 
thereby how to go on when confronting new situations.  Internalizing knowledge of a 
historical exemplar, the student not only grasped a principle of genetics, but also the 
principles of geneticists.  
By writing virtual historical environments into their textbooks, geneticists 
removed the first steps of their discipline’s reproduction from the laboratory.  It was with 
pen and paper that novice students began to reenact the historical discovery of the 
principles, perform experiments with them, and gain a grasp of the shared exemplars that 
unified and defined the scientific community.  The centrality of history in this form of 
disciplinary reproduction calls into question the common view that history-writing does 
not perform scientific functions.  In the following chapter, I will continue to problematize 
this notion by exploring a way in which history was even further embedded into the 
structure of genetics textbooks.  But I will first conclude my study of the Mendelian 
exemplar where it began—with the professor of law who created the first case-studies at 
Harvard, Christopher C. Langdell.  
During the second quarter of the twentieth century, geneticists came to see their 
discipline much as Langdell had once seen his: “the best, if not the only way of 
mastering the doctrine effectively is by studying the cases in which it is embodied.”153  
With this pedagogic shift came a significant change in the places where these doctrines 
were learned.  When Langdell developed the case-study method of teaching in the late 
nineteenth century, he had seen the library and its books as “the proper workshop” for 
students of law: “it is to us all that the laboratories of the university are to the chemists 
and physicists, the museums of natural history to the zoologists, the botanical garden to 
the botanists.”154  By the 1940s, however, the workshops of the legal and natural sciences 
were connected by more than analogy.  While first-year physicists still trained in 
laboratories and botanists in gardens, the students of genetics often joined the students of 
law in the library.  Textbooks had replaced fly rooms and crop fields.  It was in their 
pages that genetics was being practiced.       
                                                
153 Langdell, A Selection of Cases on the Law of Contracts, vii, as quoted in Forrester, "If P, Then What?  
Thinking in Cases," 15. 
154 C. C. Langdell, "The Harvard Law School [Professor Langdell's Speech at the 'Quarter-Millennial' 
Celebration of Harvard University on the 5th of November, 1886]," Law Quarterly Review 3 (1887): 124. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
Historia as Logos: 
The Development and Presentation of a Conceptual Order 
 
 
 
The organization of principles and theories was relatively standardized in the genetics 
textbooks of the 1940s-1960s.  In the vast majority, there was no variation in the chapters 
on “Mendelian” and “chromosomal” genetics: segregation, independent assortment, 
modified Mendelian ratios, sex-linked inheritance, linkage, cytology and crossing-over, 
chromosome maps, chromosomal aberrations, and mutation were almost always 
presented in this order. There was only slight variation in the organization of much of the 
remaining material.  Cellular reproduction and the formation of gametes were discussed 
in one of two places— at the opening of the textbook, or more often after Mendel’s 
principles and before chromosomal genetics.  Sex-determination and quantitative 
inheritance were explained at some point after the discussion of modified Mendelian 
ratios.  And topics of research that were seen as under development (e.g., population 
genetics and evolution, genetic systems, developmental genetics, and cytoplasmic 
inheritance) were discussed in the final third of the text. 1 
                                                
1 With a few exceptions—such as A. F. Shull, Heredity, 1st, 2nd, 3rd, and 4th eds. (New York: McGraw-
Hill, 1926, 1931, 1938, 1948); A. H. Sturtevant and G. W. Beadle, An Introduction to Genetics (London: 
Saunders, 1939); and C. D. Darlington and K. Mather; The Elements of Genetics (London: Allen & Unwin; 
1949)—my statements in this paragraph apply to almost all of the widely-circulated textbooks written in 
this period, including:  E. W. Sinnott and L. C. Dunn; Principles of Genetics; 1st; 2nd; and 3rd eds. (New 
York: McGraw-Hill; 1925; 1932; 1939); E. W. Sinnott, L. C. Dunn, and Th. Dobzhansky, Principles of 
Genetics, 4th and 5th eds. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1950, 1958); L. H. Snyder, The Principles of 
Heredity, 1st, 2nd, 3rd, and 4th eds. (Boston: D. C. Heath, 1935, 1940, 1946, 1951); L. H. Snyder and P. R. 
David, The Principles of Heredity, 5th ed. (Boston: D. C. Heath, 1957); E. Altenburg, Genetics, 1st and 
Rev. eds. (New York: H. Holt, 1945, 1957); A. M. Winchester, Genetics: A Survey of the Principles of 
Heredity, 1st, 2nd, and 3rd eds. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1951, 1958, 1961); A. M. Srb and R. D. Owen, 
General Genetics, 1st ed. (San Francisco: W. H. Freeman, 1952); A. M. Srb, R. D. Owen, and R. S. Edgar, 
General Genetics, 2nd ed. (San Francisco: W. H. Freeman, 1965); E. J. Gardner, Principles of Genetics, 1st 
and 2nd eds. (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1960, 1964); C. M. M. Begg, An Introduction to Genetics,  
(London: The English Universities Press, 1959); and R. C. King, Genetics, 1st and 2nd eds. (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1962, 1965).   
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Although it is tempting to treat standardized presentations of a science as objects 
that tell us about matters of consensus in the scientific community, textbooks are not 
artifacts, but rather tools and sites of production.  It is in them that disparate scientific 
practices and theories are first brought together and shown to be a unified discipline.  
Thus the authors of textbooks do not passively document a practice that exists elsewhere, 
but rather create the coherence of the science when they present and organize it.  
Behind the standardized organization of genetics textbooks in the mid-twentieth 
century, a construction of history and a form of history-writing were at work.  Their use 
will be the subject of the three sections of this chapter.  To begin, I will explore the 
heterogeneity in the organization of first generation textbooks, the reasoning that 
subsequently led to the standardization of the “historical approach,” and the outcome of 
attempts to develop an alternative “logical” order.  I will then turn to an analysis of the 
form and function of the literary devices that were used to write a textbook “historically.”  
In the third section, I will explore whether the standardization of organization affected 
authors’ abilities to recreate the science over time. Together, these three sections will 
show how a sense of history was intricately involved in the formation, presentation, and 
reconstructions of the conceptual order of genetics.2   
 
 
Historical vs. Logical: The Standardization of Textbook Order 
 
In the 1910s, the organization of subject matter in genetics textbooks was generally 
discussed in detail, but rarely critically evaluated, in book reviews.  An article in Science, 
for example, described the order in Thomson’s Heredity: “The book starts with 
definitions of heredity and inheritance, and proceeds to discuss the physical basis of 
inheritance, the germ cells, their maturation and fertilization.”  In the paragraphs that 
followed, the review gave a thorough “summary of the contents of the book.”3  Reviews 
of Bateson’s Mendel’s Principles of Heredity likewise recounted the progression of 
subjects in detail—from pre-Mendelian theory, to “the principles of Mendelian theory,” 
                                                
2 For a more theorized account of how the nature of scientific facts and discoveries are constituted through 
their textual organization, see S. Woolgar, "Discovery: Logic and Sequence in a Scientific Text," in The 
Social Process of Scientific Investigation, ed. K. D. Knorr, R. Krohn, and R. Whitley (London: D. Reidel, 
1980), esp. 256-262. 
3 J. P. McMurrich, Review of Heredity, by J. A. Thomson, Science 28 (1908): 211. 
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to “exceptions, real or apparent, to Mendel’s law.”4  Bateson’s historical ordering of the 
subject matter was described as though it were the natural way to present a science that 
was only a few years old: “The present work…gives a comprehensive account of the 
development of Mendelian principles of heredity down to the present year.”5  Although 
these and other reviews devoted much space to discussing the organization of subject 
matter, they did not address the merits or weaknesses of the various forms of order.  No 
approach was heralded as being more logical, or as allowing for better explanation.  
However, reviewers did critically discuss authors’ interpretations of hereditary 
phenomena and generally identified textbooks as representing different schools of 
thought.6   
As I mentioned in Chapter 1, reviews of Heredity often commented on 
Thomson’s commitment to Weismannism.  North American zoologist J. Playfair 
McMurrich, for example, wrote: “He avowedly sails…under the flag of Weismannism 
and nails this flag firmly to the mast.”7  In much of this review for Science, McMurrich 
elaborated on the consequences of Thomson’s position, arguing that his insistence on 
material units “rendered him somewhat intolerant of epigenetic possibilities.”  
McMurrich saw the phenomena of heredity as open to numerous possible interpretations, 
each with its own value and merit: “it must be admitted that the concept of determinants 
or specific material units furnishes a convenient ‘notation’ for the discussion of certain 
phenomena of inheritance; it is not, however, the only concept possible.”8  
Distinguishing between the phenomena and the concepts employed to understand it, 
McMurrich accepted Thomson’s Weismannism on instrumental grounds, stating that it 
                                                
4 W. E. Castle, Review of Mendel's Principles of Heredity, by W. Bateson, Science 30 (1909): 482-483.  
See also R. R. Gates, "Heredity," Review of Heredity, by J. A. Thomson, Botanical Gazette 47 (1909): 61. 
5 Castle, Review of Mendel's Principles of Heredity, by W. Bateson: 482 (emphasis added). 
6 E.g., J. P. McMurrich, Review of the Laws of Heredity, by G. A. Reid, Science 32 (1910): 761-762, 
discussed Reid’s commitment to a deductive model of inquiry; E. M. East, "Genetics," Review of Elemente 
der Exakten Erblichkeitslehre, by W. Johannsen, Botanical Gazette 57 (1914): 241, suggested that many of 
Johannsen’s views were Weismannian; W. E. Castle, Review of Mendel's Principles of Heredity, by W. 
Bateson, Science 40 (1914): 246, and R. R. Gates, "Mendelism," Review of Mendel's Principles of 
Heredity, by W. Bateson, and Mendelism, by R. C. Punnett, Botanical Gazette 48 (1909): 61-62, discussed 
Bateson’s Mendelian orientation; and McMurrich, Review of Heredity, by J. A. Thomson: 210-211, and 
Gates, "Heredity," 154, highlighted that Thomson was a famous advocate of Weismannism. 
7 McMurrich, Review of Heredity, by J. A. Thomson: 210-211.  See also, e.g., Gates, "Heredity," 154: 
“The writer…is perhaps most widely recognized as the translator of Weismann’s works and the exponent 
of Weismannism.” 
8 McMurrich, Review of Heredity, by J. A. Thomson: 211. 
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was just one of numerous useful ways of presenting and studying genetics.  He 
commended Thomson for not being so dogmatic as to not see the validity of alternatives: 
“he admits that determinants are ‘scientific fictions,’ that they are elements of a 
‘symbolic notation’ to be discarded so soon as it is shown to be inconsistent with 
demonstrable facts.”9  
Like Thomson’s Heredity, Bateson’s Mendel’s Principles was understood as a 
textbook representing a specific school of thought—in his case, Mendelism. Reginald 
Gates, for example, wrote: “The remarks on every page…leave no doubt as to the 
interpretation placed upon the phenomena described.”10  Mendelism was seen and 
critically discussed as being just one of many possible interpretations of heredity, relying 
on the selective consideration of facts: “It is a curious blindness to other facts of heredity 
which leads the author to the opinion that Mendelism probably represents the only type 
of inheritance which exists.”11  Emphasizing the fact that Bateson’s approach to the 
organism was based on “an unproven hypothesis,” Gates acknowledged the instrumental 
value of the theory, but suggested that it was likely to be incorrect: “The hypothesis has 
certainly proved useful, even though another explanation of the phenomena of 
segregation may ultimately be found necessary.”12 According to Gates, Bateson 
misunderstood other types of approaches to the issue:  “The fact that Galton’s law was 
designed for populations rather than for individuals seems to have been overlooked.”13  
Gates did not claim that Bateson did not understand Galton’s law, but rather that he did 
not understand the scope and purpose of the law—the type of law that it was.  
In identifying and criticizing Thomson’s and Bateson’s schools of thought, 
textbook reviews of the 1910s implicitly made sense of the logic underlying the 
organization of subject matter in Heredity and Mendel’s Principles.  Bateson’s 
commitment to a Mendelian interpretation explained his decisions to begin with 
Mendel’s experiments and discoveries, and to use Mendel’s laws as a foundation and 
organizing logic of the textbook.  Likewise, Thomson’s commitment to understanding 
                                                
9 Ibid. 
10 Gates, "Mendelism," 62.  See also, e.g., “Bateson’s book…may be regarded as the authoritative 
interpretation of Mendelism,” in Castle, Review of Mendel's Principles of Heredity, by W. Bateson: 246. 
11 Gates, "Mendelism," 61-62. 
12 Ibid.: 62. 
13 Ibid. 
 107 
inheritance in terms of determinants made sense of his decision to begin with a 
discussion of the physical basis of inheritance, the germ cells, and their reproduction.  In 
the following decades, overt criticism and discussion of authors’ different 
“interpretations” became rare in textbook reviews.  However, I want to suggest that this 
was not because disagreements over interpretation had been resolved, but rather because 
they had become embedded in discussions of order and organization, as Bateson’s and 
Thomson’s approaches became prototypes of two competing approaches to teaching.   
The mode of organization in Mendel’s Principles—in which the genetics was 
presented as building on the foundation of Mendel’s laws—became known as the 
“historical approach” and was seen as part of the standard method of teaching by the 
1930s.14  As stated in a review of An Introduction to Genetics (1939), “genetics is 
customarily approached through an account of its history.”15  And in a review of 
Snyder’s widely-used The Principles of Heredity (1935):  
The general plan of the book does not depart greatly from the 
conventional.  After presenting simple (monohybrid) Mendelian 
inheritance, there is a chapter on the physical background (cytology), after 
which dihybrid and modified ratios, sex-linkage, lethals, multiple 
allelomorphs, etc., are taken up in much their usual order.16   
 
Reviewers in Science and The American Naturalist often identified and categorized 
textbooks in relation to this traditional “historical” organization.  For example: in a 
review of H. S. Jennings' Genetics,  “the general plan of the book departs from the 
conventional,” and in a review of Adrian Srb and Edgar Owen’s General Genetics, “the 
arrangement of chapters does not deviate from that usually found in genetics 
textbooks.”17  This historical organization had been adopted in the 1920s because it was 
seen as the natural order that placed the fundamental facts first.  For example, when H. E. 
                                                
14 Note that in physics, textbook authors were just beginning to experiment with the historical approach in 
the 1940s: J. C. Hubbard, "Trends in Physics Teaching. Some Recent Texts," Science 95 (1942): 411. 
15 T. Just, Review of An Introduction to Genetics, by A. H. Sturtevant and G. W. Beadle, The American 
Midland Naturalist 23 (1940): 752.  
16 L. J. Cole, "Genetics Texts," Review of The Principles of Heredity, by L. H. Snyder and Principles of 
Genetics and Eugenics, by N. Fasten, Science 83 (1936): 373.  
17 E. Caspari, Review of General Genetics, by A. M. Srb and R. D. Owen, Science 117 (1953): 45; and M. 
F. Guyer, "Genetics," Review of Genetics, by H. S. Jennings, Science 83 (1936): 576.  See also, e.g., “the 
traditional approach to the basic principles has been abandoned,” in C. N. Herndon, Review of Medical 
Genetics, by L. H. Snyder, The American Naturalist 75 (1941): 602.  
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Walter made revisions to the first edition of Genetics and adopted a historical order in the 
second, a review in Science praised the “radical changes,” explaining:  
A chapter discussing ‘Pure Lines and Selection’ formerly preceded 
Mendelism but now more appropriately follows this subject because pure 
lines and selection can be interpreted best in terms of Mendelism. The 
basic facts of cytology were originally treated in the second chapter but 
now follow the fundamental facts of Mendelism.18   
 
Here and elsewhere, reviews suggested that the “historical order” corresponded to a more 
natural conceptual order.  It was also widely thought that this form of organization had 
clear pedagogical strengths.  In Charles W. Cotterman’s review of the fourth edition of 
Walter’s Genetics, which he identified as “among the earliest accounts of the new 
science to appear in this country,” he suggested, “Teachers of genetics and allied subjects 
should find some useful teaching devices,” such as “the historical approach” to 
teaching.19  By the 1940s, many authors agreed that knowledge of the basic foundation of 
the discipline could be best conveyed in historical terms.  In the preface to Textbook of 
Genetics, for example, William Hovanitz wrote: “This book maintains the historical 
approach to genetics…It is believed best that this approach be preserved in an 
introductory account to the subject.”20  It was also thought that the historical approach 
made the subject more interesting.  As the author of Elements of Genetics explained, 
“The historical approach has been adopted as the one most likely to gain the interest of 
the reader.”21  
It is important to note that when authors and reviewers spoke about this 
“historical approach,” they did not mean that all of the subjects in the textbook were 
presented chronologically.  Jennings' Genetics, for example, did not follow the history 
exactly, but Gates nevertheless stated: “the author in his treatment follows the history of 
                                                
18 J. A. Detlefsen, Review of Genetics: An Introduction to the Study of Heredity, by H. E. Walter, Science 
56 (1922): 145-146 (emphasis added). 
19 C. W. Cotterman, "Recent Books on Genetics," The American Naturalist 75 (1941): 599.  
20 W. Hovanitz, Textbook of Genetics (New York: Elsevier Press, 1953), v.  This view was also expressed 
in E. C. Colin, Elements of Genetics: Mendel's Laws of Heredity with Special Application to Man, 3rd ed. 
(New York: McGraw-Hill, 1956), vii: “it is felt that a knowledge of the development of a science is of 
particular interest and importance to the beginning  student.” See also Gardner, Principles of Genetics, 1st 
ed., v: “This book…emphasizes basic principles and tells the story of the classical experiments which have 
laid the foundation for a modern science.” 
21 Colin, Elements of Genetics, 3rd ed., vii.  The idea that historical details made science more interesting 
for students dates at least to the nineteenth century: W. J. Sherratt, "History of Science in Education," 9-10. 
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the development of knowledge.”22  When Edith White’s preface to Genetics explained 
that the “subject matter of this book is presented from a historical viewpoint,” what she 
meant was that students were first introduced to “Mendelian Genetics” and then to 
“Drosophila Genetics.”23  And as Dobzhansky noted in a review of The Science of 
Genetics, it was often just the chapters on transmission genetics that were being 
presented in a roughly historical order:  “Classical transmission genetics is outlined in the 
first two chapters, which generally follow the historical sequence of genetic discoveries 
(except that the concepts of allelism, homozygosity, and heterozygosity are introduced in 
a chapter preceding that in which an account of Mendel’s experiments is given).”24  It 
was a sense of historical order—a construction of history, and not an adherence to 
chronology—that guided the writing and organization of genetics textbooks.  Thus, while 
the concept of the “standard historical approach” allowed geneticists to easily discuss the 
organization of a particular textbook, it also effaced differences between textbooks.  The 
use of the term was not only descriptive, but also normative: it reinforced a notion of 
what the convention was, as well as the sense that there was an established and valued 
way of ordering the subject matter, influencing the reception of textbooks in both 
genetics and other life sciences.25   
An alternative to the historical order was the “logical method,” which shared 
essential features of Thomson’s approach in Heredity, but was explicitly formulated in 
the late 1930s as several prominent textbook authors began to question the conventional 
wisdom of geneticists.  A. Franklin Shull was amongst the first of these authors.  In the 
first two editions of his textbook Heredity, he discussed gametes and cellular 
reproduction prior to Mendelian genetics.  And in the third edition of 1938 he explained 
and defended this method, criticizing the historical approach on pedagogical grounds:   
                                                
22 R. R. Gates, "Principles of Genetics," Review of Genetics, by H. S. Jennings, Nature 137 (1936): 801. 
23 E. G. White, Genetics, 2nd ed. (New York: Vantage Press, 1962), i. 
24 Th. Dobzhansky, "Genetics, the Core Science of Biology," Review of The Science of Genetics, by C. 
Auerbach, Genetic Research, by A. Muntzing, Genetics on the Population Level, by M. Rasmuson, Human 
Genetics, by C. C. Li, and Cell Heredity, by R. Sager and F. J Ryan, Science 134 (1961): 2091-2092. 
25 See, e.g., R. Gillette, Review of Guide to Zoological Experiences, by J. L. Metcalf and C. W. Creaser, 
Quarterly Review of Biology 26 (1951): 75: “one might suggest that it would have been more consistent to 
present the student with the breeding data from which the Mendelian generalizations are drawn 
independently of the cytological parallels and later to demonstrate the correlation between Mendelian 
breeding factors and chromosomal behaviour.  The conclusion that the chromosomes are the material 
bearers of the hereditary factors could come after rather than before the Mendelian generalizations.” 
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The traditional method has been to present experimental results, formulate 
a scheme of gene operations which will logically explain them, and 
then—long afterward—show that these operations call for genes which 
are located in the chromosomes.  While this has been the order of 
discovery, few sciences are most effectively mastered by following the 
sequence of their historical development.26   
 
Sturtevant and Beadle agreed with Shull that genetics should not be taught historically, 
and in the preface to An Introduction to Genetics explained their logical approach: “The 
treatment of the material is not a historical one; the object has been rather to give a 
natural order.”27  They thought of genetics as a “mathematically formulated subject that 
is logically complete and self-contained.”28  For this reason, they “attempted to treat the 
subject…as a logical development in which each step depends on the preceding ones” 
and directed the students to read the textbook in this way: “The book should be read from 
the beginning, like a textbook of mathematic or physics, rather than…like a textbook of 
comparative anatomy or natural history.”29  In reviewing An Introduction to Genetics, 
Theodore Just noted: “Despite its rather recent origin genetics is customarily approached 
through an account of its history.  Contrary to this practice, the authors of this 
‘Introduction’ adopt a different arrangement.”30  Just’s review identified the authors’ 
claims about the value of this “logical” presentation, but did not say whether he agreed.31  
Similarly, the reviewer in Nature noted that Sturtevant and Beadle thought that their 
order was more natural, but did not offer an evaluation of the approach, agreeing only 
that it was new: “The order in which the material is presented is claimed to be a natural 
one and the reader will find the approach to genetics entirely novel.”32  Geneticists were 
evidently unsure about the value of this approach.  Although many agreed that it was 
more “logical” to begin a textbook with chapters on the physical basis of heredity, there 
was uncertainty about whether this had any pedagogical advantage.  In a book review of 
                                                
26 Shull, Heredity, 3rd ed., vii-viii. 
27 Sturtevant and Beadle, An Introduction to Genetics, 11. 
28 Ibid.  
29 Ibid.  See also H. S. Jennings, Genetics (New York: W. W. Norton, 1935), in which a similar approach 
was used for the same reasons.   
30 Just, Review of An Introduction to Genetics, by A. H. Sturtevant and G. W. Beadle: 752. 
31 Through the 1940s, reviewers were commenting on the use of the logical without evaluating it.  See, 
e.g., W. R. Singleton, Review of Introduction to Genetics and Cytogenetics, by H. P. Riley, Science 107 
(1948): 634: “The approach used by Dr. Riley is the logical one rather than a more or less historical 
development of genetics.  The first part of the book is devoted to the physical basis of heredity.” 
32 P. C. Koller, "A Synopsis of Genetics," Review of An Introduction to Genetics, by A. H. Sturtevant and 
G. W. Beadle, Nature 144 (1939): 1067. 
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Jennings’s Genetics, Michael Guyer, author of the widely used textbook Animal Biology, 
voiced skepticism:   
The general plan of the book departs from the conventional in that the 
underlying mechanism of heredity—the nature of the germinal 
constituents—is discussed before the generalities of genetics are 
reviewed.  While this is unquestionably the logical approach, how such a 
method will work out in actual class usage…is a matter that will doubtless 
be watched with much interest by teachers of genetics.33   
 
The logical approach was, however, well received by some.  Reviewers for Quarterly 
Review of Biology, for example, offered praise of Altenburg’s Genetics: “The general 
plan and arrangement of material is excellent.  The description of the chromosomal 
behavior in the first chapter lays a foundation for much of what follows.”34  
In the 1930s-1940s, geneticists discussed the logical and historical approaches as 
though they were merely two different ways of teaching the same science.  This 
disagreement about organization, however, can been seen as the product of a deeper 
disagreement about the foundation of genetics—about whether the science was based in 
units of matter, or in scientific laws.  With the logical order, knowledge of genes and 
their behavior in chromosomal reproduction provided the basis for understanding 
Mendelism; with the historical, Mendel’s laws provided the foundation for the 
chromosome theory and the theory of the gene.   On this view, essential features of 
Bateson’s and Thomson’s disagreement about the nature of the science were 
recapitulated in these disagreements about the best approach to teaching.  The historical 
and logical methods were not merely two ways of presenting the same science. They 
were, rather, ways of conveying two very different conceptual orders.  This was 
acknowledged by textbook authors Srb and Owen, who had originally written General 
Genetics using the logical method, but decided to reorganize the second edition along 
                                                
33 Guyer, "Genetics," 576.  Guyer’s Animal Biology received an excellent review, and its success was 
noted, in C. E. McClung, "Elementary Biological Texts," Review of Principles of Animal Biology, by A. F. 
Shull, Animal Biology, by M. F. Guyer, General Biology, by J. W. Mavor, Foundations of Biology, by L. 
L. Woodruff, Human Biology, by G. A. Baitsell, Biology and Human Affairs, by J. W. Ritchie, This Living 
World, by C. C. Clark and R. H. Hall, Science 94 (1941): 392. 
34 R. F. Kimball and E. S. Gersh, "Genetics and Cytology," Review of Genetics, by E. Altenburg, 
Quarterly Review of Biology 21 (1946): 79. 
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historical lines.35  In the preface to this second edition, they explained: “Our decision to 
introduce students to genetics by way of the contributions of Mendel was not merely a 
matter of graceful tribute on the occasion of the centennial of his work.  It is a 
recognition that his pioneering contribution framed the terms of reference of typical 
genetic analysis and thinking, even as they are carried out today.”36  In adopting the 
historical approach, textbook authors chose to teach one conceptual order over another; 
they presented a picture of genetics in which Mendel’s principles were a frame, holding 
the heterogeneous aspects of the science in place.  
In the 1910s, the decision to introduce genetics with Mendel’s principles was 
understood as a Mendelian approach to genetics; by the 1930s, it had come to be seen as 
a historical approach, defined against the logical; and in the 1950s-1960s, it was 
transformed again, as this organization became ubiquitous.  In the textbooks of this 
period that opened with an explanation of the physical basis of heredity, this explanation 
served to introduce a series of many chapters that were organized much like those in the 
historical approach.37  Thus, the historical approach was at least partly adopted in most 
textbooks.  There were not any new overtly ahistorical textbooks that presented sex-
linkage before Mendel’s principles, as Sturtevant and Beadle had in writing their 
“logical” An Introduction to Genetics.  But the reason for this was not that geneticists 
ceased valuing a logical approach; rather, there had been a shift in their sense of “the 
logical.”  There had been a reappropriation of the language used by Sturtevant and 
Beadle to justify their ahistorical organization—their claims that genetics was a 
“mathematically formulated subject that is logically complete” and that it should be 
presented “as a logical development in which each step depends on the preceding ones.”  
In the 1950s, geneticists agreed with these statements; Edward C. Colin, for example, 
made almost identical claims in the introduction to his textbook: “Genetics resembles 
mathematics in that one topic is built upon another in logical order.”38  What it meant to 
                                                
35 See Srb and Owen, General Genetics, 1st ed., v, in which the authors had explained that they had chosen 
to present the material logically, which “meant the abandonment of anything like a systematic historical 
approach to the subject.” 
36 Srb, Owen, and Edgar, General Genetics, 2nd ed., vi. 
37 See, e.g., Altenburg, Genetics, 1st ed. and Rev. ed.; Winchester, Genetics, 1st ed.; Begg, An Introduction 
to Genetics; and King, Genetics, 1st ed. and 2nd ed. 
38 Colin, Elements of Genetics, 3rd ed., xiv. 
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present genetics logically, however, had changed; for in Colin’s textbook, the science 
was presented as being based on Mendelism.  This approach was no longer seen in 
opposition to the logical.  It was, rather, adopted precisely because it was thought to 
reveal the logic of the science.  As explained by Dunn, “The history of genetics provides 
an example, perhaps the clearest one among the biological sciences, of how scientific 
knowledge evolves.  The logical connection between its ideas—its inner consistency—is 
readily apparent.”39  Herskowitz voiced similar thoughts when explaining his use of this 
approach in his textbook Genetics: “The aim is to present genetics as a rational, 
organized body of knowledge.”40  Reviewers of Principles of Genetics, such as Caspari, 
agreed:  “The first ten chapters follow the logical sequence of earlier editions by first 
developing the methods and results of ‘formal’ genetics and then proceeding to the 
discussion of the chromosome theory of heredity.”41  Thus, it is my contention that in the 
1950s-1960s, the “historical” organization was not only seen as conventional.  Rather, 
the standardized use of history as an organizing logic, across several decades of 
textbooks, had made this order logical.   
 
 
A Dialectical Narrative: Making Mendel’s Laws the Foundation  
 
Having traced and analyzed the standardization of organization in genetics textbooks, I 
will now explore how the historical approach was implemented in the text, with a case 
study of its use in Principles of Genetics.  I have chosen this “classical textbook of 
Sinnott and Dunn” because it was widely considered to be one of the best textbooks in 
circulation.42  Lewis Tiffany, for example, described it as “one of the two or three 
outstanding texts in the field of genetics.”43  Seymour Fogel and Irwin Herskowitz 
agreed, writing in their review in Science: “Beyond question, this is the best available 
                                                
39 L. C. Dunn, A Short History of Genetics: The Development of Some of the Main Lines of Thought, 1864-
1939 (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1965), xi. 
40 I. H. Herskowitz, Genetics, 1st ed. (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1962), 5. 
41 E. Caspari, Review of Principles of Genetics, by E. W. Sinnott, L. C. Dunn, and Th. Dobzhansky, 
Science 112 (1950): 725 (emphasis added). 
42 Ibid. 
43 L. H. Tiffany, "Edmund Ware Sinnott: President of AAAS, 1948," Science 107 (1948): 1. 
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textbook in the field of general genetics.”44  And in retrospective description, it was 
characterized as “the classic textbook of classical genetics.”45  Thus, Sewall Wright’s 
1926 prediction, “It is a book which should come into very extensive use,” was right.46  
The widespread use of the textbook was not limited to the United States and Great 
Britain; Principles was, rather, “a handbook with worldwide distribution.”47  Through the 
publication of several translations in foreign languages and a pirated English edition in 
Taiwan, Principles was used in Continental Europe, Asia, and South America.48  The 
Russian translation, which was printed in greater numbers than the English original, was 
widely used until 1948, when it was famously criticized by Lysenko in a report to the V. 
I. Lenin Academy of Agricultural Science.49  Subsequently banned, “it came to be passed 
from hand to hand like a subversive tract.”50  The pedagogical influence of Principles 
was not even limited to the classrooms in which it was used, due to its impact on the 
content and method of teaching employed in many other popular genetics textbooks.  For 
example: a method of teaching “three-factor mapping” that was apparently invented by 
Dunn and Sinnott in 1925 was widely copied in the following decades and persists in 
many introductory genetics textbooks today, despite the fact that deficiencies in this 
method have been identified.51  In addition, several illustrations from Principles were 
slightly modified and used in James D. Watson’s influential Molecular Biology of the 
                                                
44 S. Fogel and I. H. Herskowitz, Review of Principles of Genetics, by E. W. Sinnott, L. C. Dunn, and Th. 
Dobzhansky, Quarterly Review of Biology 27 (1952): 211. 
45 J. A. Moore, Heredity and Development, 2nd ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1972), 134. 
46 S. Wright, "Genetics for the Classroom," Review of Principles of Genetics, by E. W. Sinnott and L. C. 
Dunn, Journal of Heredity 17 (1926): 185. 
47 W. G. Whaley, "Edmund Ware Sinnott," Biographical Memoirs of the National Academy of Sciences 54 
(1983): 355; see also 357: “It is difficult to establish the priority among Sinnott’s many contributions, but if 
the Principles of Genetics does not occupy the foremost position, it certainly comes close to it.” When seen 
in light of the importance of Sinnott’s many contributions to genetics and biology in the first half of the 
twentieth century, Whaley’s comment must be read as a great tribute to Principles. 
48 Th. Dobzhansky, "Leslie Clarence Dunn," Biographical Memoirs of the National Academy of Sciences 
49 (1978): 82. 
49 Lysenko stated: “An example of how far our native Mendelists-Morganists uncritically accept idealistic 
genetics is the fact that until recently the basic textbook on genetics in many of our higher institutes of 
learning is a translation of the strictly Morganist American textbook of Sinnott and Dunn,” in T. D. 
Lysenko, "The Situation in Biological Science," in Death of a Science in Russia, ed. C. Zirkle 
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1949), 111.  This comment was well known and was seen 
as an example of Lysenko’s attack on classical genetics.  See, e.g., R. C. Cook, "Lysenko's Marxist 
Genetics: Science or Religion?" Journal of Heredity 40 (1949): 182.  I will return to this topic in Chapter 4.  
50 Dobzhansky, "Leslie Clarence Dunn," 82. 
51 M. Chalfie, "Is the Traditional Way of Teaching Three-Factor Mapping Sufficient?" Trends in Genetics 
13 (1997): 94. 
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Gene.52  And, as I discussed in the previous chapter on historical exemplars, the 
widespread use of problem-solving in textbooks of the 1930s-1960s was modelled on 
Sinnott and Dunn’s pedagogical innovation in the first edition of Principles.  Thus, it was 
during the life of Principles and long after that the method and style of teaching 
developed by Sinnott and Dunn shaped the teaching of genetics; and it is for this reason 
that I will focus on their text.   
In Principles, the use of Mendelian genetics as the basis for the “historical” 
presentation of the principles of genetics—and the illustration of the science’s coherence 
and inner logic—was achieved through an exception-overcome-by-extension, or 
dialectical, narrative structure: Mendel’s principles were explained, evidence was 
introduced that seemed to conflict with the principles, the principles were refined or 
rearticulated in light of the evidence, and seemingly problematic evidence was again 
introduced, etc.  In this manner, the heterogeneous body of knowledge conveyed by the 
textbook was unified on a common ground.  Evidence and theory that were not 
discovered by Mendel were presented as “interpreting, amplifying, and modifying 
Mendel’s principles”—and thus, as being essentially Mendelian.53  The central argument 
underlying this narrative was first explicitly articulated in the conclusion to the chapter 
on the principle of independent assortment.  Here, Sinnott and Dunn discussed the fact 
that the “thousands of experiments performed” in the first decades of the twentieth 
century had “resulted in the discovery of several entirely new principles,” but 
characterized these as mere “amplifications” of Mendel’s principles: “Perhaps the most 
striking result of all this activity, however, is that Mendel’s main conclusions still 
remain, essentially unchanged, as the cornerstone of the science of genetics.”54  This 
claim was substantiated throughout the rest of the textbook.  In roughly every other 
chapter that followed, a group of apparent exceptions to Mendel’s principles was shown 
to require not a rejection of them, but rather a refinement or extension of their meaning.  
The first “exceptions” to be discussed in Principles were the dihybrid crosses that 
resulted in “modifications” of the Mendelian ratios.  Sinnott and Dunn introduced these 
                                                
52 Whaley, "Edmund Ware Sinnott," 355. 
53 Sinnott and Dunn, Principles of Genetics, 1st ed., 11. 
54 Ibid., 76 
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exceptions with a discussion of their discovery in the early twentieth century.  They 
noted that research in this period had proven that the principles were not “sufficient to 
explain all the facts,” but emphasized that this did not mean they were incorrect, 
explaining: “These principles are, indeed, the firm foundation upon which all later 
research has built, but they have necessarily been qualified and extended.”55  The body of 
the chapter was then devoted to detailing ways in which incomplete dominance, factor 
interaction, and epistasis could result in “modifications” of the Mendelian ratios.  Each 
subdivision of the chapter dealt with a different modification, including the 9:7, 9:3:4, 
12:3:1, 13:3, and 15:1 ratios.56  By presenting these ratios as variations of the 9:3:3:1 
ratio—as different tokens of a single form—the authors reconciled these non-Mendelian 
results with Mendel’s principles.  The apparent exceptions to Mendelism were shown to 
be essentially, in the sense of mathematically, Mendelian.  In this way, the chapter gave 
new meaning to Mendel’s principles.  It treated them as abstract mathematical forms 
within which numerous unknown variations were able to reside.  This recharacterization 
was, however, masked by the form of the presentation, which treated the modified ratios 
as inherent features, or natural extensions, of the standard ratios.  These central claims of 
the dialectical narrative were reiterated in the chapter’s conclusion.  Emphasizing that 
“unsuspected complications” to Mendelism were often “so intricate and obscure as to 
suggest, at first, that they were unexplainable in simple terms,” Sinnott and Dunn 
highlighted the eventual synthesis: “advancing knowledge has bought them one by one 
into harmony with the underlying principles enunciated by Mendel.”57  Here, the 
exception-to-extension narrative of this chapter ended, with the claim that Mendel’s 
“underlying” principles remained essentially intact as the foundation of genetics.  
In addition to showing a reconciliation of past exceptions with Mendelism, the 
dialectical presentation created a picture of the principles of genetics in which their 
development followed along a logical trajectory.  This picture was not only of the past, 
but also of a future in which Mendel’s principles would continue to provide the 
foundation of the science.  Sinnott and Dunn articulated this idea explicitly in the 
                                                
55 Ibid., 84. 
56 Ibid., 92-110. 
57 Ibid., 119. 
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conclusion to the chapter on modified ratios: “Since many of the puzzling cases of the 
past have been resolved by mendelian experiments, it is probable that the new and more 
difficult problems encountered in experimental breeding will, on careful analysis, yield 
to this method and be reconciled with already familiar principles.”58  Thus, the idea of 
progress embedded in the use of the dialectical narrative not only presented the past as 
though it had been gradually built on the foundation of Mendel’s principles, but also 
implied that the future would continue along these lines.  In the following chapters, this 
picture was substantiated through the step by step reconciliation of more “apparent 
exceptions.”  
The next chapter to extend the reach of Mendel’s principles, “Linkage,” began 
much as the chapter on modified ratios did: it set up a potential conflict between the 
principles and the experimental results of early twentieth century research.  About 
independent assortment, the authors wrote: “Soon after the rediscovery of Mendel’s 
principles some doubt began to be cast on the universal applicability of this principle, 
since it did not explain certain exceptional results.”59  They then went on to discuss the 
first case of linkage discovered by Bateson and Punnett in 1906 and the wide variety of 
cases that were subsequently identified.  This discussion provided the background for an 
explanation of how the principle of linkage was developed by Morgan to deal with these 
phenomena.  In discussing Morgan’s work, they did not once mention Mendel.  But in 
the conclusion to the chapter, they once again returned to Mendel in order to reconcile 
Morgan’s “formulation of a new principle of heredity, the principle of linkage,” with the 
principles of Mendel.  According to Sinnott and Dunn, the principles were fundamentally 
similar:   
The history of mendelian inheritance and the history of linkage, the most 
important modification of mendelism, are in some respects parallel.  
Mendel’s principles were established from careful breeding experiments 
with one plant, under the guidance of new methods and a new statistical 
notation…The principles of linkage were discovered during intensive 
breeding experiments with one animal, the fruit fly, under the guidance of 
Mendel’s notation plus a new idea.60  
 
                                                
58 Ibid.  NB: the term “mendelian” was not capitalized in the first edition of Principles of Genetics. 
59 Ibid., 150. 
60 Ibid., 167 (emphasis original). 
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By taking the basic formula of Mendel’s research as a point of substantive similarity with 
Morgan, and emphasizing that Morgan merely added one idea, Sinnott and Dunn 
characterized the discovery of the principle of linkage as fundamentally based on 
Mendel’s methodological insights.  Linkage was presented as an essentially Mendelian 
principle.  It is important to note, however, that—as in the chapter on modified ratios—
this reconciliation did not leave the reconciled entities unchanged.  Whereas the previous 
chapter had treated Mendel’s principles as malleable mathematical ratios, this chapter 
treated them as the embodiment of a problem and an approach to solving it.   
The extension of Mendelism and assimilation of Morgan’s principles under those 
of Mendel continued in the following chapter, “The Chromosome Theory of 
Inheritance,” which opened with a reiteration and further explanation of the ways in 
which these principles were similar: 
The facts presented in the preceding chapter have led to the conclusion 
that linkage, instead of being a sporadic exception to Mendelian 
inheritance, is actually a widespread, orderly occurrence, subject to laws 
which are not only of the same cogency as those dealing with the 
segregation of factors but which also give a reasonable explanation of the 
mechanism of segregation and assortment.61  
 
On this account, Morgan’s and Mendel’s principles were not only similar in form and 
nature, but also in content, as both helped explain the same phenomena.  The only 
difference was that whereas Mendel identified the law-like nature of the phenomena, 
Morgan identified the mechanism behind it, showing that linkage was best explained by 
the chromosome theory of heredity.  By opening the chapter in this way, Sinnott and 
Dunn set up their discussion of “the many suggestive implications” of the chromosome 
theory in such a way that they seemed to fall within the trajectory of Mendel’s 
discoveries.  For example, when identifying the implications of the chromosome theory, 
they wrote:  
It means for one thing that the genes are actual particles of living material, 
occupying a measurable portion of space…The nucleus of each cell is on 
this view to be regarded as a complex aggregation of units which are 
arranged and guided through the processes of inheritance and 
                                                
61 Ibid., 177 (emphasis original). 
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development by those laws which in the end are the physical and chemical 
laws of living matter.62   
 
Here, the meaning of Mendel’s principles gained a materiality that they did not have in 
the context of Mendel’s experiments, which was the context in which the textbook had 
initially identified and explained them.  Thus, the meaning of the principles shifted as the 
student read the text, just as they had shifted through the historical development of the 
discipline.  The final section of the chapter, on the significance of the chromosome 
theory, reiterated this claim about the material extension of Mendelism: “Since the work 
of Mendel it has been known that the animal or plant may be viewed as an aggregation or 
separate units…From the work of Morgan and other investigators it is now known that 
the gene is a definite part of the chromosome with a definite location therein.”63  On this 
account, Morgan’s work merely identified the bodies of the entities that Mendel had long 
before discovered. 
 The fourth class of hereditary phenomena brought under Mendel’s principles 
included those quantitative characters that were influenced by multiple genes.  The 
chapter on these phenomena, like those on the other exceptions, began with a discussion 
of the period following the rediscovery of Mendel’s principles.  Highlighting the fact that 
“such characters were long thought to constitute important exceptions to Mendel’s 
principles and to require some other principle for their explanation,” Sinnott and Dunn 
went on to state that these traits were Mendelian in the sense that they relied on the 
genetic mechanism identified in Mendel’s principles:  
In recent years…it has been recognized that even these quantitative 
characters are not essentially different in their method of inheritance from 
the more definite ones on which Mendel based his theory.  The extension 
of mendelian principles to this very important group of traits is one of the 
most notable advances which genetics has made since Mendel’s day.64 
 
Here, Sinnott and Dunn stated the reconciliation of a problem that they subsequently 
identified in the chapter.  Stated briefly, the problem was that the distribution of 
characteristics such as height and weight—unlike binary variations in coloring or 
shape—could not be easily categorized and counted; and consequently, it seemed that 
                                                
62 Ibid.  Corollary principles, such as “the principle of the limitation of the linkage groups,” were also 
brought under the Mendelian trajectory: Sinnott and Dunn, Principles of Genetics, 1st ed., 180. 
63 Sinnott and Dunn, Principles of Genetics, 1st ed., 188. 
64 Ibid., 234. 
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they could not be subject to Mendel’s principles.  But, as in the other chapters, this was 
shown to be only an apparent problem, as Sinnott and Dunn explained how biometric 
methods were developed to study these quantitative characters and how the multiple 
factor hypothesis was developed to explain them.  Sinnott and Dunn did not mention the 
significance of these developments with respect to Mendel’s principles in the body of the 
chapter.  But in the last sentence, they once again returned to Mendel.  Concluding their 
discussion of the multiple factor hypothesis, they wrote: “Its chief contribution has 
consisted in bringing size characters, at first thought to be radically different in their 
inheritance from qualitative ones, definitely under the operation of mendelian 
principles.”65  In this reconciliation, it was the mechanism identified by Mendel that 
provided the point of contact between his principles and the extension.66  
In general, the historical approach to teaching in Principles of Genetics relied on 
a dialectical narrative that ran throughout the chapters dealing with the “principles” of 
genetics.  In the first edition that I have studied here, this was roughly every other 
chapter, and thus the narrative device spanned the entire textbook.67  In later editions of 
the textbook, the authors added many chapters that were not about “principles,” such as 
the chapters on development, population genetics, mutation, and cytoplasmic inheritance; 
the dialectical narrative did not run through these chapters, but other types of statements 
had similar effects.  In the fourth edition’s chapter on population genetics, for example, 
the authors wrote: “Modern population genetics is founded on a proposition deduced in 
1908 by Hardy and by Weinberg as a corollary of Mendel’s principle of segregation.”68  
Moreover, when the authors discussed the addition of new chapters to later editions, they 
explained that the chapters on principles were the most important.  In the preface to the 
                                                
65 Ibid., 260. 
66 Note that in later editions, they strengthened this synthesis by arguing that there was no essential 
difference between the qualitative and quantitative traits—that these were not natural properties of different 
traits: “the same character, such as size, which in a population of microorganisms may be treated as 
quantitative at one magnification, may, at another, be classified into discontinuous categories and treated 
qualitatively.” They argued that the distinguishing feature of nominally “quantitative” characters was “the 
transgressive or apparently continuous way in which the variations must be described” (emphasis added).  
In this way, they broke down the conceptual barrier that prevented some forms of inheritance from being 
characterized as Mendelian, stating that the Mendelian phenomena were merely difficult to recognize.  See 
Sinnott, Dunn, and Dobzhansky, Principles of Genetics, 4th ed., 121.  
67 Only chapters discussing applications of the principles (e.g., animal breeding, and eugenics) or special 
cases of the principles (e.g., sex-linkage, and inheritance in man) did not have this structure. 
68 See Sinnott, Dunn, and Dobzhansky, Principles of Genetics, 4th ed., 307. 
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third edition, for example, they stated: “The heart of the book, however, continues to be 
general and well-established principles and the exemplification of these in problems for 
the student to solve.”69  Thus, it was in the core of the textbook that the dialectical 
narrative functioned, creating transitions between chapters dealing with principles of 
genetics that were developed at different times to deal with the evidence produced by 
different lines of research.  
To briefly summarize, my argument thus far has been that the “historical 
approach” to teaching relied on a dialectical narrative in which the authors gradually 
reformulated Mendel’s principles.  By emphasizing a different aspect of the principles in 
each chapter, ranging from mathematical to mechanical features, the authors were able to 
create points of contact that allowed for the reconciliation of different types of exceptions 
that had been discovered in the twentieth century.  Thus in all of the chapters, the 
exceptions were not reconciled with the principles Mendel articulated, but rather with a 
conception of their fundamental nature.70  For this reason, it was the ideas inside the 
laws, rather than the laws themselves, that were highlighted as Mendel’s greatest 
achievement: “Mendel’s greatest contribution to genetics was the idea that the organism 
is an aggregation of separable units which are inherited in an orderly manner according 
to certain definite laws.”71  It was by defining Mendel’s “greatest contribution” in terms 
of an idea and not a law, that the authors were able to turn exceptions into extensions.  It 
was in this way that they presented Mendel’s principles as “the firm foundation upon 
which all later research has been built” and were able to conclude: “Mendel’s main 
conclusions still remain, essentially unchanged, as the cornerstone of the science of 
genetics.”72  In the picture created by this dialectical narrative, twentieth century 
geneticists appeared to be fundamentally similar to Mendel, and Mendel appeared to be a 
geneticist; the interpretations were mutually reinforcing.   
                                                
69 Sinnott and Dunn, Principles of Genetics, 3rd ed., vii.  See also Sinnott, Dunn, and Dobzhansky, 
Principles of Genetics, 5th ed., viii, where the authors stated that individual chapters from Chapter 20 
onwards could be skipped at the instructor’s discretion; they explained that the most important chapters, 
Chapters 3-19, were those that contained “quantitative” subjects and problem-solving exercises. 
70 It is worth noting that Dunn thought that most scientific advances and discoveries merely involved the 
extension of existing ideas, as he explained in Dunn, A Short History of Genetics, 208-210.  See also page 
xix, where he distinguished between hypotheses and ideas, concluding, “there are not very many ‘ideas’ in 
genetics altogether.”   
71 Sinnott and Dunn, Principles of Genetics, 1st ed., 84 (emphasis added). 
72 Ibid., 84, 76, respectively. 
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Although this study has focused on how the historical approach was written in the 
highly influential Principles of Genetics, the features of the text that I have identified and 
analyzed were common in textbooks of the 1930s-1960s.  The vast majority of chapters 
in Dodson’s Genetics, for example, opened with a statement about Mendel’s principles or 
methods, thereby situating the subject matter in relation to Mendelism.73  White 
explicitly identified the principle-to-extension logic in the preface to the second edition 
of Genetics.74  In textbooks by Altenburg, Begg, King, Singleton, Srb and Owen, and 
Winchester, the exception-to-extension style of narrative was used to introduce and 
explain modified Mendelian ratios, linkage, and quantitative inheritance;75 and as in 
Principles, it was these topics on the principles and their extensions that were said to be 
the most important.76  In addition, Mendel’s laws were generally described as having 
remained “essentially” unchanged by these modifications.  For example, after explaining 
that “the system of Mendel had to be modified” due to the discovery of sex linkage, 
linkage, and gene interaction, Shull concluded: “Thus the scheme grew and developed.  
Yet through all these changes the essential Mendelian feature remained—the segregation 
and recombination of the units of heredity.”77  Similarly, in a discussion of multiple 
factors in Genetics, Altenburg suggested: “Certainly the more complicated cases of 
inheritance do not disprove Mendel. On the contrary they point to something dependent 
upon his principle: multiple factors.”78  A. W. Lindsey agreed in A Textbook of Genetics, 
characterizing Mendel’s laws as being merely “amplified and supplemented by other 
discoveries,” and concluding, “the whole field of genetics is replete with demonstrations 
of their truth.”79  There were a few textbooks in the 1930s that did not treat Mendelism as 
                                                
73 E. O. Dodson, Genetics: The Modern Science of Heredity (Philadelphia: W. B. Saunders, 1956), 
Chapters 1-11, 17-18, 20-22. 
74 White, Genetics, 2nd ed., preface. 
75 See, e.g., the explanation of these topics in Altenburg, Genetics, 1st ed., 67-70, 82-96; Winchester, 
Genetics, 1st ed., 73-74, 78-83; Begg, An Introduction to Genetics, 80-91, 171-186; King, Genetics, 1st 
ed., 79-88, 94-95, 103; and Srb, Owen, and Edgar, General Genetics, 2nd ed., 23-26, 146-152, 442, 450-
454. 
76 E.g., Hovanitz, Textbook of Genetics, vi: “For a shortened course…it is suggested that the first ten 
chapters be used with portions of the remainder.”  See also Dodson, Genetics, v, where he suggested that it 
was just the first fourteen chapters that were essential. 
77 Shull, Heredity, 4th ed., 8 (emphasis added). 
78 Altenburg, Genetics, 1st ed., 96.  
79 A. W. Lindsey, A Textbook of Genetics (New York: Macmillan, 1932), 71. 
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the foundation of the science.80  But even some of these explicitly articulated the implicit 
argument in Principles.  In Walter’s Genetics, for example: “Since Mendel formulated 
these rules, numerous ‘exceptions that prove the rule’ have been discovered.”81  
This exception-to extension narrative was widely used to create a picture of 
genetics founded on Mendelism—an idea that was explicitly articulated by Charles Begg 
in An Introduction to Genetics: “An appreciation of this simple fact [the existence of 
multiple-factors] will at one and the same time demonstrate how universal in application 
are the fundamental Mendelian principles, and how elaborate is the fabric which may be 
woven with their help.”82  Srb and Owen made a similar claim in General Genetics, 
using words that were identical to those of Sinnott and Dunn: “The principle of 
independent assortment…is one of the cornerstones on which an understanding of 
genetic systems has been built.”83  And A. M. Winchester made an even stronger claim in 
Genetics, stating: “It should be kept in mind, however, that these deviations are the 
exception, and that the great majority of dihybrid crosses yield the 9:3:3:1 ratio.”84  As a 
corollary of the exception-to-extension narrative structure and the presentation of 
Mendelism as the foundation of genetics, many textbook authors presented twentieth 
century theories as being located in the mind of Mendel.  Altenburg’s Genetics, like 
Sinnott and Dunn’s Principles, gave Mendel substantial credit for the development of the 
chromosome theory of heredity:  
It should be emphasized that no one man is to be credited with the 
chromosome theory…But the name most prominently associated with the 
development of the theory must be that of Mendel.  For it was he who 
showed how the genes were distributed…Thus, Mendel’s experiments 
laid the foundation of the chromosome theory.85   
 
 
 
                                                
80 E.g., Jennings, Genetics, presented genetics as a system, and each chapter focused on a different aspect 
of the system; and H. E. Walter, Genetics: An Introduction to the Study of Heredity, 4th ed. (New York: 
Macmillan, 1938), treated genetics methodologically, organizing the text broadly in terms of “five avenues 
of approach.”  
81 Ibid., 82; see also 83: “It may be repeated that they strengthen rather than weaken the original theory of 
Mendelian inheritance.”  
82 Begg, An Introduction to Genetics, 186.  See also, e.g., the section titled “The Universality of Mendel’s 
Principle,” in Altenburg, Genetics, 1st ed., 95-96. 
83 Srb, Owen, and Edgar, General Genetics, 2nd ed., 146. 
84 Winchester, Genetics, 1st ed., 83. 
85 Altenburg, Genetics, 1st ed., 76.  
 124 
 
Here, and elsewhere, Mendel was also credited with the discovery of genes.86  Thus, the 
analysis of Principles of Genetics that I developed in this section does not only apply to 
this one influential textbook, but rather identifies widespread features of the textbook 
teaching of genetics in the 1920s-1950s.  
Although I have thus far focused on how the historical approach was related to 
the stability of the conceptual order of genetics, it is also important to look at how this 
approach affected its malleability over time.  The narrative structure of the textbook 
placed experiments, evidence, and principles in hierarchical relationships that did not 
remain constant across the editions of a textbook, but rather shifted, often through the 
rewriting of history.  To explore the form and content of these shifts in the ways the 
science fitted together, I will return to my case study of Principles of Genetics in the next 
section, analyzing the first four editions’ presentations of the chromosome theory of 
inheritance.  
Before returning to this case study, however, it is perhaps worth noting that 
geneticists in the 1940s were not unaware of the gradual transformation of the meaning 
of Mendel’s principles.  This was, in fact, explicitly identified in some textbooks’ 
discussions of the “essential idea” of the principles.87  In Heredity, for example, Shull 
discussed the malleability of geneticists’ conception of “the essential characteristics of 
Mendelian heredity.”88  He identified various conflicting ways in which the nature of 
Mendel’s principles had been defined, focusing on geneticists’ disagreements about 
whether dominance and blending inheritance were “Mendelian.”  Shull explained that 
some geneticists saw dominance as a central part of Mendel’s experiments, and therefore 
regarded blending inheritance as non-Mendelian because dominance was absent.  He 
then explained that others defined Mendelian heredity as the segregation and independent 
assortment of genes: distinguishing Mendel’s principles from other features of heredity 
“by the fact that they depend upon the behavior of the chromosomes,” these geneticists 
thought that dominance was not central to Mendelism because it had “no relation to these 
                                                
86 See, e.g., W. R. Singleton, Elementary Genetics (New York: D. Van Nostrand, 1962), 34. 
87 See, e.g., Shull, Heredity, 1st ed., 134-135; Shull, Heredity, 4th ed., 160; and Altenburg, Genetics, 1st 
ed., 42-43. 
88 Shull, Heredity, 1st ed., 134. 
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chromosomal movements.”  Shull advocated this later view, suggesting that blending 
inheritance should be considered Mendelian for these reasons.  But he noted that this 
conception raised questions about other aspects of heredity, including “crossing-over” 
and the various “forms” of non-disjunction: “Are these peculiarities to be excluded from 
Mendel’s law, or shall the law be defined to include them?”  Answering this question, 
and concluding this section, he wrote: “Usage has differed greatly, but there seems to be 
a growing tendency to regard as Mendelian all heredity that definitely depends upon 
chromosomes or their behaviour.”89  Shull thought that geneticists had shifted the 
boundaries of Mendelian phenomena, including and excluding certain forms of heredity, 
to bring them in line with a chromosomal conception of Mendel’s laws.90  In later 
editions of Heredity, he articulated this claim more fully.  Discussing whether linkage, 
the first apparent exception to Mendelism, should be thought of as falling under 
Mendel’s laws, Shull wrote:  
Mendel never observed linkage; should linkage then be excluded from 
Mendelian heredity?  Considering that linkage is produced by the very 
things (chromosomes) which are responsible for independent assortment, 
geneticists chose not to separate linkage from the other fundamental 
features of heredity and have extended the term Mendelian heredity to 
cover it.  Once this extension was accepted, it was logical to include the 
other things that are dependent on the regular behaviour of chromosomes, 
such as sex-linked inheritance.  And finally, even those phenomena which 
result from irregularities of chromosome conduct—nondisjunction, 
translocation, duplication, deficiency—were regarded as Mendelian 
phenomena.  At the present time, any transmission that is directly 
dependent on chromosomes is considered Mendelian heredity.91 
 
Thus, geneticists such as Shull were well aware of the malleability and historical 
development of geneticists’ sense of the nature of Mendel’s laws.  And it is with their 
chromosomal characterization of this shift in mind that I now turn to look at textbooks’ 
presentations of the chromosome theory of heredity.  
 
 
 
 
                                                
89 Ibid.  
90 Note that on this conception, “non-Mendelian” inheritance was limited to cytoplasmic inheritance—the 
topic of the chapter in which this discussion of Mendelism was located.   
91 Shull, Heredity, 4th ed., 160. 
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A Malleable Conceptual Order: Reshaping the Chromosome Theory of Heredity 
 
In 1925, when Principles of Genetics was first published, the chromosome theory of 
heredity was a matter of general consensus in the Anglo-American community of 
geneticists.92  Stephen Brush’s detailed case study of the reception of the theory identifies 
the types of evidence that led to this consensus.93  Most important were the phenomena 
of sex-linkage and non-disjunction, the parallelism between chromosomal behavior and 
Mendel’s laws, the correspondence between the number of linkage groups and 
chromosomes, and the ability to predict crossing-over frequencies from linear genetic 
maps.94  In an attempt to understand how the theory “became knowledge,” Brush 
analyzes the assimilation of the chromosome theory into textbooks of genetics, cytology, 
and biology in the 1910s-1920s.  He finds that there was often a discrepancy between the 
evidence geneticists found convincing, and the evidence given as proof of the theory—
that the evidence cited varied according to discipline and audience.95  Although this study 
sheds light on how the chromosome theory disseminated outside the community of 
geneticists, it leaves open important questions about the meaning of the knowledge 
within the community and the ways in which this changed after the theory was widely 
accepted.96  For example:  when new questions and fields of research emerged in the 
following decades, how were older bodies of evidence and theory brought into 
relationships with those under development?  Within textbooks using a historical 
approach, were chapters and their contents reorganized?  What effect did any 
recontextualization within a volume have on the picture of the science it presented?  It is 
                                                
92 S. G. Brush, "How Theories Became Knowledge: Morgan's Chromosome Theory of Heredity in 
America and Britain," Journal of the History of Biology 35 (2002): 503-506. 
93 Ibid.  On the reception of the chromosome theory outside the United States, see A. G. Cock, "William 
Bateson's Rejection and Eventual Acceptance of the Chromosome Theory," Annals of Science 40 (1983); J. 
Harwood, Styles of Scientific Thought: The German Genetics Community 1900-1933 (Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press, 1993), 33-45; and J. Gayon and R. M. Burian, "France in the Era of Mendelism (1900-
1930)," Comptes Rendus de l'Académie des Sciences, Paris, Sciences de la Vie 323 (2000). 
94 Brush, "How Theories Became Knowledge," 516-518. 
95 Ibid.: 510-515.  He argues, for example, that although practitioners considered non-disjunction to be the 
most compelling proof of the theory, many textbooks—he identifies Shull’s Heredity—did not present this 
evidence and focused instead on less technical evidence, such as the correspondence of linkage groups.  
While this is true of the first edition of Shull’s Heredity, which he cites as evidence, he fails to note that 
Shull included non-disjunction in later editions; see, e.g., the fourth edition. 
96 As Peter Galison suggests in his analysis of the many ways in which Maxwell’s equations have been 
reinterpreted since the time of their invention, the resituating of past theories can serve important 
disciplinary functions: P. Galison, "Re-Reading the Past from the End of Physics," in Functions and Uses 
of Disciplinary Histories, ed. L. Graham, W. Lepenies, and P. Weingart (Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1983). 
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to begin to answer these questions that I now return to my case study of Principles of 
Genetics, exploring how Sinnott and Dunn gradually revised their presentation of the 
proof of the chromosome theory, thereby analyzing the malleability of the conceptual 
order of genetics.97  
In the 1925 edition of Principles, Sinnott and Dunn presented evidence for the 
chromosome theory in a series of three chapters—“VI: The Physical Basis of Heredity,” 
“VII: Linkage,” and “VIII: The Chromosome Theory of Inheritance.”98  In the first of 
these chapters, they discussed early support for the chromosome theory, identifying the 
“striking parallels” between geneticists’ accounts of the Mendelian behavior of genes and 
cytologists’ accounts of the behavior of chromosomes in cellular meiosis.  According to 
Sinnott and Dunn, these parallels indicated that the genes were located in the 
chromosomes; but they did not prove it because of an epistemological difference between 
geneticists’ knowledge of the behavior of genes and cytologists’ knowledge of the 
behavior of chromosomes.  Cytologists’ account of chromosomal behavior was “a 
description of fact, since it is founded on actual microscopic evidence,” whereas 
Mendel’s laws were “hypotheses which satisfactorily explain the results of breeding 
experiments.”99  Reiterating that the parallel was therefore not sufficient proof, Sinnott 
and Dunn concluded by stating that they would identify the crucial evidence in the next 
two chapters.100  In the following chapter, Sinnott and Dunn discussed the development 
of geneticists’ knowledge about linkage—from an exception to Mendel’s laws, to a 
principle of genetics—and presented the principle as providing additional support for the 
chromosome theory.  But in the chapter’s conclusion, they once again stated that the 
                                                
97 It is important to note that my analysis of the revisions to the presentation of this evidence will by 
definition set aside questions about the categorical exclusion of certain forms evidence.  For an extensive 
discussion of the denigration of embryologists’ work on the chromosome theory—a disciplining use of 
history that falls outside the scope of this chapter—see S. Gilbert, "Bearing Crosses: A Historiography of 
Genetics and Embryology," American Journal of Medical Genetics 76 (1998), which I discussed in the 
Introduction.  For more on the relationship between genetics and embryology, see S. Gilbert, "The 
Embryological Origins of the Gene Theory," Journal of the History of Biology 11 (1978); and G. E. Allen, 
"T. H. Morgan and the Split between Embryology and Genetics, 1910-1935," in A History of Embryology, 
ed. T. J. Horder, J. A. Witkowski, and C. C. Wylie (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1983). 
98 Sinnott and Dunn, Principles of Genetics, 1st ed., 147.  This format was standard.  See, e.g., Snyder, The 
Principles of Heredity, 2nd ed., 32; and Snyder and David, The Principles of Heredity, 5th ed., 47-48. 
99 Sinnott and Dunn, Principles of Genetics, 1st ed., 144; here, they also described these as being parallels 
“between a concrete set of facts (chromosome behaviour) and the hypotheses proposed to explain another 
set of facts (factor behaviour).” 
100 Ibid., 147.  
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“specific evidence” and proof of the theory’s validity came from the discoveries they 
would outline in the last of the series of three chapters.101  There, in “The Chromosome 
Theory of Inheritance,” Sinnott and Dunn first discussed the correspondence between the 
number of linkage groups and the number of chromosomes (the principle of the 
limitation of the linkage groups), and then explained Bridges’ discovery of non-
disjunction—a special case of sex-linkage, in which the transmission of a sex-linked 
gene parallels the irregular transmission of X chromosomes.  The principle of the 
limitation of the linkage groups offered “cogent” and “negative” evidence for the theory, 
according to Sinnott and Dunn, but it was Bridges’ combined cytological and genetic 
studies of non-disjunction that provided “positive” and “conclusive” proof.102  They did 
not discuss these experiments in detail, however, and focused instead on the experiments 
that “accomplished the more difficult feat” of showing that “the genes are arranged in a 
single straight line, and their distances apart are proportional to the amount of crossing-
over between them.”103  This principle, the linear order of the genes, was a “secondary or 
supporting principle of the chromosome theory,” according to Sinnott and Dunn.104  
After discussing the development of this principle, they concluded the chapter with a 
section on the significance of linkage and the chromosome theory for the study of 
genetics. 
To briefly summarize the main points of my analysis thus far: in a series of three 
chapters, “The Physical Basis of Heredity,” “Linkage,” and “The Chromosome Theory of 
Inheritance,” discoveries and work on linkage and the linear arrangement of the genes 
were organized to progress and culminate in an account of the chromosome theory of 
inheritance.  The first chapter noted parallels that indicated the validity of the 
chromosome theory; the second discussed a principle that offered support; and the third 
provided cogent but negative evidence for the theory, followed by conclusive and 
positive proof.  By presenting this evidence as a series of steps forward—from 
uncertainty to certainty—Sinnott and Dunn unified these chapters in a quasi-historical 
narrative of progress, in which progress in theory appeared to be driven by the historical 
                                                
101 Ibid., 169. 
102 Ibid., 180 
103 Ibid., 180, 184. 
104 Ibid., 184. 
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accumulation of evidence presented in the text.  With this ordering of experiments, data, 
and discovery, the authors defined the hierarchical order of theory and evidence in the 
science of genetics.  In addition, they differentiated various forms of evidence, implicitly 
defining the relative weight of evidence according to the experimental practices that 
produced it.  Equating facts with things that could be visually observed, they suggested 
that cytology allowed for the identification of “facts” about heredity.  They emphasized 
that although breeding experiments produced data that could support “hypotheses” about 
heredity, such as Mendel’s and Morgan’s principles, these were not visually verifiable 
and therefore not facts.105  Both breeding experiments and cytology, on their account, 
indicated the validity of the chromosome theory of inheritance.  But it was only when 
Bridges brought them together in his cytogenetic research on non-disjunction that 
geneticists obtained proof.106  Through this account of the history of the discovery, 
Sinnott and Dunn not only presented a hierarchy of evidence and theory in which linkage 
and Mendel’s principles supported the chromosome theory of inheritance, but also a 
hierarchy of experimental methods with cytogenetics at the top.   
The way in which Sinnott and Dunn thought about the collection of facts and 
theories for the chromosome theory of inheritance was not stable, however, as can be 
seen in the significant revision and reorganization of the text of these three chapters in 
the second edition in 1932.  In the first of the chapters, on the physical basis of heredity, 
explanations of gamete cell structure and reproduction, which previously formed half the 
chapter, were substantially reduced and transformed into an introduction for new sections 
on the chromosome theory of sex determination and its “important influence on ideas 
concerning the physical basis of inheritance.”107  These new sections presented 
explanations of sex-linked factors and non-disjunction, much of which had been 
imported from later chapters.108  Within these sections, parallels between transmission of 
sex-linked genes and X chromosomes were added as evidence of the gene’s location in 
the chromosome.  But, as in the first edition’s presentation of the more general parallels 
                                                
105 Ibid., 144. 
106 Ibid., 169. 
107 Sinnott and Dunn, Principles of Genetics, 2nd ed., 116. 
108 E.g., the discussion of sex chromosomes in the second edition was imported from “Chapter X: Sex and 
Its Inheritance” in the first edition; thus, in the second edition, this chapter had less content and was 
renamed, “The Determination of Sex.” 
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between genes and chromosomes, the authors emphasized that these conclusions 
“remained highly probable inferences” until Bridges provided proof with 
nondisjunction.109  In the chapters that followed, far less text was changed.  The few 
modifications to the chapter on linkage had little effect on the picture it presented.110  But 
the several small changes to the chapter on the chromosome theory were significant.  A 
new opening discussion of the history of the theory emphasized that it did not develop 
from similar theories proposed by Weismann or investigators in the field of experimental 
embryology.111  The discovery of the genes’ linearity was no longer presented as a 
supporting principle of the chromosome theory, but rather was characterized as “an 
additional principle of heredity which Morgan has called the Linear Order of the 
Genes.”112  A new section compared cytological and genetical maps, illustrating the 
cytological support for chromosomal gene maps.  And the conclusion no longer 
discussed the significance of linkage and the chromosome theory.  Taken as a whole, the 
1932 revisions to the three chapters constituted a new presentation of these aspects of the 
science.  The series still culminated in a chapter on the chromosome theory of 
inheritance.  But given that non-disjunction—the proof of the genes’ location in the 
chromosomes—was explained in the first chapter, the three chapters were no longer 
organized around a narrative of accumulating evidence for the theory.  Rather, they 
progressed towards the creation of gene maps.  And unlike the first edition, in which the 
chapters progressed from cytological and genetic evidence to cytogenetic evidence, all 
three of the second edition’s chapters presented steps that were achieved through a 
complementary use of cytology and breeding experiments.  In the first, it was the 
discovery of non-disjunction that confirmed the genes location in the chromosomes.  In 
the second, it was the discovery of linkage groups that confirmed the principle of linkage.  
In the third, it was the parallels between theoretically-formulated linkage maps and 
visually-formulated cytological maps that supported the development of a physical 
                                                
109 Sinnott and Dunn, Principles of Genetics, 2nd ed., 125. 
110 E.g., a few cases of linkage were added, the conclusion on the widespread occurrence of linkage was 
replaced by one on factors affecting the strength of linkage, and the section on multiple allelomorphs was 
moved to an earlier chapter; see page 147.  See also Sinnott and Dunn, Principles of Genetics, 1st ed., 165. 
111 Sinnott and Dunn, Principles of Genetics, 2nd ed., 149. 
112 Ibid., 153.  Note that Morgan’s “principle of Limitation of the Linkage Groups” was also capitalized 
and identified as being a principle on page 152.  
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representation of genes in chromosomes.  This shift towards a cytogenetic 
characterization of the body of evidence and theory for the chromosome theory was 
further developed in subsequent editions, providing the basis for a representation of 
genes as structural features of the chromosome.   
The revisions to the chapter on the physical basis of heredity for the third edition 
in 1939 changed very little.  There was a new short section on the discovery of 
Drosophila’s giant salivary gland chromosome—a discovery that made it “possible to 
identify the factors of heredity, the genes, with specific structures in the chromosome.”113  
Here and elsewhere in this new section, the focus was on the genes’ materiality.114  And 
the few small additions to the next chapter had a similar purpose: the new title—
“Linkage and Linkage Maps,” instead of “Linkage”—drew attention to the chapter’s 
focus on the physical representation of genes, as did new concluding sections, which 
highlighted the genes’ structural properties and behavior as bodies within the 
chromosomes.115  The only text deleted from the chapter was the section on cytological 
demonstrations of crossing-over; and this was actually just moved into the next chapter 
on the chromosome theory, which was renamed “Genes and Chromosomes.”  Here, the 
imported section accompanied several new sections on salivary gland chromosome 
mapping; all of these sections presented hypotheses about the material structure of genes 
(e.g., deficiency, inversion, and duplication) that had been confirmed visually with 
cytological studies.  And new text in the chapter’s concluding paragraph reiterated that 
this body of evidence supported a material picture of the gene:   
By comparing the genetical and cytological findings in a number of such 
cases, it has been possible to specify the locations of many genes in the 
chromosomes and to show that the linear order of the genes is not only a 
necessary inference from the data of linkage and crossing over but a 
fundamental fact about the structure of chromosomes.116   
 
Taken together, these revisions to the 1932 text moved this series of chapters further 
away from their original emphasis on the chromosome theory.  Although the third 
chapter still discussed the theory, the narrative underlying the series culminated in a 
                                                
113 Sinnott and Dunn, Principles of Genetics, 3rd ed., 163. 
114 E.g., ibid., 164: “the elements in the cross bands...constitute the nearest approach to the ultimate 
morphological structure yet attained.”  
115 Sinnott and Dunn, Principles of Genetics, 2nd ed., 207-208. 
116 Sinnott and Dunn, Principles of Genetics, 3rd ed., 240. 
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picture of the genes as material bodies.  The importance of this feature of genetic theory 
was emphasized by a dramatic change in the textbook’s frontispiece: where a photograph 
of Mendel was once presented, the third edition provided the student with a detachable 
fold-out poster of Bridges’ maps of the giant salivary gland chromosomes of Drosophila.  
Commenting on this revision in a review, Just wrote: “This change bespeaks well the 
new era in genetics.”117 
 In the fourth edition of 1950, a new introduction to the chapter on the physical 
basis of heredity explicitly identified what had over the past 25 years become the focus 
of this series of three chapters.  This new introduction differentiated the gene concept 
that had been used in the first six chapters of the textbook, which dealt with the laws of 
gene transmission, from the gene concept that would be used in the following chapters.  
About the transmission gene of the earlier chapters, the authors wrote: “The gene so 
defined is really a symbol or abstraction, and the body of knowledge concerned with this 
symbolic gene has come to be known as formal genetics.”118  They then explained that 
the series of chapters on chromosomal genetics would deal with “the material, or 
physical” gene, which was studied through a “hybrid” of genetics and cytology.119  
Revisions to their discussion of the gene gave substance to this new gene concept.  In the 
section on “the fundamental hereditary material,” for example, there were several 
changes.  Where the third edition had identified the gametic cells as the fundamental 
hereditary link—“the only physical link between one generation and the next…is the pair 
of gametes”—the fourth edition focused on the genes: “the inherited constitution consists 
of discrete units, the genes.”120  This shift in emphasis was accompanied by a new 
discussion of the ways in which “the theory of the gene resembles the atomic and 
molecular theories of physics and chemistry.”  The authors identified similarities in form 
(e.g., “all these theories are particulate, or corpuscular”) and similarities in justification 
(e.g., “their justification lies in the fact that they make intelligible many 
relationships…and often permit us to predict the results of new, hitherto untried 
                                                
117 T. Just, Review of Principles of Genetics, by E. W. Sinnott and L. C. Dunn, The American Midland 
Naturalist 22 (1939): 755. 
118 Sinnott, Dunn, and Dobzhansky, Principles of Genetics, 4th ed., 151 (emphasis original). 
119 Ibid.  
120 Sinnott and Dunn, Principles of Genetics, 3rd ed., 157; and Sinnott, Dunn, and Dobzhansky, Principles 
of Genetics, 4th ed., 150. 
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experiments”).121  The conclusion to this chapter on the physical basis of heredity was 
similarly revised: having previously focused on the fact that genes were likely to be in 
the chromosomes, it was rewritten to highlight the fact that meiotic divisions provided 
the mechanism for the movement of genes in Mendel’s laws.  The substantial sections of 
text dealing with sex chromosomes (sex-linkage, attached X chromosomes, and non-
disjunction), which had been imported into this chapter in 1932 as proof of the 
chromosome theory, were inserted into the following chapter, “Genes and 
Chromosomes,” which was moved before the chapter on linkage and linkage maps.122  
All of the 1939 text from “Genes and Chromosomes,” however, had been removed.  The 
chapter contained only these newly imported sections on sex chromosome studies, which 
were presented as confirmation that the genes were located in the chromosomes.123  This 
shift was complemented by slight changes in the following chapter on linkage: instead of 
introducing the idea of linkage by focusing on its support for the chromosome theory, the 
chapter focused on its support for the theory of the linear arrangement of the genes.124  
Sections that were previously in the chapter on genes and chromosomes, supporting the 
chromosome theory, were brought into discussions of linkage; this shift included the 
sections explaining the limitation of linkage groups and the linear arrangement of the 
genes, which were no longer called “principles of heredity” or attributed to Morgan, as 
they had been in 1939.125  The section on “Chromosome Maps” was renamed “Linkage 
Maps.”126  And the comparisons of linkage and cytological chromosome maps—and the 
corresponding cytological analysis of the chromosome, which was shown to parallel and 
support the theories of geneticists—were no longer included in this chapter, but rather 
were located in a new chapter that followed, “Chromosome Aberration and Cytological 
Maps of Chromosomes.”   
                                                
121 Sinnott, Dunn, and Dobzhansky, Principles of Genetics, 4th ed., 150-151.  The only other addition was 
the inclusion of historical detail; the discussion of general cell biology was almost identical. 
122 Ibid., 179-192. 
123 Ibid., 197. 
124 Ibid., 203-204. 
125 Sinnott and Dunn, Principles of Genetics, 3rd ed., 218-220, 223-224; and Sinnott, Dunn, and 
Dobzhansky, Principles of Genetics, 4th ed., 225.  The sections on double crossing-over, interference, and 
coincidence were also moved into this chapter.  
126 Sinnott and Dunn, Principles of Genetics, 3rd ed., 219, 223; and Sinnott, Dunn, and Dobzhansky, 
Principles of Genetics, 4th ed., 225. 
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These 1950 revisions and reorganizations of the 1939 text thus gave new 
significance to a body of experiments and evidence that had once been presented as being 
about chromosomes.  The chapter on the physical basis of heredity no longer mentioned 
the chromosome theory, as it focused instead on genes as material entities.  The proof of 
the chromosome theory was located in “Genes and Chromosomes,” but this chapter no 
longer discussed genes and chromosomes generally, focusing instead on sex linked 
inheritance—as was noted in the fifth edition, where the chapter was renamed “Sex-
Linked Inheritance.”  And the chapter on linkage was used to present evidence for the 
linear arrangement of the genes and gene maps, rather than for the chromosome theory.  
Thus, a narrative that had once culminated in the presentation of “the principle of the 
chromosome theory of inheritance” no longer even mentioned it as a “principle.”  In its 
place stood another principle—linkage—that had previously been presented as support 
for the chromosome theory.  Consequently, the 1950 text created a dramatically different 
hierarchical ordering of evidence and principles, which in turn conveyed a very different 
picture of genetics.  The progression of topics—from the nature of the genes, to their 
place in the chromosome, to their linear order and ability to cross-over—formed a series 
of chapters about the materiality of the genes and their behavior.  According to the 
authors’ explanation of these changes in the preface, the textbook no longer presented the 
chromosome mechanism for its own sake, but rather discussed it in relation to the 
“genetical system.”127   
Although it has not been feasible to include other textbooks in this detailed 
comparative study of the four editions of Principles, a brief survey of other widely used 
textbooks in this period suggests that many of the changes I have identified corresponded 
with broader trends in the teaching of genetics.  The increased focus on the materiality of 
the gene, for example, appeared in numerous textbooks.  In the 1948 edition of Heredity, 
for example, Shull wrote: “it is now possible to look in a microscope…and point almost 
exactly to the spot where something lies that is responsible for an eye color, a wing 
shape, or the number of joints in a leg.”128  Others, such as King, followed Sinnott and 
Dunn and included detachable foldout posters of Bridges’ maps of Drosophila’s giant 
                                                
127 Sinnott, Dunn, and Dobzhansky, Principles of Genetics, 4th ed., ix. 
128 Shull, Heredity, 4th ed., 9.  See also page 33.  
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salivary gland chromosomes.129  In the preface to the 1951 edition of Principles of 
Heredity, Snyder drew attention to the new chapter on the physiology of the gene, and 
explained that related aspects of the 1930s language of the first edition had been 
replaced: “The term ‘factor,’ which was used synonymously with ‘gene’ in the earlier 
editions, has been replaced with the more exact term gene, and thus the concept of gene 
is presented to the student from the very beginning.”130  And, as in Principles, knowledge 
of the materiality of the gene was presented as being knowledge of the cause of 
hereditary phenomena: “Mendel’s laws are essentially a description of what happens 
when we make various kinds of crosses or matings.  Having found this out the next 
question we are likely to ask is how or why it happens.”131 
In general, my analysis in this section has tried to show how the significance of 
evidence and principles was dependent upon the ways in which they were used.  As new 
questions and fields of study emerged between 1925 and 1950, the experiments and facts 
that were originally presented in support of the chromosome theory were 
recontextualized.  Within the “historical” framework of the textbook, chapters and their 
contents were reorganized, substantially altering the meaning of a body of text that had 
changed relatively little on the whole.  Although this case study has focused on changes 
in presentations of evidence for the chromosome theory of heredity, this is just one of 
many topics that were shaped into different conceptual orders.  The study of quantitative 
inheritance, for example, did not have a standardized place in presentations of genetics: 
textbooks of the 1950s-1960s were often divided into three general sections—on 
Mendelian, chromosomal, and population genetics—and different authors placed 
quantitative inheritance in different sections by emphasizing different aspects of the 
study of this type of heredity.132  Gardner and many of his contemporaries presented 
quantitative inheritance as an aspect of Mendelism by focusing on the quantitative traits 
                                                
129 King, Genetics, 1st ed., 132-133.  A non-detachable foldout map was included in Sturtevant and 
Beadle, An Introduction to Genetics, Figure 48 (between pages 130 and 131). 
130 Snyder, The Principles of Heredity, 4th ed., vi (emphasis original).  This increased focus on the gene in 
genetics seems to have had a parallel in physics, in which textbooks came to be organized around “force 
functions.”  For a discussion of the organizing logic of physics textbooks, see Chapter 3 in R. N. Giere, 
Explaining Science (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988), esp. 66., where he explains: “it is force 
functions that provide the chief organizing principle in most classical mechanics textbooks.” 
131 Snyder and David, The Principles of Heredity, 5th ed., 36. 
132 Note that I will return to discuss the division of textbooks into sections on Mendelian, chromosomal, 
and population genetics in Chapter 4. 
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that formed modified Mendelian ratios.133  Snyder and David presented it in the section 
on chromosomal genetics by drawing connections between the statistical study of 
multiple genes and the cytogenetic study of multiple alleles.134  Srb, Owen, and Edgar 
presented it in the group of chapters on population genetics, where they connected it by 
focusing on the biometrical tools that were used to study both quantitative traits and the 
movement of genes in populations.135  And Sinnott and Dunn, after moving it from the 
section on population genetics in the second edition to the section on Mendelian genetics 
in the third, made it an independent chapter at the end of the textbook in the fifth edition 
that was meant to be studied alongside the numerous chapters containing statistical 
problems.136  Thus, it was not just the significance of evidence that was highly malleable 
in the hands of textbook authors, but also that of entire types of heredity and 
experimental methods.  Throughout the textbook, in decisions about how to organize the 
subject matter, authors shaped the conceptual order of the science. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
My study of the development of the conceptual order of genetics began with a historical 
investigation of two competing ways in which textbook authors organized their subject 
matter.  Exploring the reception of the first generation textbooks by Bateson and 
Thomson revealed that the differences between these approaches were not, at first, 
conceived in primarily pedagogical terms.  Book reviews, which provided detailed 
accounts of the ordering of subject matter, presented the two approaches as though they 
were connected to two very different pictures of the nature of hereditary science:  
Bateson built the science on heredity’s laws, Thomson on heredity’s ultimate physical 
units.  Although substantive discussions of these differences became increasingly rare 
after the 1910s, I have argued that the underlying disagreements were not resolved but 
rather translated into discussions of pedagogical utility.  The controversial features of 
                                                
133 See, e.g., Gardner, Principles, 1st ed., Chapter 6; Colin, Elements of Genetics, 3rd ed., Chapter 6; 
Dodson, Genetics, Chapter 10; King, Genetics, 1st ed., Chapter 7; and Singleton, Elementary Genetics, 
Chapter 11. 
134 Snyder and David, The Principles of Heredity, 5th ed., Chapters 14, 15. 
135 Srb, Owen, and Edgar, General Genetics, 2nd ed., Chapter 14. 
136 Sinnott and Dunn, Principles of Genetics, 2nd ed., Chapter 11; 3rd ed., Chapter 6; and Sinnott, Dunn, 
and Dobzhansky, Principles of Genetics, 5th ed., Chapter 29. The decision to make it an independent 
chapter is discussed on page vii of the fifth edition.  
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Bateson’s and Thomson’s conceptions of hereditary science did not disappear with this 
reduction, but rather were embedded and unacknowledged in later uses of these two 
organizational forms.  Thus, the growth and eventual ubiquity of the historical approach 
was not only a pedagogically significant development.  This norm brought about a 
change in geneticists’ ideas of “the logical,” and made Mendel’s laws the general 
foundation of the conceptual order of the science.   
The use of Mendel’s laws as the basis for the “historical” presentation of the 
principles of genetics was often achieved with what I have identified as a “dialectical” 
narrative structure.  Evidence that at first seemed to require a rejection of the laws was 
shown, chapter-by-chapter, to merely require the extension of them.  In each chapter, the 
primary character of Mendelian phenomena was redefined in terms that created a link 
between them and the apparent exceptions: mathematical, methodological, and 
mechanistic points of contact provided the basis for a presentation of reconciliation.  The 
steps of the narrative thus relied on different rhetorical devices.  Throughout all of the 
steps, however, Mendel’s laws were treated as though they were the manifestations of 
more fundamental ideas.  The exceptions were not reconciled with extensions of 
Mendel’s articulation of his principles, but rather with extensions of a conception of the 
principles.  In this manner, Mendel’s principles were imbued with meaning that they did 
not have in the context of his experiments, which was the context in which the textbook 
had initially identified and explained them.  Thus, the significance of the principles 
shifted as the student read the text, just as they had shifted through the historical 
development of the discipline.  A recapitulation of the past was thereby embedded in the 
narrative structure of the textbook, perhaps even more deeply than was intended.  The 
step-by-step reconciliation of seemingly problematic evidence also created a picture in 
which past progress in theory had been driven by the accumulation of evidence as 
presented in the text—a positivistic picture that was further supported by the exclusion of 
failed theories from the presentation of these steps.  The textbook connected principles 
that had been independently developed to deal with evidence produced by relatively 
unrelated lines of research, unifying Morgan’s principles under those of Mendel and 
creating an image of genetics as a rationally organized body of knowledge.  
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At the same time that the dialectical historical narrative presented disciplinary 
coherence, it provided a framework for the conceptual order of the science.  Despite the 
nominally “historical” approach, the hierarchical organization of facts and theories was 
not entirely determined by the order of their historical discovery; nor was it determined 
by an internal logic.  Rather, the hierarchy was malleable and shaped by individual 
geneticists.  This type of flexibility was acknowledged by authors such as Dunn, whose 
history of genetics highlighted the influence of Johannsen as an “orderer of ideas” and a 
“systematizer of thought in genetics,” and discussed the importance of his work and that 
of others who had brought disparate aspects of practice and theory together into a 
cohesive discipline.137  Although Dunn’s list of influential orderers of ideas only 
identified individuals who made significant contributions to theory, I have suggested that 
the authors of textbooks were equally influential in this respect.  Because textbooks are 
one of the few places that the heterogeneity of practice and theory are brought together to 
be presented as a cohesive discipline, the conceptual order of the science is particularly 
malleable in the hands of textbook authors.  Slight changes in the organization of dogma 
contribute to very different pictures of the discipline.   
In this chapter I have argued that history, as a logic of organization, came to 
function as disciplinary frame in genetics textbooks, holding disparate facts and theories 
in their proper places and presenting the student with a coherent and unified science.  In 
making this argument, I have tried to illustrate the importance of a type of history-writing 
that is not immediately apparent in the words of the text, but rather is embedded and 
partly hidden in its structure.  The historicity of this “history” differed significantly from 
that of the historical introductions and historical exemplars, as did the features of the 
science it presented.  The conceptual order and rational structure of the science of 
genetics were not identified with statements about the past, but rather were conveyed 
through a feature of the textbook that existed only in the dialectical narrative holding 
together its cumulative chapters.  Thus, history was constitutive of the organizational 
logic, narrative structure, and inner rationality of the science presented; it was, in another 
word, the logos of the textbook.  
                                                
137 Dunn, A Short History of Genetics, 211. 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
Senses of History: 
The Conception of “Classical” Genetics 
 
 
 
We need not be too concerned lest “classical genetics” of the text-books be found 
wanting…It is a long time since any geneticist put his whole conception of genetic 
processes into a text-book. 
 
A. F. Shull, in “Two Decades of Evolutionary Theory.”1 
 
 
In most textbooks of genetics, ideas are not always, or even often, ascribed to those who 
first presented or tested them. 
 
L. C. Dunn, in A Short History of Genetics.2 
 
 
Although the term “classical” is often used unreflectively, studies of its myriad senses 
have suggested that it does not function as a simple description, but rather as a powerful 
and complex idea in need of analysis.  The epochal “classical” that we project onto an 
era, for example, has been identified as a concept in tension—essentially static in that it 
designates a period that is by definition over, and necessarily changing in that it cannot 
have any sense or function without the dynamism of nostalgia or repetition.3  The 
elevation of a text to the status of “a classic” has been shown to efface the situation in 
which it was created, endowing it with a degree of authority that allows the reader to 
                                                
1 A. F. Shull, "Two Decades of Evolution Theory," The American Naturalist 76 (1942): 176. 
2 L. C. Dunn, A Short History of Genetics: The Development of Some of the Main Lines of Thought, 1864-
1939 (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1965), xii. 
3 S. Settis, The Future of the 'Classical' (Cambridge, England: Polity Press, 2006), 16.  This “timeless” 
aspect of the concept of the classical has been analyzed in very different ways in H. G. Gadamer, Truth and 
Method, trans. J. Weinsheimer and D. Marshall (New York: Crossroad, 1989), 285-290, and in N. Crowe, 
"Timelessness and the Idea of the Classical," in Nature and the Idea of a Man-Made World (Cambridge: 
MIT Press, 1999). 
 140 
forget the texts that came before it.4  Various mechanisms of classicism—retrospective 
and prospective, and transferential and regressive—have been identified in references to 
“classical antiquity.”5  The aesthetic of “classicism” in art has been characterized as the 
naturalization of a social source of authority with which power is asserted.6  The idea of 
“musical classics” that developed in eighteenth century England has been connected to 
the Tory-Whig political conflict and the social reformation of manners, and thus 
recognized as an aspect of the English elite’s efforts to exert stability and maintain 
privilege during a period of rapid change.7  Physicists’ uses of the “classical” at the turn 
of the twentieth century have been analyzed as features of the worldview arguments with 
which “modern” physics was fashioned.8  Thus, “classical” should be seen as a term that 
exerts force and in a variety of fields, and its use should raise questions. 
In the 1970s, students of genetics, like students of physics, learned to 
conceptualize their science in terms of its classical and modern eras.  With this 
differentiation of the classical from the modern, a sense of the past played a key role in 
the disciplining of the science.  The idea of the classical allowed for the presentation of 
molecular genetics as a revolution in geneticists’ understanding of heredity.  But, the idea 
of “classical genetics” was not merely an anachronistic description projected by 
molecular geneticists onto the past.  The use of the term in the 1970s was, rather, just one 
redefinition in a series of reappropriations of an idea that had developed over five 
decades, in which “classical” had been used by geneticists to refer to a type of past work, 
an ideology, a philosophy of science, a type of genetics, and a historical era.  In this 
chapter, I will explore how the sense of disciplinary history embodied in references to the 
classical was conceived and conceptualized, from the first references to “classical cases” 
in the 1920s, to the disciplinary deployments of “classical genetics” fifty years later. 
 
                                                
4 J. A. Secord, Victorian Sensation: The Extraordinary Publication, Reception, and Secret Authorship of 
Vestiges of the Natural History of Creation (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003), see esp. 515-
518. 
5 J. Porter, "What Is "Classical" About Classical Antiquity," in Classical Pasts: The Classical Traditions of 
Greece and Rome, ed. J. Porter (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005), see esp. 62.  
6 H. Zerner, "Classicism as Power," Art Journal 47 (1988). 
7 W. Weber, The Rise of Musical Classics in Eighteenth-Century England: A Study in Canon, Ritual, and 
Ideology (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992).  The analysis of the concept of classical music by L. 
Finscher, "Zum Begriff der Klassik in der Musik," Deutsches Jahrbuch der Musikwissenschaft 11 (1966), 
is considered to be a key contribution to this subject.   
8 R. Staley, "On the Co-Creation of Classical and Modern Physics," Isis 96 (2005). 
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A Reference to Past Work: The Identification of Exemplary Cases and Theories 
 
Some of the first uses of the word “classical” in the literature of genetics were references 
to problems that pre-dated Mendelian studies of heredity.9  For example: when 
researchers at the Berkeley Division of Genetics discussed their studies of a non-
Mendelian phenomenon, they did so by referring to a “classical” case of extra-gametic 
hereditary transmission: “The classical instance of reversion of the nectarine back to the 
peach can be clearly explained, as East (1921) has suggested, on the assumption that 
nectarines subject to this phenomenon are simply periclinal chimeras.”10  Although this 
article did not identify what made the case “classical,” East’s article had explained the 
conventional wisdom: Darwin had “fathered” the idea that some bud variations are not 
transmitted by seed and, “The usual citation is the nectarine.”11  In this sense, “classical” 
identified the fact that a particular phenomenon was well known, pre-dating the twentieth 
century study of genetics.  
More often in the 1910s-1920s genetics literature, “classical” was used to 
identify, or to define, the paradigmatic cases of a hereditary phenomenon for which there 
was a generally accepted “Mendelian” explanation.  A phenotypic ratio of 1:2:1 in the F2 
generation, for example, was associated with a well-established “classical” case 
discovered by Bateson: “Most students of ‘Mendelism’ would probably hold the opinion 
that little remains to be added to our knowledge of the classical case of blue Andalusian 
fowl.”12  Lethality was regularly identified with Lucien Cuénot’s yellow mice, as in a 
                                                
9 Note that throughout this chapter, my claims about first references and general trends in the use of 
“classical” as a description of genetics have been developed through extensive readings of primary and 
secondary sources.  Additional support has been provided by electronic searches for the term “classical” 
and all of its variants (e.g., classic, classics) and typographical forms (e.g., classic-cal) in every article that 
was published between 1916-1970 (as well as some that were published earlier and later) in: American 
Journal of Botany, American Midland Naturalist, American Naturalist, Annals of the Missouri Botanical 
Garden, Botanical Gazette, Bulletin of the Torrey Botanical Club, Genetics, Journal of Ecology, Journal of 
Heredity, Missouri Botanical Garden Annual Report, New Phytologist, Philosophical Transactions of the 
Royal Society of London: Series B, Proceedings of the Royal Society of London: Series B, Proceedings of 
the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, Quarterly Review of Biology, Science, 
and Scientific Monthly.  For journals that are not electronically archived (e.g., Nature pre-1950), I have 
read the relevant published indexes.  
10 R. E. Clausen and T. H. Goodspeed, "Inheritance in Nicotiana Tabacum.  III.  The Occurrence of Two 
Natural Periclinal Chimeras," Genetics 8 (1923): 104.  NB: The article by East to which they refer was 
actually published in 1917; the title, journal and volume information are correct. 
11 E. M. East, "The Bearing of Some General Biological Facts on Bud-Variation," The American 
Naturalist 51 (1917): 143. 
12 G. H. Carpenter, "Heredity and Evolution," Nature 104 (1919): 81. 
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1914 study of linkage in Drosophila:  “The classic example of this sort of effect is that of 
the yellow mice.”13  Gene interaction producing a 9:3:3:1 ratio was frequently identified 
with Bateson and Punnett’s heterozygous walnut-combed chicken.  In a study of 
interaction in flower color, for example:  “Among animals a classical case of a 
compound character and of spectacular factor interactions is that of the walnut comb in 
fowls.”14  And mutation was generally seen in terms of Hugo De Vries’ work on species 
of Oenothera, as in an article on mass mutation in Botanical Gazette: “The type of 
heredity here exemplified is shown by several mutations from O. Lamarckiana.  O. lata 
De Vries provides the classic case.”15  In addition to these European examples, hereditary 
mechanisms discovered by chief advocates of Mendelism in the United States were also 
described as classical.  For example, in reporting on a study of O. Lamarckiana in 1922, 
De Vries wrote that he had “tried to arrange the mutant types into distinct groups, 
analogous to those proposed by Morgan,” describing Morgan’s experiments as “his 
classical researches on Drosophila.”16  In these publications, the cases identified as 
“classical” were often those that had allowed for the original identification of a genetic 
principle or mechanism, highlighting the work of key contributors to the science.17  
The early uses of “classical” in the literature of genetics served an important 
scientific function.  In projecting “classical” onto the paradigmatic cases of genetically 
explicable hereditary phenomena, geneticists not only pictured them as models, but also 
treated them as exemplars of a type of hereditary phenomena; they were the foundation 
for reasoning by analogy.  For example: the case of the walnut comb in fowl—which was 
first detailed in articles and textbooks by Bateson and Punnett, and was subsequently 
                                                
13 J. S. Dexter, "The Analysis of a Case of Continuous Variation in Drosophila by a Study of Its Linkage 
Relations," The American Naturalist 48 (1914): 723.  See also, e.g., L. R. Waldron, "A Study of Dwarfness 
in Wheat Accompanied by Unexpected Ratios," Genetics 9 (1924): 214; and S. Wright, "Systems of 
Mating. IV. The Effects of Selection," Genetics 6 (1921): 163. 
14 J. P. Kelly, "A Genetical Study of Flower Form and Flower Color in Phlox Drummondii," Genetics 5 
(1920): 226. This was also the standard example in textbooks of the time.  See, e.g., E. W. Sinnott and L. 
C. Dunn, Principles of Genetics: An Elementary Text, with Problems, 1st ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 
1925), 77. 
15 H. H. Bartlett, "Mass Mutation in Oenothera Pratincola," Botanical Gazette 60 (1915): 442. 
16 H. De Vries and K. Boedijn, "On the Distribution of Mutant Characters among the Chromosomes of 
Oenothera Lamarckiana," Genetics 8 (1923): 233, 236. 
17 In the 1930s, Emerson’s work on plant colors in maize was called classical, as was Wilson’s work on the 
variable number of  chromosomes in a species.  See, e.g., respectively, M. M. Rhoades, "Effect of the Dt 
Gene on the Mutability of the A1 Allele in Maize," Genetics 23 (1938): 377; and Th. Dobzhansky, "The Y 
Chromosome of Drosophila Pseudoobscura," Genetics 20 (1935): 373.  See also W. Bateson, "The 
Progress of Mendelism," Nature 104 (1919): 214. 
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included in most textbooks by their colleagues and the future generations of geneticists—
provided the basis for thinking about other cases of gene interaction.  In an analysis of 
white-margined flowers in the Japanese morning-glory published in Genetics, for 
example, the author noted that Bateson and Punnett’s “classical experiment” had guided 
the discovery of a “number of similar instances.”18  The work of Morgan’s lab received 
similar treatment in academic publications.  The linkage groups in Drosophila, for 
example, provided a model that other geneticists used to interpret and describe their 
work: “The summaries…suggest that linkage group organization in the tomato resembles 
closely the classical Drosophila picture.”19  In these uses, “classical” provided a point of 
reference by which to categorize and discuss current research.  The classical cases were 
not only scientific exemplars, but also the basis for categories of family resemblance.20  
When Dobzhansky later discussed whether the segregation, recombination, linkage, 
chromosome maps, non-disjunction, and translocations in bacterial genetics were 
“similar to those discovered by classical genetics,” he pictured the principles of genetics 
in terms of “their Drosophila prototypes.”21 
In the 1930s, the types of things identified as “classical” expanded, as geneticists 
began to use the term to refer to theories, as well as cases.  East frequently referred to 
Mendelian dominance “in the classical sense.”22  The cellular mechanism that caused 
Mendelian segregation was said to be explained “either on the classical theory of 
separation of pairs of chromatids…or on the chiasmatype theory.”23  Dobzhansky 
described Morgan’s principle of the limitation of the linkage groups as “the classical 
assumption, according to which each linkage group corresponds to a separate 
                                                
18 Y. Imai, "A Genetic Analysis of White-Margined Flowers in the Japanese Morning-Glory," Genetics 12 
(1927): 203. 
19 J. W. Macarthur, "Linkage Studies with the Tomato II: Three Linkage Groups," Genetics 13 (1928): 
415. 
20 See also, e.g., “The similarity of these described series to the classical allelic gene series of Drosophila 
eye color, rodent coat color, and anthocyanin color in maize or primula is striking,” in R. E. Lincoln and J. 
W. Gowen, "Mutation of Phytomonas Stewartii by X-Ray Irradiation," Genetics 27 (1942): 460; and 
Waldron, "A Study of Dwarfness in Wheat Accompanied by Unexpected Ratios," 214, in which “the 
classical case of the yellow coat color of mice” is used to explain unexpected experimental results. 
21 Th. Dobzhansky, "The Theory of the Gene," American Naturalist 87 (1953): 123. 
22 See, e.g., E. M. East, "Heterosis," Genetics 21 (1936): 392. 
23 D. G. Catcheside, "Critical Evidence of Parasynapsis in Oenothera," Proceedings of the Royal Society of 
London. Series B, Biological Sciences 109 (1931): 181. 
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chromosome.”24  And Morgan referred to Bridges’ explanation of irregular segregation, 
which provided the basis of the chromosome theory, as the “classical theory of secondary 
non-disjunction.”25  In addition, the experimental organisms on which these theories 
were based were often characterized as “classical” in journals, with claims such as: “For 
many years Drosophila melanogaster has been a classical object for genetic studies.”26  
In his 1935 textbook Genetics, Jennings agreed: “Drosophila…is in many respects the 
classic organism for genetics.”27  And while I will return to this point later in the chapter, 
it is perhaps worth noting here that Drosophila experiments would later be used to define 
the classical era of genetics.28 
In summary, the rapid growth in genetics in the interwar period had brought about 
changes in geneticists’ sense of the historicity of their science.  One of the first uses of 
“classical” in the literature of genetics had referred to a problem discovered by Darwin, 
which had provided a point of reference in East’s 1916 studies of bud variation.  By the 
1930s, however, such pre-Mendelian cases of heredity had been eclipsed by those of the 
Mendelian era; it was, for example, East’s 1916 studies that were being referred to as 
“classical work on quantitative characters” and “classical experiments,” providing an 
exemplar and reference point for research in the field.29  In the intervening years, the 
nature of that which was identified as classical had shifted—from individual cases of 
hereditary phenomena, to cases that were taken to represent types of phenomena, to 
theoretical accounts of these phenomena.  Insofar as these uses of “classical” identified 
past problems, experiments, and theories, they participated in the characterization of the 
study of genetics as a science with a history.  Unlike “Mendelian,” which was a 
characterization of the hereditary phenomena or mechanism, “classical” was a 
                                                
24 Th. Dobzhansky, "Translocations Involving the Third and the Fourth Chromosomes of Drosophila 
Melanogaster," Genetics 15 (1930): 385. 
25 L. V. Morgan, "Effects of a Compound Duplication of the X Chromosome of Drosophila Melanogaster," 
Genetics 23 (1938): 434. 
26 T. S. Painter, "A New Method for the Study of Chromosome Aberrations and the Plotting of 
Chromosome Maps in Drosophila Melanogaster," Genetics 19 (1934): 175.  See also the references to 
“classical material” and “the classic genera Oenothera and Drosophila” in, respectively, H. M. Showalter, 
"Self Flower-Color Inheritance and Mutation in Mirabilis Jalapa L," Genetics 19 (1934): 568; and R. R. 
Gates, "International Genetics," Nature 124 (1929): 296. 
27 H. S. Jennings, Genetics (New York: W. W. Norton, 1935), 36; see also 47-48. 
28 See, e.g., J. Schultz, "Innovators and Controversies," Review of The Gene: A Critical History, by E. A. 
Carlson, Science 157 (1967): 298. 
29 See, e.g., E. Anderson, "Recombination in Species Crosses," Genetics 24 (1939): 670, 674.  
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description of the importance of an event in the history of the study of heredity.  In the 
early twentieth century, the use of “classical” by geneticists was similar to that of 
mathematicians, physicists, botanists, physiologists, and chemists.30  The role of these 
claims in the developing and malleable discipline of genetics, however, was particularly 
significant; for it was with this type of language that the conceptual and institutional 
boundaries of the science began to be defined.  To the extent that the science was defined 
by its exemplars—by the experiments and theories that were taken to be classics—the 
language of the classical played a key role in its disciplining.  And although the 
“classics” of genetics were generally identified without political intent into the early 
1930s, it was not long before the political character of this language became apparent, in 
a shift that coincided with the emergence of “classical genetics.”  
 
  
A Formalistic Idealization: The Attack from Dialectical Genetics 
 
It was in the mid to late 1930s—in reports of T. D. Lysenko’s attempts to suppress the 
research of geneticists working in the Mendelian tradition in Russia—that “classical 
genetics” first entered the academic literature and public presentations of the science of 
genetics.  The origins of this development can be traced to December 14, 1936, when The 
New York Times reported on the cancellation of the seventh international congress on 
genetics in Russia, with a headline proclaiming, “Prof. N. I. Vaviloff, a Famous Plant 
Expert, Is Arrested—Others Under Attack.”  The article explained: 
In the past three months T. D. Lysenko…has been attacking the “classical 
geneticists” in the monthly scientific magazine, Socialist Reconstruction 
of Agriculture.  He challenged the validity of classical genetics, including 
                                                
30 See, e.g., “the classical example” and “a classical example” in L. Berman, "Anthropology and the 
Endocrine Glands," The Scientific Monthly 21 (1925): 165; G. R. Bisby, "Some Observations on the 
Formation of the Capillitium and the Development of Physarella Mirabilis Peck and Stemonitis Fusca 
Roth," American Journal of Botany 1 (1914): 279; A. F. Blakeslee, "The Botanic Garden as a Field 
Museum of Agriculture," Science 31 (1910): 55; C. H. Browning and R. Gulbransen, "Bactericidal 
Properties Conferred on the Blood by Intravenous Injections of Diamino-Acridine Sulphate," Proceedings 
of the Royal Society of London. Series B, Containing Papers of a Biological Character 90 (1918): 136; C. 
M. Jackson, "Obstacles to Research," Science 42 (1915): 820; W. Libby, "Conceptual Thinking," The 
Scientific Monthly 15 (1922): 440; T. R. Merton and J. W. Nicholson, "On Intensity Relations in the 
Spectrum of Helium," Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series A, Containing 
Papers of a Mathematical or Physical Character 220 (1920): 161, 168; and H. S. Taylor and W. N. 
Henderson, "The Solubility of Curves of Salt Hydrates: Calcium Nitrate," Journal of the American 
Chemical Society 37 (1915): 1688.  A brief search of non-scientific journals finds similar uses of “classical 
examples,” as well as the use of very different senses of the term (e.g., “classical” as a reference to timeless 
values, an aesthetic form, a pedagogical cannon, and a historical era).   
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the Mendelian laws and the chromosome theory and stigmatized them as 
“formalistic” and of no practical value, whereas his work, he said, is 
producing useful results.  Mr. Lysenko said, “Genetics is merely an 
amusement, like chess or football,” and he attacked the All-Union 
Institute of Plant Industry…as useless.31   
 
This report was immediately reprinted in Science and translated into Russian by the 
Moscow newspaper Izvestia, sparking numerous replies from Russian geneticists 
defending Soviet science, which were then published in Science and Journal of Heredity, 
as were counter-replies by American geneticists.32  It was in the context of this 
controversy that “classical genetics” entered into Science and Journal of Heredity for the 
first time.  And within days the controversy was furthered fueled with the publication of 
another article in The New York Times, from their correspondent in Moscow:   
Classical genetics came under heavy fire at the conference of the 
Agricultural Academy of Genetics, which closed here tonight…Professor 
Lysenko, as the leader of the “practical” school of selectionists, criticized 
Professor Vaviloff as the leader of the classical—or, as his opponents say, 
“formalistic”—school for failing to take into account a vast amount of 
experimental data on the production of new varieties of plants through 
inter-variety crossings on 15,000 collective farms.33   
 
While these reports gave geneticists little information about the specifics of Lysenko’s 
attack, Journal of Heredity quickly published a few articles intended to shed some light 
on the issue.34  In an article that discussed “Iarovization vs. ‘Classical Genetics,’” A. J. 
Bruman of the U. S. Department of Agriculture suggested that some aspects of 
                                                
31 "Moscow Cancels Genetics Parley," New York Times, December 14 1936, 18.  This article first ran in 
The New York Times as a wireless transmission from a correspondent in Moscow and was then reproduced 
in Science as "Abandonment of the Moscow Meeting of the International Congress of Genetics," Science 
84 (1936): 553-554.  This article and events were also discussed in "News and Views: International 
Congress of Genetics and the U.S.S.R.," Nature 139 (1937): 142, although without the phrase “classical 
genetics.” 
32 These first reports of the “Lysenko Affair” in The New York Times and the subsequent controversy were 
widely discussed in the literature of the natural, social, and political sciences.  See, e.g., R. C., "The 
Genetics Congress," Journal of Heredity 28 (1937): 24-25; R. C. Cook, "Lysenko's Marxist Genetics: 
Science or Religion?" Journal of Heredity 40 (1949): 169-170; P. E. Mosely, "Freedom of Artistic 
Expression and Scientific Inquiry in Russia," The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social 
Science 200 (1938); J. W. Pincus, "The 'Genetic Furore' in U.S.S.R.," Journal of Heredity 28 (1937): 57; J. 
W. Pincus, "The Genetic Front in the U.S.S.R," Journal of Heredity 31 (1940): 165; and C. Zirkle, ed., 
Death of a Science in Russia (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1949), 47-48.  For the later 
historiography of the “Lysenko Affair,” see Z. Medvedev, The Rise and Fall of T. D. Lysenko (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1969); D. Joravsky, The Lysenko Affair (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
1970); and N. Roll-Hansen, The Lysenko Effect: The Politics of Science (Amherst: Humanity Books, 
2005).  
33 H. Denny, "Geneticists Argue Work in Moscow," New York Times, December 28 1936, 18. 
34 See, e.g., A. J. Bruman, "The Place of Iarovization in Plant Breeding," Journal of Heredity 28 (1937); 
and C., “The Genetics Congress.”  The lack of scientific publications by Lysenko was also noted in 
"Genetics and Plant Breeding in the U.S.S.R.," Nature 140 (1937): 296.  
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Lysenko’s work were “grasping in what may prove to be a field of some promise.”35  An 
Editor’s Note that prefaced this article explained that it was submitted a week before the 
cancellation of the Seventh International Congress, and described Bruman’s analysis as 
“invaluable” in helping the reader “understand the underlying motivation, which has led 
the ‘iarovization geneticists’ to brand ‘classical genetics’ as ‘a game like chess or 
football’.”  The editor noted: “It is left to the reader to reach his own conclusion as to the 
point at which such exact scientific measures as probable errors leave off, and where 
such intangibles as ‘Marxian ideology’ begin to change the writings of the new 
iarovization school of genetics from true science to political special pleading.”36  
It is notable that Anglo-American genetics used Lysenko’s terminology when 
referring to the two sides involved in this controversy.  In the Quarterly Review of 
Biology, for example, Bentley Glass used Lysenko’s phrase “Mendelian-Morganian 
geneticists” as a way of talking about his own scientific community:  “In the second 
Russian conference on the genetics controversy, held in 1936 (the first was in 1929), the 
Mendelian-Morganian geneticists lost the day…In 1939, a third genetics conference met, 
and charges against the ‘classical’ geneticists were repeated.”37  It was not until the 
Marxist journal Science and Society published some of the proceedings from the 1939 
Conference on Genetics and Selection, however, that substantive versions of the 
arguments made by Lysenko and his colleagues were available in English.38  The editors 
of Science and Society explained their choice of three addresses, out of the fifty-three 
printed in the Russian journal Pod Znamenem Marksizma (1939, no. 11): “Fifty-three 
                                                
35 Note that in the 1930s, the term “iarovization,” also referred to as “vernalization,” was used to refer to 
the manipulation of biological processes through external factors; it later became associated with 
Lysenko’s Lamarckian theory of acquired inheritance.  
36 Bruman, "The Place of Iarovization in Plant Breeding," 31. 
37 B. Glass, "Dialectical Materialism and Scientific Research," Review of The New Genetics in the Soviet 
Union, by P. S. Hudson and R. H. Richens, Quarterly Review of Biology 23 (1948): 333-34.  Conway 
Zirkle’s account of Soviet “verbalism,” written to help American genetics reading Lysenkoists' arguments 
in Death of A Science in Russia, is useful here.  Noting that doctrines, theories, and hypotheses were 
personalized, Zirkle explained:  “Thus, the Russian universities do not have professors of evolution but 
professors of Darwinism.  Genetics is rarely mentioned…but instead such terms as “Mendelism,” 
“Morganism,” and “Michurinism” are current.”  According to Zirkle: “This personalizing is much more 
than the mere attaching of personal labels to impersonal ideas.  The ideas themselves are distorted.”  He 
noted that while “Mendelism-Morganism” received “great condemnation” in the late 1930s, it was largely 
replaced by “Morganism-Weismannism” in the late 1940s.  See Zirkle, ed., Death of a Science in Russia, 
8-11. 
38 These publications in Science and Society were later discussed in Zirkle, ed., Death of a Science in 
Russia, 34-35.  
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scientists presented their positions at the open meetings of the Conference, but the 
principal disputants, representing widely different views on theory and methods in 
genetics, were Vavilov and Lysenko…Because of their prominence and leading roles in 
the controversy, the speeches of Vavilov and Lysenko are here presented almost in full, 
together with the address of I. M. Polyakov who takes perhaps the most interesting 
intermediate position.”39   
In Lysenko’s address, he set out to respond to the Russian geneticists who were 
critical of his rejection of the Mendelian tradition, as he explained in the opening: “the 
present conference wants to hear from me, principally, why I reject Mendelism, why I do 
not consider formal Mendelian-Morgan genetics a science.”  Lysenko answered these 
questions with many “illustrations,” explaining his break with the “Mendelian-
Morganists” as a disagreement about what should be counted as exemplary work in the 
study of heredity—a disagreement about the “classics.”  For example: “The Mendelians 
have continually blamed us (and still do), for not appreciating the teachings of 
Johannsen, and for taking a critical attitude toward this ‘classic’ of biological science.”40  
Here, and elsewhere in his speech, Lysenko characterized his conflict with the West as 
rooted in fundamentally different ways of choosing scientific exemplars, and therein 
sources of authority.  He stated: “One has to know how to choose authorities in science. 
Only that theory which helps you in practical solution of problems undertaken or 
assigned, earns the right to scientific labors.”41  Lysenko’s criticism of Johannsen’s work 
was part of his attempt to redefine the classics of Soviet genetics.  According to N. I. 
Vavilov, a well known advocate of Mendelism, Lysenko was responsible for the growing 
belief “that it is not only necessary to remove Mendel from the list of classics, but also to 
regard his work as full of harmful generalizations.”42  Lysenko discussed this point at 
length in his address, and it was in his introduction to this discussion that he used the 
phrase “classical genetics,” describing a source of error.  He stated: “Let us take up 
                                                
39 "Genetics in the Soviet Union: Three Speeches from the 1939 Conference on Genetics and Selection," 
Science and Society IV (1940): 183.  NB: “Vaviloff,” mentioned in The New York Times, was also spelled 
“Vavilov.”   
40 T. D. Lysenko, "Genetics in the Soviet Union: Three Speeches from the 1939 Conference on Genetics 
and Selection," Science and Society IV (1940): 199. 
41 Ibid.: 217. 
42 N. I. Vavilov, "Genetics in the Soviet Union: Three Speeches from the 1939 Conference on Genetics 
and Selection," Science and Society IV (1940): 190. 
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another example of our ‘attacks’ on ‘classical genetics.’ The question is the so-called 3:l 
relation.”43  This seems to be one of the few times that Lysenko used the term “classical 
genetics” in an English publication, and it is difficult to know the meaning of the inverted 
commas.44  But what is important is that Anglo-American geneticists did see the term as 
a criticism used by Lysenko, as it was in Polyakov’s defense of Lysenko.  Polyakov 
discussed “the issues on which classical genetics dogmatized, and hastened to declare to 
be forbidden ground,” such as directed mutation; he noted “the conjecture” on the topic 
made “by classical geneticists” before Morgan “clamped down” on them and “buried” 
the topic.45  In referring to “Mendelian-Morganism” as “classical genetics,” Lysenko and 
his supporters not only suggested that the science and its power structure were 
constituted in the classics it had chosen.  In addition, they implied that “Mendelism-
Morganism” was an artifact of the culture of the West—that the science was no more 
than a cultural tradition.  It was this aspect of their argument that American geneticist R. 
Cook rejected in a lengthy article on “Lysenko’s Marxist Genetics,” in which he 
responded to an article that had been published in the journal Soviet Russia Today: “The 
issue is not whether ‘the tradition of Mendel-Morganism’ or the ‘Michurin teaching’ is 
doctrinally true.  This issue is of the facts, which Lysenkoists deny.  The principles of 
‘Mendel-Morgan genetics’ are not a ‘tradition’.”46  Muller responded to Lysenko in a 
similar way, arguing that there was no difference between “formal genetics” and “true 
genetics.”47  On this Anglo-American picture, Western science was not one approach 
amongst many; it was the only scientific approach.  The substantive connection between 
the culture of the West and “classical” genetics, and their superiority over the Soviet 
alternatives, was later emphasized by Caspari and Marshak, who wrote in an article on 
                                                
43 Lysenko, "Genetics in the Soviet Union: Three Speeches from the 1939 Conference on Genetics and 
Selection," 203. 
44 There are at least two problems.  First, there is not any notation of whether Lysenko indicated them in 
his address, or of who decided to use them in the transcription.  Second, it is not clear whether the language 
is his, or if he is attributing one or both of the terms to his opponents; the situation is not helped by looking 
at the language of Anglo-American geneticists, who used inverted commas in a similar manner. 
45 I. M. Polyakov, "Genetics in the Soviet Union: Three Speeches from the 1939 Conference on Genetics 
and Selection," Science and Society IV (1940): 224. 
46 Cook, "Lysenko's Marxist Genetics: Science or Religion?" 196 (emphasis original).   
47 Muller’s response to Lysenko was reported in Denny, "Geneticists Argue Work in Moscow," 2. 
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the rise and fall of Lysenko: “the slow ‘Western’ method, based on quantitative classical 
genetics, is superior.”48  
Anglo-American geneticists’ understanding of the Lysenkoists’ attack on 
“classical genetics” was also informed by the English translation of the 1948 
Proceedings of the Lenin Academy of the U.S.S.R., and by the numerous subsequent 
reprintings of Lysenko’s address to this session.49  At this session of the Lenin Academy, 
Mendelism-Morganism was characterized as idealistic and formalistic, in its approach to 
heredity and thus in the way it represented the processes of life.50  According to 
Lysenko’s colleague V. N. Stoletov, the problem with Mendel’s classic work was that his 
approach “tried to press manifestations of diverse and mobile life into line with the laws 
of mathematics.”51  Lysenko agreed that the attempt to “reduce biological science to 
mere statistics” resulted from the fact that Mendelist-Morganists failed “to grasp the 
concrete content of biological processes.”52  As described by his colleague P. F. 
Plesetsky, “the investigator with such a mathematical approach to the problem loses sight 
of the biological characteristics of the plant.”53  The reason that this approach obscured 
the nature of heredity was that it was not “science,” but rather a form of “extra-
experimental speculation.”54  As articulated by Lysenko: “The scientific basis of studying 
biological connections is lost when studying living nature detached from nature.”55  The 
mathematical “extra-experimental” analysis involved the prioritization of the mental over 
the material, and thus led to an “idealistic” and “metaphysical” picture of heredity.56  In 
the argument advanced by Lysenko and his colleagues, this idealism was intricately 
connected to the non-pragmatic orientation of the science.  Academician E. I. Ushakova, 
                                                
48 E. Caspari and R. E. Marshak, "The Rise and Fall of Lysenko," Science 149 (1965): 276. 
49 See, e.g., T. D. Lysenko, "The Situation in Biological Science," in Death of a Science in Russia, ed. C. 
Zirkle (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1949); and T. D. Lysenko, Soviet Biology (London: 
Birch Books, 1948).  For an excellent analysis of these addresses, see P. Wrinch, "Science and Politics in 
the U.S.S.R.: The Genetics Debate," World Politics 3 (1951). 
50 For a discussion of a general Soviet attack on “formalism” in the arts that was written during this period, 
see Mosely, "Freedom of Artistic Expression and Scientific Inquiry in Russia.” 
51 V. N. Stoletov, as quoted and translated in Wrinch, "Science and Politics in the U.S.S.R.: The Genetics 
Debate," 502. 
52 Proceedings of the Lenin Academy of Agricultural Sciences of the U.S.S.R., July 31-August 7, 1948, 
Complete Stenographic Report (New York: International Publications, 1949), 614-615. 
53 Ibid., 111. 
54 This usage is discussed in Wrinch, "Science and Politics in the U.S.S.R.: The Genetics Debate," 496. 
55 Lysenko, "The Situation in Biological Science," 131. 
56 Proceedings of the Lenin Academy of Agricultural Sciences of the U.S.S.R., July 31-August 7, 1948, 
Complete Stenographic Report, 21-26. 
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for example, argued:  “Just as it is hard for a normal person to understand and accept the 
notion that the world we see is not an objective reality existing outside of us…so it is 
hard to understand how the Morgan-Mendel theories can be applied in practice.”57  It was 
research into “useless problems” that led classical geneticists “deeper into the quagmire 
of formalism,” according to Stoletov; it was “living practice” that was “the enemy of 
formalism” and its “cure.”58  A similar distinction was drawn by Lysenko, who praised 
research that followed the Lamarckian theories of Soviet botanist Ivan Michurin: “It is 
not an exaggeration to state that the feeble metaphysical Morganist ‘science’ of the 
nature of living organisms can in no way be compared to our efficient Michurinist 
agrobiological science.”59  The reason for this was that they saw pragmatically oriented 
research as linked to the study of development.  Lysenko explained: “The scientific 
solution of practical problems is the most reliable method toward a sound knowledge of 
the rules of development of living nature.”60  The study of development was “the point of 
departure” for all valuable work on heredity, according to Lysenko.61  Equating “the 
fundamental concepts of the theory of development” with “the principles of dialectical 
materialism,” he wrote:  “According to dialectics, every identity, every sameness always 
contains differences. Hence we cannot imagine two offsprings of a plant being in no way 
different from each other.”62  Michurinism arose from practical concerns and dialectical 
materialism, and for this reason reflected the dynamic nature of life; Mendelism-
Morganism was based in theory and idealism, and thus misrepresented heredity as 
formalistic and static.  
In short, Lysenko argued that the Mendelian-Morganian research tradition, the 
tradition of classical genetics, was formalistic in that it was an idealistic and static model 
of heredity; it failed to capture the dynamic and dialectical nature of development—the 
                                                
57 Ibid., 195. 
58 Ibid., 574. 
59 Lysenko, "The Situation in Biological Science," 105.  See also, e.g., the numerous articles discussed by 
Wrinch, "Science and Politics in the U.S.S.R.: The Genetics Debate," 499. 
60 Lysenko, "The Situation in Biological Science," 131 (emphasis original). 
61 T. D. Lysenko, "Intravarietal Crossing and Mendel's So-Called 'Law' of Segregation," in Agrobiology: 
Essays on Problems of Genetics, Plant Breeding and Seed Growing (Moscow: Foreign Languages 
Publishing House, 1954), 223.  Elsewhere, Lysenko spoke of “formal genetics” as being a body of theory 
that was in opposition to “the theory of development.”  See, e.g., Lysenko, "Genetics in the Soviet Union: 
Three Speeches from the 1939 Conference on Genetics and Selection." 
62 Ibid.  
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essential nature of heredity.  From this political and ideological critique, “classical 
genetics” entered into the common language of Anglo-American geneticists, where it 
was later reappropriated along with other aspects of Lysenko’s terminology.63  Before I 
turn to explore these reappropriations, however, it is worth noting that the few Anglo-
Americans who wrote of “classical genetics” outside of the context of the Lysenko affair 
in the early 1940s accepted a picture of their discipline as a science founded in static 
mathematical relationships.  For example, G. W. Beadle and E. L. Tatum, who were 
working on the genetic control of developmental reactions, embraced this picture; as they 
explained in the introduction to an address on the study of development:  “During the last 
forty years the mechanism of the transmission of hereditary characters has been 
elucidated by the work collectively referred to as classical genetics.  With the gradual 
unfolding of the rules of this ‘geometry of inheritance’ the concept of the gene as the 
heredity unit has taken form.”64  They accepted this idea of the classical gene that 
emerged from statistical studies, arguing that it was not incapable of dealing with the 
dynamics of biology: “Just as the organism may be thought of as an integrated whole, so 
the complement of genes that regulate its development may be thought of as a whole or 
unit of higher order.”  According to Beadle and Tatum, this conception of the 
developmental system did not require “abandoning the gene concept as Goldschmidt has 
recently argued.”65  Rather, they argued, genes could be reconceptualized as units 
directing the synthesis of enzymes controlling metabolic processes—a hypothesis that 
they characterized as “a purely gratuitous assumption,” but for which they offered 
experimental support later that year, in an article that quickly became a widely 
recognized landmark, providing the foundation for their “one gene – one enzyme” theory 
of the gene.66  
 
 
                                                
63 E.g., C. D. Darlington adopted Lysenko’s terminology in 1956, referring to the principles of genetics as 
“the Mendelian-Morganian rules” in his critique of classical genetics: C. D. Darlington, "Natural 
Populations and the Breakdown of Classical Genetics," Proceedings of the Royal Society of London. Series 
B, Biological Sciences 145 (1956): 355. 
64 G. W. Beadle and E. L. Tatum, "Genetic Control of Developmental Reactions," The American 
Naturalist 75 (1941): 107. 
65 Ibid.: 107-108. 
66 G. W. Beadle and E. L. Tatum, "Genetic Control of Biochemical Reactions in Neurospora," Proceedings 
of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America 27 (1941). 
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A Static Philosophy of Science: The Dynamic Genetics of Richard Goldschmidt 
 
While Anglo-Americans such as Beadle and Tatum found it easy to disregard Lysenko’s 
criticisms of classical genetics as founded in Marxist ideology rather than science, 
similarly radical and systematic criticisms of “classical” genetics were surfacing from 
within their own scientific community and academic establishment in the late 1930s.67  
This internal criticism was not new, but rather had developed over the previous three 
decades—a period in which the study of embryology was effectively split off from the 
study of heredity, which came to be conceptualized in terms of geneticists’ work on 
variation and mechanics.  During these decades, those interested in embryology and 
development had criticized this narrow line of research, arguing that it contributed to a 
misconceptualization of the nature of the hereditary material.68  As Beadle and Tatum 
mentioned, one of the most vocal critics was Richard Goldschmidt, who had left 
Germany in 1936 and joined the division of genetics at Berkeley.69  Goldschmidt’s 
position was, however, very different from that of Lysenko, which he vehemently 
criticized.70  Coming from a scientific culture in which physiological and developmental 
studies were highly valued and research was not only centered on the theories of Mendel 
and Morgan, Goldschmidt rejected the atomistic picture of the chromosome.71  While he 
                                                
67 While Sonneborn attempted to address the scientific merits of Lysenko’s arguments without being 
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articulated this as a rejection of “classical genetics” in the 1950s—arguing that the 
“tenets of classical genetics” need to be reconceptualized, and identifying hereditary 
phenomena that “must be understood in terms of a general genetic principle” other than 
those “underlying classical genetics”—his critique began in the 1930s with an attack on 
the classical theory of the gene.72   
In his 1938 “The Theory of the Gene,” one of the first pieces to target “the 
classical,” Goldschmidt introduced his position: “What we intend to discuss is not the 
existing classic theory of the gene, but the reasons why we believe that this classic theory 
is no longer tenable and has to be superseded.”73  Drawing on the discovery that a gene’s 
expression could be altered by either a change in its position within the chromosome (a 
position effect) or by crossing-over in an adjacent locus (a spontaneous chromatin 
rearrangement)—and further developing Muller’s proposal that these effects could be 
understood in terms of chemical interactions among gene products—Goldschmidt 
proposed a new picture of the nature of hereditary material.  Because a gene’s location 
altered its function, it could no longer be seen as a structural unit that carried its function 
with it, according to Goldschmidt.  And thus, the classical picture—which presented the 
gene as being, simultaneously, a unit of structure, function, mutation, and 
recombination—misrepresented the nature of the hereditary material.  According to 
Goldschmidt, “the language of classic genetics” made what was actually a chromosomal 
rearrangement “act” like a mutant gene, and thereby created a false picture of the gene as 
an independent unit of the chromosome.74  Speculating that everything that geneticists 
had identified as gene mutations might actually be position effects, Goldschmidt argued 
that a system of misleading concepts needed to be collectively dismantled.  He suggested 
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that geneticists should think of the entire chromosome as the unit of heredity.  On this 
picture, mutations were not changes in the chemical constitution of a classical gene, but 
rather rearrangements of the chromosome that altered its chemical properties:  “The 
conclusion, then, is that... no genes are existing but only points, loci, in the chromosome 
which have to be arranged in a proper order or pattern to control normal development.”75  
Goldschmidt’s conviction that the gene did not exist as an individual unit became an 
underlying theme in his work.  In the following decade he developed an alternative 
picture of the hereditary material, proposing a hierarchy of structural and functional 
genetic units ranging from barely visible structures to large segments of the 
chromosome.76   
Goldschmidt’s reconceptualization of the nature of the chromosome, which was 
based on his work in physiological and developmental genetics, challenged traditional 
pictures of the genetic mechanisms driving development and evolution; and his 
articulations of this challenge significantly influenced how geneticists in the 1940-50s 
thought about the nature of “classical genetics.”  For example: in his controversial and 
widely read monograph Physiological Genetics (1938), published in the same year as 
“The Theory of the Gene,” Goldschmidt criticized geneticists’ attention to problems of 
transmission at the expense of problems of development, employing language similar to 
that used by Lysenko.  Describing studies of the mechanism of heredity and “the status of 
the germ plasm” as “static genetics,” Goldschmidt advocated a shift in focus towards the 
“physiological” or “dynamic genetics” of gene action.  This distinction, which he drew 
only in the preface to the monograph, was widely commented upon by his colleagues and 
was subsequently used to characterize the nature of the difference between “classical” 
and “developmental” genetics.77  In Goldschmidt’s mind, however, it was not only a 
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distinction between fields of study.  As he explained in his Presidential Address to the 
Ninth International Congress on Genetics in Bellagio (1953), the static and dynamic—the 
statistical and the physiological—were “different philosophies of genetics.”  The former 
developed explanations through “the introduction of more and more units for statistical 
treatment,” whereas the latter referred to “genic action and developmental systems” and 
avoided “explanation in terms of unproved, additional systems of units” such as gene 
modifiers.78  These were different “mental attitudes,” according to Goldschmidt, in the 
sense that he thought there was “no objective way to decide which is the correct” one.79  
In discussing the outcomes of this congress in Science, Michael Lerner, a population 
geneticist and colleague of Goldschmidt at the Department of Genetics at Berkeley, 
noted:   
it can be said that the most significant trend at the Bellagio Congress was 
the virtual abandonment of the gene in the classical sense as the object of 
study.  Both the statistical and physiological approaches, to follow the 
distinction laid down by President Goldschmidt, have instead turned their 
attention to the properties and functions of more complex systems…This 
is not to say that the foundations of classical genetics constructed in the 
course of the last 50 years have been undermined or destroyed.  It is only 
that some of the more naive and simple concepts, essential in their own 
time, have now outlived their usefulness and are being replaced.80 
 
Although Lerner held Goldschmidt’s work on physiological genetics in great esteem, he 
strongly disagreed with Goldschmidt’s work on evolution, which was equally influential 
in shaping the idea of “classical genetics” that emerged in the 1940s-50s.81   
In Material Basis of Evolution (1940), a widely read and radical critique of the 
model of classical genetics underlying the Neo-Darwinian study of evolution, 
Goldschmidt argued that the evolution of new species could not result from the gradual 
accumulation of small mutations.  The “bridgeless gaps” between species could only be 
spanned by macromutations, which Goldschmidt suggested could occur through two 
different genetic mechanisms: systemic chromosome mutations, or gene mutations with 
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significant developmental effects.  On the “systemic mutation” picture, which he saw as 
the phylogenetic consequence of his rejection of the classical gene, a new species 
emerged through large-scale rearrangements of the primary pattern and thus the reaction 
system of the chromosome.82  This theory of evolution-through-systemic-mutations 
required that a genetic system jump from one stable developmental reaction system to 
another; and in the last third of The Material Basis of Evolution, Goldschmidt 
demonstrated that a single genetic change could bring about such a shift.  He noted that 
this aspect of his argument did not require a rejection of the classical theory of the gene, 
given that developmental macromutations could be understood as mutations in genes or 
as systemic mutations. But he argued that systemic mutations were a more plausible 
means for producing a new species, and Material Basis of Evolution was widely read as a 
radical rejection of the classical genetics on which Neo-Darwinism was founded.  In a 
review for American Naturalist, for example, Carl Hubbs stated that Goldschmidt 
presented his readers with a simplistic dichotomy, “classical genetics versus 
Goldschmidtian genetics.”83  And Shull’s historical review of population genetics, “Two 
Decades of Evolutionary Theory,” quoted Material Basis of Evolution when discussing 
the hereditary mechanisms studied through the mathematical analysis gene populations: 
“They are the subject matter of what Goldschmidt, in a tone of mild disparagement, calls 
‘classical genetics’.”84   
Few of Goldschmidt’s colleagues agreed that the gene concept needed to be 
completely abandoned or that microevolution had no role in species formation.  But by 
the 1950s, many did agree that the “classical” picture of the gene was a misrepresentation 
of the hereditary material: discussions of the nature of the gene regularly drew on 
Goldschmidt’s ideas, and standard textbooks presented his rejection of the classical 
picture, often quoting from his work at great length.85  Perhaps the reason for this was 
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that most geneticists did not see Goldschmidt as rejecting the foundation of classical 
genetics, but rather as building on it.  As described by Curt Stern: “His outstanding 
experimental accomplishment…led to an analysis of the phenomenon of intersexuality 
which went far beyond the framework of classical genetics…  He reached his height in 
his endeavors to build a dynamic physiological genetics on the static and material basis 
which Mendel and Morgan had laid.”86  On this picture, Goldschmidt’s approach was 
compatible with that of classical genetics; and it was in these terms that Goldschmidt’s 
ideas were incorporated into the teaching of the principles of genetics.   
 
 
A Type of Science: The Pedagogical Differentiation of Classical Genetics 
 
One of the first textbooks to refer to “classical genetics” was the 1945 edition of 
Altenburg’s Genetics, which used the term in differentiating between two ways in which 
genetics was studied and conceptualized.  The opening line of the textbook’s preface, “In 
the present text emphasis has been placed on modern genetics,” introduced a discussion 
in which Altenburg explained that the traditional definition of genetics, as the study of 
heredity and variation, was “no longer adequate.”87  Drawing attention to modern 
geneticists’ studies of various aspects of the germplasm—including its origin and 
evolution, physical and chemical constitution, interactions with the environment, spread 
and distribution, and influence on development—Altenburg suggested: “Genetics in the 
modern sense might therefore better be defined as the science which concerns itself with 
the study of the germ plasm.”  This physical focus of modern genetics made it distinct 
from that of “classical genetics,” according to Altenburg, who did not clearly define the 
latter but seemed to accept that the “definition often given of genetics as the study of 
heredity and variation” was fitting.88  On this picture, classical genetics was based on 
breeding experiments and statistical analyses of phenotypic distributions, whereas 
modern genetics complemented these approaches with cytological observations.   
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A similar distinction was introduced in the fourth edition of Principles of 
Genetics (1950), which was later described as “the classic textbook of classical 
genetics.”89  Here, in the introduction to the chapter on “the physical basis of 
inheritance,” Sinnott, Dunn, and Dobzhansky differentiated between the gene concept 
used in studying cytogenetics and that used in studying the laws of transmission:  
For the purposes of analyzing the inheritance of traits in crosses it is 
sufficient to define a gene as a unit, transmitted from parents to 
offspring…The gene so defined is really a symbol or abstraction, and the 
body of knowledge concerned with this symbolic gene has come to be 
known as formal genetics…Formal genetics was developed in essentially 
modern form during the first quarter of the twentieth century.90  
 
The historical account that followed explained that the “union of genetics and cytology” 
in recent decades had allowed geneticists to study the genetic material “visually,” and 
had thus led to a new conception of the gene.  According to Sinnott, Dunn, and 
Dobzhansky, when geneticists “endeavored to discover where in the organism genes are 
located, what they are, and how they function,” the gene they were studying was 
identical to “the material, or physical, basis of heredity.”91  Thus, it made sense to 
distinguish between two different types of genetics—formal genetics and cytogenetics, 
each with a purpose-specific conception of the gene.  Although the authors never used 
the phrase “classical genetics,” they drew these lines in the same place as Altenburg, who 
did use the term.  This is worth noting because of the way in which these lines 
subsequently shifted in later textbooks of the 1950s.  In this regard, it is also notable that 
Sinnott and Dunn had not drawn this distinction in the first three editions of Principles of 
Genetics (1925, 1932, and 1939), but introduced it only in 1950.  
The introduction of a distinction between the symbolic and material gene in 1950 
coincided with addition of the eminent population geneticist Dobzhansky to the 
authorship of Principles of Genetics.  At the time this fourth edition was published, the 
textbook had already achieved extensive international circulation and had been widely 
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praised by Anglo-American geneticists and famously criticized by Lysenko.92  
Dobzhansky’s contributions further contributed to its popularity in the United States.  A 
review in Science, for example, praised the new edition:  “Teachers of genetics will be 
gratified to find that they have here for the first time a textbook of genetics adequately 
representing the facts and principles of classical genetics as well as the more recent 
findings and problems of our own time.”93  This review by Ernst Caspari was one of the 
first to mention “classical genetics,” using it to refer to the essential teachings of genetics 
that grounded the student in the discipline—a form of presentation that was to become 
standard in the textbooks of the 1950s.  For example: in Srb and Owen’s General 
Genetics (1952)—which was described as a “leading” textbook in the 1950s, and later 
seen as the molecularly-oriented successor to “the definitive genetics textbook” of 
Sinnott, Dunn, and Dobzhansky—the structure was outlined in the preface: “The first 
sixteen chapters provide elementary coverage of the so-called ‘classical’ areas of 
genetics.  These areas are included in almost every general course in the subject.”94  Srb 
and Owen differentiated classical genetics from the study of “genetic effects,” in chapters 
17-19, and “population genetics,” in chapters 20-21.  Similar divisions and language 
were employed by E. J. Gardner, in his widely used textbook series Principles of 
Genetics.  In the third edition (1968), the preface explained: “The material has been 
organized into three parts: I, Basic Genetics; II, Nature and Function of Genetic Material; 
and III, Population Genetics and Evolution.”95  Merrell similarly divided his An 
Introduction to Genetics (1975) into three main sections, “on classical genetics, the 
nature of the gene, and the genetics of populations,” noting that they “constitute, more or 
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less, the usual subject matter for a beginning course in genetics.”96  It was not just 
general genetics textbooks, however, but also more specialized works that were seen as 
requiring a foundation in classical genetics.  James Watson, for example, opened The 
Molecular Biology of the Gene with a chapter on “The Mendelian Worldview,” in order 
to “help the reader see how our ideas about molecular genetics have developed out of the 
work of the classical geneticists.”97  Authors’ treatments of “classical genetics” were also 
regularly discussed in book reviews and mentioned on textbook dust jackets. 98 
The authors of the standard general genetics textbooks of the 1960s—like 
Altenburg (1945) and Sinnott, Dunn, and Dobzhansky (1950)—used the gene as a point 
of reference in defining “classical genetics.”99  There was, however, a significant shift in 
the content and textual location of these claims.  In the earlier uses, “classical genetics” 
referred to theories and knowledge developed from the statistical analysis of phenotypes, 
as opposed to those developed through cytogenetics.  In one respect, this distinction was 
similar to that in Goldschmidt’s work: it was used to identify different ways in which a 
single problem, the problem of transmission, was approached and conceptualized.  By 
the late 1950s, however, this had changed.  Geneticists did not differentiate between a 
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symbolic and physical gene, nor between the gene of Mendel and that of Morgan.100  
When considered alongside the molecular picture of the gene, the differences between 
the two seemed insignificant.  And thus, they came to be defined as one—as an 
independent and indivisible unit of hereditary structure, function, recombination, and 
mutation.  The symbolic gene of Mendelian breeding experiments was reconceived as a 
physical unit, and the physical gene of cytogenetics came to be seen as “classical.”  
This unification of symbolic and physical genes, and corresponding redefinition 
of the classical era, came with a shift in the location of textbooks’ discussions of the 
nature of classical genetics.  In the late 1950s, the idea of classical genetics was no longer 
introduced in between chapters on Mendelian and cytogenetic studies of heredity.  It was, 
rather, shifted to the transition between chapters on cytogenetic and physiological 
studies.  In its new location, it projected unity onto the chapters on Mendelism, Sex-
Linkage, Linkage, Crossing Over, Genome Structure, and Mutation.  “Classical genetics” 
functioned as an idea of the past against which to define the modern.  In Genetics: The 
Modern Science of Heredity (Dodson, 1956), for example, the chapter on “The 
Physiology of the Gene” opened with a discussion that differentiated its subject matter 
from that of the first sixteen chapters:  “The preceding chapters,” which explained the 
theories and investigative methods of transmission genetics, “dealt principally with 
numerical relationships between various phenotypes and the genotypes upon which they 
are based.”  The student learned that physiological genetics, on the other hand, focused 
on the “causal sequences” between the genotype and phenotype, “in which the gene is 
simply the primary causal factor.”  This was the aspect of heredity that the classical 
approach failed to address.  In describing this difference, Dodson drew explicitly on 
Goldschmidt:   
The earliest studies of heredity were directed entirely towards the 
problems of the mechanisms of transmission, the understanding of the 
genetic ratios, the “statics of genetics,” as Goldschmidt has put it.  The 
problems of dynamic genetics, or how genic effects are obtained, was 
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[sic.] seldom touched upon.  As a result heredity was commonly regarded 
as more or less magical in its operation.101   
 
On this account, the distinction between physiological and classical genetics had to do 
with differences in their investigative strategies and the types of phenomena they 
studied—conceptual differences that were presented in terms of historical progress from 
the early to the modern study of heredity.  It was thus in chronological as well as 
methodological and conceptual terms that the chapters on physiological genetics were 
differentiated from those on classical genetics.  The textual placement of Dodson’s 
discussion of the nature of the gene and classical genetics—at the start of a series of 
chapters on the genic control of metabolism and development—was a common way of 
differentiating between sections of the textbook.   
Statements about the nature of the gene and classical genetics were also located at 
the opening of chapters on physiological genetics in the 1958 edition of Principles of 
Genetics—which, notably, removed the previous edition’s discussion of the symbolic 
and physical gene.  In this fifth edition, classical and physiological genetics were 
described as approaches that focused on different aspects of the hereditary process and 
produced different types of knowledge: attempts to study the classical principles of 
genetics analyzed “effects,” whereas physiological studies uncovered “causal relations.”  
According to Sinnott, Dunn, and Dobzhansky, the former supported inferences, which 
were known as the laws of transmission.  And the latter led to two different types of 
knowledge, corresponding to the two processes studied in physiological genetics: the 
genic control of development and the genic control of metabolism, both of which “are 
concerned with ontogeny, but deal with it at different levels.”102  They explained that the 
study of development began with differences in phenotypic characters and worked 
backward through developmental stages towards differences in genes, whereas the study 
of metabolism began with the nucleus and tried to identify the reactions by which 
compounds were synthesized.  It is notable that the chapters explaining these aspects of 
genetics were framed by discussions of the nature of the gene and references to classical 
genetics.  At the beginning of the chapter on developmental genetics, for example, they 
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identified the assumptions about the gene that provided the foundation for classical 
genetics and asked: “are new assumptions about genes and their effects needed to explain 
the genic control of development processes?”103  In answering this question, they 
characterized the distinction between “classical” and “developmental” genetics as being 
one of setting:  classical genetics was based on the analysis of phenotypic differences that 
were traceable to genetic differences between individuals of the same familial lineage; 
developmental genetics was based on the analysis of metabolic differences that were 
traceable to the “same set of genes” in “members of the same cell lineage.”  One of the 
purposes of studying development, according to Sinnott, Dunn, and Dobzhansky, was “to 
discover new ideas about genes and their functions in a setting different from that in 
which the problems of classical or formal genetics are studied.”104   
In the 1960s, the standard textbooks continued to define classical genetics in 
terms of the gene, but the textual location of these discussion was once again 
significantly restructured:  they still followed the chapters on the “principles,” but instead 
of being located in the introduction to chapters on physiology, they were part of an 
independent section of the textbook on the gene.105  In John Moore’s Heredity and 
Development, for example, a series of chapters on “Mendelism,” “Chromosomal 
Inheritance,” and “Morgan and Drosophila” were followed by a chapter entitled 
“Genetics—Old and New,” which opened with a discussion of what had been 
accomplished by the 1930s.  According to Moore, “What had been worked out were the 
rules governing the transmission of the genes,” which he explained by listing the 
“generally established concepts of classical genetics.”106  These rules of transmission 
were characterized as universal (e.g., “their universality was impressive”), but the 
textbook presented them as idealizations to which there were some exceptions.  In 
Moore’s words: “the generally established concepts of classical genetics appear in italics; 
                                                
103 Ibid., 339.   
104 Ibid.  
105 In addition to the textbooks that I discuss, see E. J. Gardner, Principles of Genetics, 1st ed. (New York: 
John Wiley & Sons, 1960), 257-299. 
106 Moore, Heredity and Development, 2nd ed., 140. 
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expansions or exceptions…are in roman type.”107  Thus, the chromosome theory of 
heredity was presented:  
3. Genes are situated on chromosomes.  There are few exceptions to this 
generalization.  A fraction, possibly very small, of inheritance is 
dependent upon non-chromosomal structures such as mitochondria, 
plastids, and some virus-like bodies.108  
 
Insofar as the concepts of classical genetics were presented as rules to which there were a 
few exceptions, they were presented as idealizations—and so were the phenomena that 
geneticists described with them: “From these simple propositions one can deduce most of 
the phenomena of classical genetics.”109  In the chapters that followed, Moore turned to 
discuss the questions geneticists asked “once the concepts of transmission genetics had 
been established”—“What is the gene? How does it act?”  In these chapters that 
discussed the “new” study of genetics, the classical was further defined, as it became the 
foundation for knowledge of modern genetics.  This “historical” presentation adopted by 
Moore was common in this period and was seen as the logical way of teaching genetics.  
David Merrell, for example, explained in the preface to his 1975 An Introduction to 
Genetics: “Rather than beginning by describing our current knowledge of molecular 
genetics, we present genetic concepts and discoveries for the most part in historical 
sequences…Only after one understands these laws can one logically proceed to analyses 
at the cellular and molecular levels of hereditary organization.”110  
The 1960s expansion of chapters on the gene and corresponding historicization of 
the classical era can also be seen in the widely used second edition of General Genetics 
(Srb, Owen, and Edgar, 1965).  In this edition, it was at the opening of a pair of chapters 
on gene action—after a series of chapters on the general principles of genetics, and 
before the chapters on development and population genetics—that they first discussed 
classical genetics, in a section on “The Classical Gene.”  As the authors explained in the 
introduction to the chapter, they took the classical gene to be that used in Morgan’s work 
on Drosophila:  “In this chapter we will describe the ‘classical’ gene, as conceived, for 
                                                
107 Ibid.  
108 Ibid., 141 (emphasis original). 
109 Ibid., 142.  The idea of “classical genetics” as ideal genetics was furthered in authors’ references to 
Mendelian ratios as “classical ratios.”  See,  e.g., Chapter 6, “Modification of Classic Genetic Ratios,” in R. 
C. King, Genetics, 1st ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1962). 
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example, by T. H. Morgan, and then show how the classical conception has been 
revised.”111  According to the authors, the “classical conception of the gene assumed it to 
be a unitary particle” in three different ways: a unit of physiological function, mutation, 
and chromosome structure—each of which corresponded to a way in which the gene had 
been observed.112  Here, they defined the classical gene in terms that corresponded neatly 
with Benzer’s cistrons, recons, and mutons, and with the philosophy of operationalism 
that prominent geneticists were advocating in the 1950s-1960s.  L. J. Stadler, for 
example, had famously argued that geneticists needed to adopt the “operationalist 
viewpoint that has become commonplace in modern physics.”113  Bentley Glass agreed in 
an article on the gene: “In these days of the operational definition, we should quite 
properly not be speaking of ‘genes’ at all, but of…‘mutons,’ ‘recons,’ and ‘cistrons’.”114  
On the operationalist account, classical geneticists had used three distinct criteria for the 
gene, but had mistakenly thought that they referred to a single unit of the chromosome: 
“For a long time geneticists tacitly assumed that the units of mutation, recombination and 
function corresponded to the same physical entity, the classical ‘gene’.”115  Modern 
geneticists, then, had to merely break the classical gene along divisions that already 
existed within it.  In this picture, classical genetics was reducible to modern genetics; the 
classical gene, if it existed, was merely a special case in which the recon, muton, and 
cistron happened to coincide.  Authors who adopted this view, such as Srb, Owen, and 
Edgar, were thus able to conclude: “The picture of the gene derived from formal genetic 
analyses agrees well with modern ideas and facts concerning the chemical nature of the 
gene and its mode of action.”116 
When Srb and Owen first published their textbook in 1952, several reviews 
suggested that it focused on the modern at the cost of the classical.  Journal of Heredity, 
for example, reported: “In their enthusiasm to include the latest developments, the 
historical foundation of the subject has been neglected.  In fact, the student may be left 
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114 B. Glass, "In Pursuit of a Gene," Science 126 (1957): 683.  See also, e.g., A. W. Ravin, "Experimental 
Approaches to the Study of Bacterial Phylogeny," The American Naturalist 97 (1963): 309. 
115 Ravin, "Experimental Approaches to the Study of Bacterial Phylogeny," 309. 
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with the impression that all of the important discoveries in genetics were made within the 
past decade.”117  Ernst Caspari agreed in his review for Science: “The heaviest stress of 
the book is on physiological genetics.  This does not mean that the number of chapters 
dealing with this subject has been increased above that found in other textbooks.  It 
means rather that a physiological point of view prevails throughout the book.”118  
Although Caspari praised their treatment of this material, he suggested that this emphasis 
“led to the result that relatively little space is devoted to purely formal genetics,” which 
he thought made it “doubtful whether the book will gain wide acceptance in the teaching 
of elementary genetics.”119  By the late 1960s, however, the second edition of General 
Genetics had become one of the most widely used general genetics textbooks, along with 
Gardner’s Principles of Genetics, and Monroe Strickberger’s Genetics.120  The textual 
structure and treatment of “classical genetics” in General Genetics was even replicated in 
popular textbooks of the 1970s and 1980s, such as Suzuki, Griffiths, and Lewontin’s An 
Introduction to Genetic Analysis.121   
The three standard textbooks of the 1960s—Srb, Owen, and Dodson’s General 
Genetics, Gardner’s Principles of Genetics, and Strickberger’s Genetics—made a notable 
break with their predecessors: they all devoted an independent section to the 
physiology/biochemistry of the gene, rather than treating it as an aspect of a chapter on 
development.  The index reference for “biochemical genetics” in Gardner’s 1972 edition, 
for example, did not identify a chapter on developmental genetics, as it had in Snyder’s 
1957 Principles of Heredity, but rather pointed to a chapter on the nature of the genetic 
material.  In the “modern” textbooks of Gardner, Strickberger, and Srb, Owen, and 
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Dodson, the nature of the gene was distinguished from the function of the gene.122  And 
the study of gene action was presented as distinct from the study of development.123   
The addition of a fourth section on the gene is apparent in the language of 
Strickberger’s preface.  For although Strickberger maintained the traditional division of 
genetics into three levels of heredity, “from the molecules of cells, through 
developmental stages of individuals, to populations of organisms,” he identified four 
“areas of study,” or fields of questions: “1. What and where is the genetic material?  2. 
How is it formed, transmitted, and changed?  3. How is it organized and how does it 
function?  4.  What happens to it among groups of organisms as time passes?”124  
Students reading the textbook would not just learn about the genetics of transmission, 
development, and populations; they would also study the gene.  And although most 
textbooks of the 1970s continued to devote just one chapter to developmental genetics 
and one to population genetics, the growth of research in molecular genetics resulted in a 
significant expansion in the number of chapters devoted to the nature of the gene and 
gene action.125  
Between 1950 and 1970, the growth of research on microorganisms provided the 
foundation for a new way of conceptualizing “classical genetics.”  Instead of mapping 
classical genetics onto the previously established category of transmission genetics, 
textbook authors defined it in terms of its difference from molecular genetics.  The 
pioneers in the field of microorganism research—Beadle, Gray, and Tatum—had framed 
their work in terms of its relation to “classical genetics” as early as the 1940s.126  But this 
language did not gain greater currency until the 1950s-1960s, when it became common 
for authors of journal articles on microorganism research to refer to the techniques and 
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principles of “classical genetics” when describing new methods and discoveries.127  As 
these new lines of research developed, genetics came to be seen as a science with two 
branches.  These two branches were presented as having different scopes and aims, and 
consequently, as having different paradigmatic organisms.  For example, in the context 
of molecular experiments on microorganisms, the historicity of the use of Drosophila 
became apparent.  This research organism, which had been the preferred subject and tool 
of geneticists for decades, became a marker of a past era, which Schultz noted in 1967: 
“‘Classical’ genetics has come to be identified with the work on Drosophila, which 
proved the chromosome theory of heredity and gave us the theory of the gene.”128  The 
identification of eras with organisms was also articulated in genetics textbook reviews, 
which regularly divided the subject into classical and molecular branches.129  A review of 
King’s textbook, for example, stated: “This book and, of course, its author, are 
admittedly Drosophila-oriented.  Yet it must not be assumed, as it so often is, that this 
book adopts a ‘classical’ approach to its subject matter, or that its treatment of 
‘molecular’ genetics is bound to be skimpy and inadequate.”130  Even Dunn’s A Short 
History of Genetics promoted the conceptual association between types of genetics and 
types of organisms, defining classical genetics as the study of multi-cellular organisms 
and molecular genetics as the study of single-cell organisms.131  Thus, research on 
microorganisms not only provided the subject matter for new textbook chapters on gene 
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structure and action in the 1950s—the chapters that were subsequently known as the 
section on “molecular genetics”—but also provided the ideas with which the classical era 
was reconceptualized, in both the academic literature of genetics and in its 
historiography.  
 
 
A Historiographical Category:  The Writing of Disciplinary History 
 
The gene provided a point of reference for definitions of “classical genetics” in 
textbooks, and in histories of genetics, the first of which was written in 1965—a year in 
which geneticists were celebrating the centenary year of the publication of Mendel’s 
classical paper, and in which Watson published what would later become a “classic” 
textbook of molecular genetics.  In A Short History of Genetics, Dunn told the history of 
genetics from the perspective of 1939: “We may say that in the preceding period back to 
about 1900, genetics as we know it today took a form sufficiently unified to constitute a 
distinctive entity within biology.  I shall call this the period of ‘classical genetics’.”132  
While Dunn acknowledged that these beginning and end dates were somewhat 
arbitrary—that classical genetics was, to an extent, a historiographical artifact—he 
argued that research in this period was unified by “a few relatively simple ideas,” such as 
“the theory of the gene and its extension to the physical basis of heredity and to the 
causes of evolutionary changes in populations.”133  In Dunn’s historiography, the 
definition of classical genetics in terms of the theory of the gene is significant, because it 
allowed for a reconceptualization of the relationships between classical, developmental, 
and population genetics.  Although he occasionally equated “classical genetics” with 
“transmission genetics,”134 as geneticists often did, he generally characterized classical 
and molecular genetics as different ways of framing the same set of problems.  Thus he 
did not differentiate classical genetics from studies of development and evolution, but 
rather from the “new” studies of molecular genetics.  In classical genetics, “problems 
were stated in terms of historical events in organisms—reproduction, heredity, 
                                                
132 Dunn, A Short History of Genetics, xix-xx.  On pages xv-xvi, Dunn noted that he was guided by Alfred 
Barthelmess’s Vererbungswissenschaft (1952) and Hans Stubbe’s Kurze Geschichte der Genetik (1963), 
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133 Ibid., vii. 
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development, evolution,” as opposed to the new genetics, in which they were “stated and 
studied in molecular terms.”  The two types of genetics were presented as asking 
questions at different “levels.”135  On this account, which was repeated by others, 
classical and molecular genetics were parallel approaches to the same set of problems.136   
The concluding chapter of Dunn’s history, “Old and New in Genetics,” further 
developed his picture of the classical era with a discussion of molecular genetics, which 
Dunn dated to the 1940s: “When Avery, MacLeod, and McCarty proved (1944) that the 
material identified was deoxyribonucleic acid…a new kind of genetics began.  It was 
proper to call this ‘molecular genetics’ since questions about continuity and change could 
now be asked in molecular terms.”137  Posing questions such as, “Will the new 
knowledge cause a radical change in our perception of the problems of genetics as these 
had taken form in the ‘classical’ period?”, Dunn suggested: “It will help, in answering 
these questions, if we keep in mind what have been the chief directions of research in 
classical genetics,” which he identified as “formal genetics (or transmission genetics), 
population genetics, and physiological or developmental genetics.”  He suggested that 
these three branches were unified in that they all sought “to understand a single entity, 
the succession of living organisms in reproduction, heredity, evolution, and individual 
development.”  And, according to Dunn, “the chief focus through which these problems 
came to be viewed was the concept of the gene.”138  Thus, Dunn’s historiography can be 
seen as inadvertently answering his opening question: molecular genetics did in fact 
change the ways in which classical genetics was seen.  From the perspective of the 
modern, previously disparate fields of study were seen as unified by their non-molecular, 
“classical,” conception of the gene.  
The publication of Dunn’s history coincided with the publication of Arnold 
Ravin’s The Evolution of Genetics and Alfred Sturtevant’s A History of Genetics, which 
were immediately followed by Elof Carlson’s The Gene: A Critical History and Curt 
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Stern and Eva Sherwood’s The Origins of Genetics: A Mendel Source Book.139  
Sturtevant’s and Dunn’s histories became sources for the “preface histories” in genetics 
textbooks, and Stern and Sherwood’s text was suggested as a supplement for textbook 
teaching.140  Commenting on this “upsurge” in history-writing, Jack Schultz, who had 
worked with Sturtevant in Morgan’s lab and praised him as “one of the founders of 
classical genetics,” suggested: “It is due partly, perhaps, to the circumstance of a 
succession of centennial celebrations, for Darwin and Mendel…to the rise of molecular 
genetics…and perhaps most important, to the approaching twilight of a generation whose 
accomplishments are embodied in this history.”141  Remarkably, these histories of the 
1960s, as well as many of the accounts that were subsequently included in textbooks and 
journals, placed the end of the classical era in the late 1930s—the time at which, I have 
shown, “classical genetics” was first used as a name for a type of genetics. 142   
Geneticists’ sense of the history of classical genetics, and their historiographical 
presentation of its basic character, was informed by their conceptions of “classical 
physics.”  Parallels had long been drawn between the studies of heredity, physics, and 
chemistry—between factors/genes, atoms, and molecules—in both textbooks and journal 
articles.  In the 1953 Textbook of Genetics, for example: “Genetics deals with facts as 
fundamental to the biological sciences as the atomic theory to the chemical 
sciences…The gene and the chromosome theory of heredity is equivalent to the atomic 
and molecular theory of the constitution of matter.”143  These parallels continued to be 
drawn in the historiography of the discipline, as the transition from classical to molecular 
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genetics was presented as mirroring the transition from classical to modern physics.  This 
idea had been articulated as early as 1939, when Goldschmidt stated: “It is my opinion 
that the classic theory of the gene corresponds to the conception of the indivisible atom 
of old physics…Genetics has outgrown this.”  Describing genetics as being “in a 
condition parallel to that of physics immediately before Rutherford,” he proclaimed that 
geneticists “shall soon be ready for our Planck and Bohr.”144  In the era of molecular 
genetics, the history of the classical science continued to be articulated in these terms.  A 
review of Pontecorvo’s Trends in Genetics Analysis (1959), for example, stated:   
When the physicist increased the resolving power of his tools and entered 
the atomic nucleus, a whole new world of parts confronted and confused 
him: so it was with the geneticist upon his entry within the classical 
gene…This unanticipated complex fine structure has rendered the word 
gene all but useless and a legion of new terms and old terms in new garb 
have rushed in to fill the void.145   
 
Here, the reviewer not only mapped the history of genetics onto that of physics, but did 
so by referring to the emergence of the new terminology of “mutons,” “recons,” and 
“cistrons.”  As noted earlier, the shift towards this operationalist language in genetics 
was itself modelled on physics. Thus, operationalism in physics influenced the way 
geneticists formulated their research, as well as how they described their history.  And it 
was not long before this historiographical modeling of genetics on physics impacted the 
teaching of genetics, through its incorporation into textbooks.  In the discussion of the 
classical era in Heredity and Development (1972), for example:  
Classical genetics was essentially complete in 1930.  It was in a state 
similar to that of physics in 1899, when A. A. Michelson said, “The more 
important fundamental laws and facts of physical science have all been 
discovered, and these are now so firmly established that the possibility of 
their ever being supplanted in consequence of new discoveries is 
exceedingly remote […].”  For both sciences the period of intellectual 
calm was brief. 146 
 
In describing the discoveries that brought closure to the classical periods of genetics and 
physics, Moore wrote: “Physics was soon revolutionized by studies of the nucleus of 
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physical matter; genetics was revolutionized by studies of the nucleus of living 
matter.”147  On Moore’s account, it was in the mid 1940s—when the chemical 
composition of genes was discovered, providing the basis for studies of gene action—
that the new era of genetics had begun. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
The preface of Gardner’s 1960 Principles of Genetics opened with a statement about the 
textbook’s aim: “This book is written primarily for the college student taking his first 
course in genetics.  It emphasizes basic principles and tells the story of the classical 
experiments which have laid the foundation for a modern science.”148  At several points 
in the textbook, Gardner emphasized that almost all of the principles and mechanisms 
discussed were supported by many more examples than the classical ones he 
identified.149  Throughout the first 13 chapters of the textbook, hereditary mechanisms, 
principles, and anomalies were all explained by reference to a “classical example,” 
“classical experiment,” or “classical study.”  The chapter on incomplete dominance, for 
example, detailed the “early classical study” conducted by Bateson and Punnett that 
“demonstrated gene interaction…from the results of crosses between two varieties of 
sweet peas.”150  And the chapter on modified ratios discussed the “classical experiment 
which resulted in the 15:1 ratio,” which was “reported by George H. Shull from studies 
on the plant called shepherd’s purse.”151  Quantitative inheritance was illustrated by 
Emerson and East’s work on maize, aneuploidy by nondisjunction in Bridges’ 
Drosophila, and multiple alleles by Castle’s albino rabbits.152  These were the classic 
cases of classical genetics—the scientific exemplars that defined the principles and the 
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discipline, and were widely agreed upon and identified as “classical” in textbooks, 
journals, and histories of genetics.153   
Many of the classical examples identified by Gardner had first gained their status 
as “classical” in the 1910s-1920s, when “classical” was not a description of an aspect of 
heredity, but rather a description that identified the historical place of the example in 
scientific practice.  In its very earliest uses, “classical” did little more than identify the 
historicity of an example, situating it within an established tradition.  But, as I have 
shown in the first section of this chapter, its significance was soon after transformed, as 
“classical” came to be used to identify experimental cases that were seen as being 
representative of types of heredity.  Defining diverse groups of cases in common terms, 
geneticists established key categories of family resemblance.   
Although geneticists in the early 1930s were seemingly unaware of the “political” 
character of calling something a classic, this aspect of the language was identified by the 
end of the decade, as the more explicitly disciplinary language of “classical genetics” 
emerged.  In the writings of Lysenko, the classics of Weismannian-Mendelian-
Morganian genetics were identified as sources of scientific authority that misguided the 
science of heredity; the Western tradition of genetics was described as a cultural tradition 
rooted in idealism.  This political critique of “classical genetics” as an ideology was 
categorically rejected by most Anglo-American genetics.  But a concurrent attack on its 
philosophy, articulated by Richard Goldschmidt, had greater traction.  Goldschmidt’s 
attack, like Lysenko’s, was from the vantage point of physiological and evolutionary 
theory, characterizing “classical genetics” as a static and atomistic science that obscured 
the dynamic character of heredity and life.  Although Goldschmidt was a harsh critic of 
Lysenko, there are a few similarities in their discussions of classical genetics.154  Both 
defined classical genetics as a formalistic and static orientation toward hereditary 
phenomena that was essentially flawed; and neither used the term more than a few times.  
These similarities are worth noting because of the way in which classical genetics was 
                                                
153 E.g., Dunn, A Short History of Genetics, 101, also identified Cuénot’s yellow mice as a classical case.  
Sturtevant, A History of Genetics, 60, also identified East and Emerson's work on maize as “a classic.”  
And Dodson used many of the same examples as Gardner, including: Mendel’s peas for Mendel’s laws, 
white-eyes in Drosophila for sex-linkage, the creeper trait in foul for lethality, and vestigial wings in 
Drosophila for multiple alleles: Dodson, Genetics, 8-14, 65-67, 85, 88-89. 
154 E.g., Goldschmidt, "Research and Politics," 223. 
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subsequently defended and incorporated into the language of the self-described “classical 
geneticists.”   
In the 1940s-1950s, “classical genetics” was not only a criticism, but also a 
defense of a dominant tradition in the Anglo-American study of heredity.  The defense 
did not advance a radically different picture of the nature of classical genetics, but rather 
a different evaluation of how to treat this body of knowledge.  Both its critics and its 
defenders saw classical genetics as an idealized picture of heredity—a mathematical 
model that almost never mapped perfectly onto the biological reality of heredity.  But 
while those advocating a dialectical ideology and dynamic philosophy of biology took 
this idealistic simplification as grounds on which to reject classical genetics, its defenders 
took this as reason to use it as a foundation on which to build a more complex model.  It 
was in the latter terms that “classical genetics” was subsequently incorporated into 
textbooks, obscuring the radical agenda that had motivated its initial deployments—the 
political foundation on which future conceptions of the discipline’s past era were built.   
In the textbooks of the 1950s, classical genetics was defined through its 
differentiation from developmental and evolutionary genetics.  The difference between 
them was not, however, characterized as the manifestation of essentially different 
underlying philosophies of genetics, as they had been in Goldschmidt’s work.  They 
were, rather, presented as the product of different experimental contexts, differing only in 
scope: developmental genetics focused on the gene, classical genetics on the individual, 
and evolutionary genetics on the population.  They differed because they looked at 
different aspects of heredity, not because they were different ways of looking; it was 
differences in the hereditary phenomena that were responsible for the differences in 
approach.  Genetics had long been divided into branches dealing with three different 
problems.  In a 1938 review of Goldschmidt’s Physiological Genetics, for example, 
Coulter had stated: “the three great problems with which geneticists have concerned 
themselves” are “the problem of the machinery of heredity,” “the problem of 
development,” and “the problem of evolution.”155  When geneticists used “classical 
genetics” synonymously with “the study of hereditary mechanics”—or, “transmission” or 
                                                
155 M. C. Coulter, Review of Physiological Genetics, by R. Goldschmidt, Ecology 19 (1938). 
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“Mendelian” genetics—they did not establish a new disciplinary category.  But through 
this usage, “classical genetics” came to be seen as the study of a type of problem; and as 
an aspect of the structure of genetics textbooks, it was not only a body of science, but 
also a type of heredity.  Thus, “classical” was no longer primarily about historicity.   
Although textbooks of the 1950s departed radically from Goldschmidt’s 
conception of classical genetics, their presentation was similar in one respect: the theory 
of the gene provided a point of reference with which to differentiate classical from 
physiological genetics.  These discussions of the gene originally served as a transition 
from the classical to the physiological chapters, but expanded into entire sections of the 
textbook in the 1960s-1970s, as the biochemical study of gene action and structure came 
to be seen as an independent branch of the science.  With this shift, classical genetics 
came to be defined by its differentiation from molecular genetics, rather than 
physiological and population genetics.  And in the concurrent emergence of the 
historiography of genetics in the mid 1960s, it was this account that was given.  Classical 
genetics was not defined by a type of problem or type of heredity, but rather by the level 
at which it investigated heredity.  The study of transmission, development, and evolution 
could be approached from the perspective of either classical or molecular genetics; 
classical genetics looked at organisms, molecular genetics looked at genes.  And it is a 
variation of this picture that exists in the textbooks, monographs, and journal articles of 
today, which often define “classical genetics” as “reverse genetics,” and “molecular 
genetics” as “forward genetics.”156 
In this chapter, I have traced the conception and development of the language of 
the classical in genetics, showing that “classical genetics” cannot be properly understood 
as a mere idealization projected anachronistically from the modern onto the past.  This 
epochal idea was read back onto a period in which geneticists meant something very 
                                                
156 E.g., W. Brune, M. Messerle, and U. H. Koszinowski, "Forward with BACs," Trends in Genetics 16 
(2000): 256-257; F. C. Kafatos, "A Revolutionary Landscape: The Restructuring of Biology and Its 
Convergence with Medicine," Journal of Molecular Biology 319 (2002): 862; P. Mormede and B. C. Jones, 
Neurobehavioral Genetics (New York: CRC Press, 1999), 70, 375; F. Vogel and A. G. Motulsky, Human 
Genetics, 3rd ed. (New York: Springer, 1997), 196; and A. J. M. Walhout and M. Vidal, "Protein 
Interaction Maps for Model Organisms," Nature Reviews: Molecular Cell Biology 2 (2002): 56-57.  
References to “classical” approaches, studies, and analyses are common in contemporary textbooks.  See, 
e.g., Snustad and Simmons, Principles of Genetics, 10, 11, 12, 54, 101, 144, 205, 230, 234, 362, 371, 411, 
475, 509, 520, 549, 550, 551, 608, 668, 726, 792. 
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different when describing their work as “classical,” but the “classical” examples of the 
1920s and the “classical genetics” of the 1970s were nevertheless substantively 
connected.  Genealogically, I have shown that it was through reappropriations of the idea 
of classical cases that classical genetics was created.  And with respect to function, I have 
shown that the varied uses of “classical” were alike in one way: as a description of an 
exemplary case, a type of science, and a branch of genetics, “classical” was a powerful 
concept in the political language of genetics.  At first used to define and establish sources 
of scientific authority, it was subsequently developed in arguments about the 
philosophical and ideological character of science, and eventually served to establish the 
disciplinary identity and boundaries of genetics.  These genealogical and functional 
similarities have not, however, been the sole focus of this chapter.   
Tracing the development of “classical” in the language of geneticists, I have also 
identified significant differences between its particular and context-specific deployments.  
And it is perhaps this differentiation that is most interesting and important.  For when we 
explore the different senses in which the classical functions, we recognize the myriad 
ways in which history makes claims on us; and when we stop using the term 
honorifically, we open up rich historiographical ground.  Although references to the 
classical make use of the authority of the past and function as statements about history, 
the power of the classical relies on the effacement of its historicity and the conditions in 
which it has been created and deployed.  It is through this tension that the classical gains 
traction on the present.  And it is by analyzing the effacement of its historicity that we 
understand what we inherit with our senses of the past. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
The Forms and Functions of History-Writing 
 
 
 
Critical acumen is exerted in vain to uncover the past; the past cannot be presented; we 
cannot know what we are not.  But one veil hangs over past, present, and future, and it is 
the province of the historian to find out, not what was, but what is.  Where a battle has 
been fought, you will find nothing but the bones of men and beasts; where a battle is 
being fought, there are hearts singing.  We will sit on a mound and muse, and not try to 
make these skeletons stand on their legs again. 
      
Henry David Thoreau, August 9, 1841.1 
 
 
It is often suggested that the use of history in science textbooks gives life to dry facts, 
theories, and equations, showing the human side of scientific practice and the excitement 
of discovery.  This view is articulated by scientists commenting on the didactic use of 
history-writing in textbooks, as well as by those advocating it.  In a report on how to 
improve the teaching of science, for example, a committee of the British Association for 
the Advancement of Science  (BAAS) concluded:   
It is desirable…to introduce into the teaching some account of the main 
achievements of science and of the methods by which they have been 
attained…There should be more of the spirit, and less of the valley of dry 
bones, if science is to be of living interest…Everyone should be given the 
opportunity of knowing something of the lives and work of such men as 
Galileo and Newton…Darwin and Mendel, and many other pioneers of 
science.  One way of doing this is by lessons in the history of science.2 
 
In this passage, the authors’ use of the phrase “the valley of dry bones” is an allusion to a 
valley described in The Book of Ezekiel:   
The hand of the Lord…set me down in the midst of the valley; and it was 
full of bones; and he caused me to pass by them round about; and behold, 
                                                
1 H. D. Thoreau, The Journal of Henry D. Thoreau, ed. B. Torrey and F. H. Allen, vol. 1 (New York: 
Dover, 1962), 85 (emphasis original). 
2 "Report of the Committee on Science in Secondary Schools," in Report of the British Association for the 
Advancement of Science, 1917 (London: John Murray, 1918), 140. 
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there were very many in the open valley; and lo, they were very dry.  And 
he said unto me, Son of man can these bones live?3  
 
Alluding to this question and answering it, the authors of the BAAS report suggested the 
valley of dry bones of science could be brought to life, and that it was history-writing that 
could do so.  
The view that history-writing in textbooks gives life to a science by breathing life 
into its past is one that I have challenged in this dissertation.  I have shown that the dry 
bones of science in textbooks are not like those in the valley of Ezekiel, but rather like 
those in what I take to be Thoreau’s redescription of it.   Whereas the breath of God will 
give bodies and life to the bones in the valley and transform them into “an exceeding 
great army,” the skeletons of soldiers on Thoreau’s battlefield will not “stand on their 
legs again.”  According to Thoreau, the historian does not breath life into the past—“the 
past cannot be presented.”  In representing the past, we recreate it, and thus do not 
uncover what we often imagine.  With historical reflection, we pull aside the one veil that 
hangs over our “past, present, and future,” and in doing so see ourselves.  For although 
“we cannot know what we are not,” we can study who we are, and therein lies the 
“province of the historian.” 
If we read Thoreau’s radical historiographical claims as descriptive, rather than 
evaluative—as statements about what history-writing does, rather than about what it can 
do—they identify a key feature of the types of history-writing that I have explored.  In 
this dissertation, I have shown that formulations of the historical in genetics textbooks 
were not about the past.  Histories of the study of heredity written by Bateson, Castle, 
and Thomson defined the nature of a science that had not yet cohered.  Virtual historical 
environments were means of socializing students into the scientific culture of their time.  
The use of history as a logic of organization provided a stable structure in which the 
conceptual order of the science could be defined and recreated.  Claims about “classical” 
genetics were used in establishing and challenging sources of scientific authority, playing 
a formative role in the development of the disciplinary identity of genetics.  These types 
                                                
3 The Book of Ezekiel 37: 1-3, in The Holy Bible Containing the Old and New Testaments Translated out of 
the Original Tongues (Oxford: University Press, 1885).  NB:  I have chose this version, later known as the 
“English Revised Version,” because it was the standard version in circulation when the BAAS report was 
written. 
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of history-writing did not primarily provide accounts of what had been, but rather were 
arguments and tools used to shape what genetics was and would be.    
In identifying and exploring these uses of history, I have suggested that history-
writing played an important role in the formation and disciplinary development of 
genetics.  This was the case, at the very least, because of the ways in which history-
writing was connected to the pedagogy and reproduction of genetics: insofar as textbooks 
were central to the teaching of genetics, history-writing was central to the development 
of geneticists.  But, as Fleck has suggested, it is not only the textbook’s functions at the 
beginning of the life of a scientist that make it important.  As one of the few places in 
which the heterogeneous aspects of a field are brought together and presented as a 
discipline, textbooks are also a key form of scientific literature.  Thus, they should not be 
understood as repositories into which science is deposited, nor as artifacts that are only 
valuable because they allow us to trace the assimilation and acceptance of scientific 
advances.  To develop a complete picture of where science happens, we need a 
symmetrical analysis that treats textbooks as sites of production.  In this dissertation, I 
have begun to develop this line of analysis with respect to four types of history-writing.  
But, as is inevitable, there were many questions that I left unanswered; to conclude, I will 
briefly discuss some of these as potential areas for future research. 
The dissemination of ideas and facts from textbooks to scientific practice is in 
need of further study.  In my analysis of geneticists’ uses of the “historical approach,” I 
argued that a construction of history was central to the development and presentation of 
the conceptual order of genetics; but I did not explore if and how this conceptual order 
was subsequently incorporated into journal science.  While it would likely be difficult if 
not impossible to prove that a textbook was the origin of a particular constellation of 
evidence and theory, a comparative study of textbooks and journals could certainly 
suggest some such connections.   It would be valuable to know, for example, if and how 
the use of “Mendelian” in articles changed as the historical approach became standard in 
textbooks, and whether there was a reordering of facts and theories related to the 
chromosome theory in journal science during the second quarter of the twentieth century.   
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Focusing on the transfer of ideas from textbooks to journals would also help 
further an analysis of “classical genetics."  In my investigation of the development and 
use of this term, I was able to show that it was shaped by geneticists who worked to 
pioneer new branches of genetics, as well as by those who tried to incorporate these 
advances into the standard textbooks of the 1950s-1970s.  Given that this language with 
wide circulation in journal science was in part formed in textbooks, it would be worth 
looking at how the “classical genetics” of textbooks related to that of journal science in 
the late twentieth century.  The relationship between the “classical” of geneticists and 
that of physicists also deserves attention.  Considering that the historiographical use of 
“classical genetics” was informed by a sense of the historical development of physics, 
further study would not only clarify the nature and extent of this connection, but also the 
more general ways in which geneticists modelled their science on physics.      
In addition to looking at how history-writing in textbooks influenced journal 
science, it would be valuable to explore how these uses of history were shaped by 
broader culture.  This approach would be particularly useful in extending my analysis of 
virtual historical environments and textbook histories.  With respect to the use of virtual 
historical environments, one of the most interesting questions that I left unanswered 
concerns the cultural origins of this use of history-writing.  Although I found that this 
pedagogical development coincided with a broader trend of interest in historical and 
case-based approaches to teaching, I was unable to identify a casual relationship between 
the two.  As I discussed, there has been significant research—in departments of history, 
sociology, and education—on the uses of historical lessons and “discovery learning” in 
science education in secondary schools; and the use of case-studies in the teaching of 
science to non-scientists at Harvard has been the focus of several studies.  But I have 
been unable to find any historical research that identifies the pedagogical ideals that 
shaped the teaching of university science for scientists.  This line of research would be 
valuable, as it would contribute to a more complete picture of the communication circuit 
that informed and shaped the scientific functions of history-writing in textbooks.  
 Regarding explicit accounts of the history of genetics, there is much work to be 
done in comparing textbook histories with the sources on which they were based.  
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Whereas authors such as Thomson and Castle regularly discussed and quoted from 
primary sources, most authors of later textbooks rarely did.  Instead, they relied on 
secondary sources, and their accounts of history can thus be explored as reconstructions 
of historiography.  By studying what went into textbook histories, and what was 
excluded, it would be possible to see how history-writing was used to shape the science 
long after accounts of its history had become relatively standardized.  In this regard, it 
would be important to explore why most authors did not use and refer to a rich body of 
historical scholarship, as Thomson and Castle had.  It seems likely that this was in part 
because the history of the science had come to be thought of as a matter of common 
knowledge; if so, it would be worth looking at how this common sense account was 
formed.  In general, particular attention should be given to the textbooks written after 
Dunn, Sturtevant, Ravin, and Carlson published accounts of the history of genetics 
around 1965.4  These monographs allow for a valuable form of comparison between the 
textbook histories and the historical scholarship of geneticists.  Of special interest are the 
histories written by Dunn and Sturtevant—not only because these authors also wrote 
widely-circulated textbooks, but also, and more so, because their textbooks were 
paradigms of the competing historical and ahistorical approaches to teaching.  It is not, 
however, just the possibility of comparative analyses that makes the histories of Dunn, 
Sturtevant, Carlson, and Ravin interesting sources for further study.   Because these 
monographs were seen as a sign of the “twilight of a generation whose accomplishments 
are embodied in this history,” a study of their reception would enrich our understanding 
of geneticists’ attitudes about the place of history-writing in science.5   Lastly, in addition 
to looking at historical accounts written by geneticists, it would be worth looking at those 
written by historians.  Comparing geneticists’ textbook histories with historians’ 
revisionist histories would help clarify if and how textbook authors read and dealt with 
critical historical scholarship. 
                                                
4 L. C. Dunn, A Short History of Genetics: The Development of Some of the Main Lines of Thought, 1864-
1939 (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1965), A. W. Ravin, The Evolution of Genetics (New York: Academic 
Press, 1965), A. H. Sturtevant, A History of Genetics (New York: Harper & Row, 1965), E. A. Carlson, 
The Gene: A Critical History (Philadelphia: Saunders, 1966).  Note that drafts, notes, and correspondence 
regarding Sturtevant’s history are part of the A. H. Sturtevant Papers at California Institute of Technology.  
5 J. Schultz, "Innovators and Controversies," Review of The Gene: A Critical History, by E. A. Carlson, 
Science 157 (1967): 296. 
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In concluding, I should note that I hope my analysis will not only be valuable for 
historians of science, but also for those interested in the general nature and functions of 
history-writing.  As I have identified and explored the ways in which history was written 
in genetics textbooks, I have gradually pushed the boundaries of the concept of history-
writing, challenging common sense notions of what can be involved in, and what should 
be counted as, the writing of history.  I have shown that history-writing did not only take 
the form of writing-about-history in lessons about the past.  In addition, history was 
written-into textbooks as virtual historical environments used in the enculturation of 
students.  Authors were writing-historically when presenting the conceptual order of the 
science.  And they wrote-with-history when using the disciplinary category of the 
classical.  Thus, history-writing should be seen as a complex conjunction, and narrative 
history-writing as just one of many ways in which the past is put on paper.  In 
recharacterizing “history-writing,” I have also questioned what we often consider to be 
the nature of the “history” and of the “writing” of it.   I have argued the writing of history 
in textbooks did not only take place in historical introductions, nor was it merely the 
inscription of discursive text on paper.  Rather, it included the creation of the 
frontispiece, the diagrams and illustrations, the problem-solving exercises, the structure 
holding the chapters together, and the concept of the classical.  In addition to providing 
descriptions of the past, writing was used to map and order the world in which the 
geneticist stood.  For these reasons, we must reconceptualize the nature of the graphic 
component of history-writing—of where and what it is.  In addition, my analysis has 
shown that with each type of history-writing, “history” was constituted in a different 
manner.  In narratives about “the history” of genetics, the past was treated as a body of 
information.  With exemplars, past experiments were turned into mirrors of present 
scientific practice.  When authors used “the historical approach,” they turned history into 
an ideal.  And in the creation and development of the concept of the “classical,” a sense 
of the past became part of the disciplinary identity of genetics.  Thus, history like writing 
appeared in a myriad of ways.  In identifying some of their forms and functions, I hope to 
have provided a starting point for further historiographical research on the subtle yet 
powerful ways in which the historicity of our past can make claims upon us. 
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